Supreme Court, New York County, November 17, 2017

Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, [*2]New York City (Thomas J. Kavaler of counsel), and Moses & Singer LLP, New York City (Robert Lillienstein of counsel), for Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. and others, respondents.

Rottenberg Lipman Rich, P.C., New York City (Mark M. Rottenberg of counsel), for Joseph I. Sussman, P.C. and others, respondents.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Jane Azia, Mary Alestra and Mark Ladov of counsel), for petitioners.

Petitioner Schneiderman, New York Attorney General, sues pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (12) and General Business Law § 349 for respondents' fraud and illegal conduct in leasing credit card equipment. The lessors are respondents Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., Lease Finance Group LLC, MBF Leasing LLC, Lease Source-LSI, LLC, Golden Eagle Leasing LLC, and Pushpin Holdings LLC (Northern Leasing respondents). Respondents Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., Sussman, and Babad (attorney respondents) enforced these leases through litigation. Respondents Cohen and Hertzman are officers of the Northern Leasing respondents. Petitioner Attorney General also seeks dissolution of Northern Leasing, Inc., based on its fraud and illegal conduct. (Business Corporation Law § 1101 [a] [2].) Petitioner Judge Fisher seeks to vacate the default judgments respondents obtained. (CPLR 5015 [c].)

Respondents move to dismiss the petition based on documentary evidence, the applicable statutes of limitations, and the petition's failure to state a claim. (CPLR 3211 [a] [1], [5], [7].) At oral argument, respondents withdrew their motions insofar as they as sought disclosure.

When evaluating respondents' motion to dismiss the petition under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept petitioners' allegations as true, liberally construe them, and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. (JF Capital Advisors, LLC v Lightstone Group, LLC, 25 NY3d 759, 764 [2015]; Miglino v Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc., 20 NY3d 342, 351 [2013]; ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. v MBIA Inc., 17 NY3d 208, 227 [2011]; Matter of Drug Policy Alliance v New York City Tax Commn., 131 AD3d 815, 816 [1st Dept 2015].) Dismissal is warranted only if the petition fails to allege facts that fit within any cognizable legal theory. (ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. v MBIA Inc., 17 NY3d at 227; Lawrence v Graubard Miller, 11 NY3d 588, 595 [2008]; Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Mill Fin., LLC v Gillett, 122 AD3d 98, 103 [1st Dept 2014].)

To dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), the admissible documentary evidence must utterly refute or{**60 Misc 3d at 871} completely negate petitioners' allegations against respondents so as to eliminate all material disputes regarding those facts. (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002]; Mill Fin., LLC v Gillett, 122 AD3d at 103; Art & Fashion Group Corp. v Cyclops Prod., Inc., 120 AD3d 436, 438 [1st Dept 2014].) The documentary evidence must plainly and flatly contradict the petition's claims. (Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 91 [1999]; Xi Mei Jia v Intelli-Tec Sec. Servs., Inc., 114 AD3d 607, 608 [1st Dept 2014]; Cathy Daniels, Ltd. v Weingast, 91 AD3d 431, 433 [1st Dept 2012]; KSW Mech. Servs., Inc. v Willis of N.Y., Inc., 63 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2009]; see Lopez v Fenn, 90 AD3d 569, 572 [1st Dept 2011].)

Respondents contend that CPLR 214 (3) bars petitioners' claims for acts or omissions more than three years before the filing of the petition on April 11, 2016. A limitations period of six years, however, applies to petitioners' claims under Executive Law § 63 (12). (CPLR 213 [1]; State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83, 86-87 [1975]; People v Credit Suisse Sec. [USA] LLC, 145 AD3d 533, 535 [1st Dept 2016]; Matter of People v Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC, 137 AD3d 409, 418 [1st Dept 2016].) Petitioners' claim under Business Corporation Law § 1101 (a) (2), based on fraud and scienter, is similarly subject to a limitations period of six years. (CPLR 213 [1]; State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d at 88.) Only petitioners' claims under General Business Law § 349 are subject to a limitations period of three years. (CPLR 214 [2]; Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201, 209-210 [2001].)

"Deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state are hereby declared unlawful." (General Business Law § 349 [a].)

"Whenever the attorney general shall believe from evidence satisfactory to him that any person, firm, corporation or association or agent or employee thereof has engaged in or is about to engage in any of the acts or practices stated to be unlawful he may bring an action in the name and on behalf of{**60 Misc 3d at 872} the people of the state of New York to enjoin such unlawful acts or practices and to obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained directly or indirectly by any such unlawful acts or practices." (General Business Law § 349 [b].)

This provision allows petitioner Attorney General to commence an action on the people of New York's behalf to enjoin and obtain restitution for deceptive acts or practices affecting consumers. (People v Coventry First LLC, 13 NY3d 108, 114 [2009].) The acts or practices violating General Business Law § 349 must be consumer-oriented, relating to purchases or leases for personal, family, or household use. (Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 15 AD3d 206, 207 [1st Dept 2005]; Sheth v New York Life Ins. Co., 273 AD2d 72, 73 [1st Dept 2000]; see City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc., 12 NY3d 616, 621, 623 [2009]; Stutman v Chemical Bank, 95 NY2d 24, 29 [2000].)

[1] The petition labels the lessees under the Northern Leasing respondents' leases for credit card equipment as consumers, but also describes the lessees as small businesses and small business owners. Sustainable claims under General Business Law § 349 are limited both to transactions for personal, family, or household and not business uses and to transactions in New York. (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d at 325; Egan v Telomerase Activation Sciences, Inc., 127 AD3d 653, 653 [1st Dept 2015]; Ovitz v Bloomberg L.P., 77 AD3d 515, 516 [1st Dept 2010].) Although in opposition to respondents' motions petitioners suggest that enforcement of the leases' guaranties against the individual guarantors may impact their personal, family, or household finances, the petition nowhere alleges that the guaranties are entered, implemented, or even enforced for personal, family, or household purposes. Because petitioners do not show that the lessees or guarantors are consumers under General Business Law § 349, petitioners fail to sustain their claim under that statute.

"Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state of New York, on notice of five days, for an order{**60 Misc 3d at 873} enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing restitution and damages . . . ." (Executive Law § 63 [12].)

This provision authorizes petitioner Attorney General to commence an action to enjoin and seek restitution for fraudulent or illegal business activity. (People v Greenberg, 27 NY3d 490, 497 [2016]; People v Sprint Nextel Corp., 26 NY3d 98, 108 [2015]; People v Coventry First LLC, 13 NY3d at 114.)

Fraud under this provision is "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud and any deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, false pretense, false promise or unconscionable contractual provisions." (Executive Law § 63 [12]; see People v Credit Suisse Sec. [USA] LLC, 145 AD3d at 534.) This provision also defines "repeated" conduct as conduct [*3]affecting more than one person and "persistent" conduct as continuing conduct. (Executive Law § 63 [12].)

The test for fraud under Executive Law § 63 (12) is whether the act tends to deceive or creates an atmosphere conducive to fraud. (People v General Elec. Co., 302 AD2d 314, 314 [1st Dept 2003].) A claim under section 63 (12) does not require evidence of bad faith, scienter (People v General Elec. Co., 302 AD2d at 315), or the elements of common-law fraud. (People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d 345, 346 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 108 [2009].)

[2] In sum, to maintain a claim of fraud under Executive Law § 63 (12), the petition must allege enough facts to allow a reasonable inference of fraud. (Pludeman v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d 486, 492 [2008]; DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C., 78 AD3d 442, 443 [1st Dept 2010]; Pramer S.C.A. v Abaplus Intl. Corp., 76 AD3d 89, 98 [1st Dept 2010].) Through allegations that the Northern Leasing respondents' salespersons secure leases by misrepresenting the lease provisions, giving lessees incomplete or unexecuted copies of leases, materially altering leases after their signature, and enforcing leases with forged signatures, petitioners sufficiently plead fraud under the statute.

A. The Independent Sales Organizations' Conduct

The Northern Leasing respondents contend that the petition complains of acts by independent sales organizations (ISOs), for which the Northern Leasing respondents are not liable. The petition alleges that the ISOs are respondents' agents and that Northern Leasing's agents or Northern Leasing itself committed{**60 Misc 3d at 874} the deceptive and fraudulent conduct. (See People v Coventry First LLC, 52 AD3d at 346.) Specifically, the petition alleges the Northern Leasing respondents' direction, supervision, and control of, support to, and direct involvement in the ISOs' misconduct, thus establishing that the Northern Leasing respondents knew and approved of the ISOs' misconduct. (Id.)

Since respondent Cohen's affidavit fails to authenticate or lay any foundation for the admissibility of the standard ISO agreements upon which respondents rely to establish that the ISOs were not their agents or employees, respondents fail to establish any documentary defense based on the standard agreements' contents. (AQ Asset Mgt. LLC v Levine, 128 AD3d 620, 621 [1st Dept 2015]; Amsterdam Hospitality Group, LLC v Marshall-Alan Assoc., Inc., 120 AD3d 431, 432-433 [1st Dept 2014]; IRB-Brasil Resseguros S.A. v Portobello Intl. Ltd., 84 AD3d 637, 637-638 [1st Dept 2011]; Advanced Global Tech., LLC v Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 44 AD3d 317, 318 [1st Dept 2007].) Even if the court accepts the agreements as admissible, they do not dispositively demonstrate that the ISOs are not respondents' agents because, by securing lessees for the Northern Leasing respondents, the ISOs obtain a benefit for these respondents. Most fundamentally, standard agreements that ISOs will not make representations on the Northern Leasing respondents' behalf, will deliver the equipment and a copy of the lease to lessees, will comply with law, and will abide by Northern Leasing respondents' policies do not negate the petition's allegations that these promises of future conduct were not kept.

The Northern Leasing respondents, after all, own the leased equipment and thus retain responsibility when the equipment is not delivered, does not function, is not repaired, or is not replaced as promised and when they allegedly respond to complaints of undelivered or non-functioning equipment by simply insisting on continued payments. In all these ways, the petition effectively pleads the Northern Leasing respondents' direct conduct or the ISOs' actual authority as the Northern Leasing respondents' agents, which respondents do not refute. Whether the petition pleads the ISOs' apparent authority therefore is academic.

B. Petitioners' Evidence

Although respondents may not support their motions to dismiss the petition with affidavits (Serao v Bench-Serao, 149 AD3d 645, 646 [1st Dept 2017]; Lowenstern v Sherman Sq.{**60 Misc 3d at 875} Realty Corp., 143 AD3d 562, 562 [1st Dept 2016]; GEM Holdco, LLC v Changing World Tech., L.P., 127 AD3d 598, 599 [1st Dept 2015]; Flowers v 73rd Townhouse LLC, 99 AD3d 431, 431 [1st Dept 2012]), petitioners may rely on admissible affidavits to supplement the petition. (CPLR 403 [b]; Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d at 827; Cron v Hargro [*4]Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366 [1998]; Ray v Ray, 108 AD3d 449, 452 [1st Dept 2013]; Thomas v Thomas, 70 AD3d 588, 591 [1st Dept 2010].) The Northern Leasing respondents contend, however, that the affidavits petitioners present to support their petition are inadmissible. First, the Northern Leasing respondents urge that lessors or guarantors' affidavits are deficient because they were not sworn contemporaneously with their writing. No authority, however, invalidates an affidavit because the witness wrote it first to memorialize events and later swore to it for use in court.

Second, the Northern Leasing respondents insist that the affidavits include inadmissible hearsay where the lessees attest to statements by Northern Leasing respondents' employees. The lessees' accounts of what those employees stated to the lessees, however, are not offered for the truth of those statements, but simply for what promises or misrepresentations the employees made. (Hinlicky v Dreyfuss, 6 NY3d 636, 646-647 [2006]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 149-150 [2005]; People v Davis, 58 NY2d 1102, 1103 [1983]; Giardino v Beranbaum, 279 AD2d 282, 282 [1st Dept 2001]; see Bruckmann, Rosser, Sherrill & Co., L.P. v Marsh USA, Inc., 87 AD3d 65, 68 n [1st Dept 2011].)

The Northern Leasing respondents next contend that the affidavits sworn outside of New York lack a certificate of conformity. (CPLR 2309 [c].) The Northern Leasing respondents waived this defect when they failed to reject the affidavits within 15 days after their service or to indicate any prejudice from the defect. (CPLR 2101 [f]; Pion v New York City Hous. Auth., 125 AD3d 462, 462 [1st Dept 2015].) Moreover, since the affidavits were duly notarized outside of New York, the omission of a certificate of conformity is not a fatal defect, but is a mere irregularity that petitioners may remedy nunc pro tunc. (Indemnity Ins. Corp., Risk Retention Group v A 1 Entertainment LLC, 107 AD3d 562, 563 [1st Dept 2013]; Hall v Elrac, Inc., 79 AD3d 427, 427-428 [1st Dept 2010]; Matapos Tech. Ltd. v Compania Andina de Comercio Ltda, 68 AD3d 672, 673 [1st Dept 2009].) In any event, several affidavits sworn in New{**60 Misc 3d at 876} York, which do not require any certificate of conformity, substantiate petitioners' claims. While the Northern Leasing respondents contend that petitioner Attorney General presented only a few affidavits of the hundreds of thousands of transactions on which petitioners' claims are based, the Attorney General need not establish a claim under Executive Law § 63 (12) by any number or percentage of consumer complaints. (State of New York v Princess Prestige Co., 42 NY2d 104, 107 [1977].)

C. Unconscionability

1. The Need for a Hearing

The Northern Leasing respondents contend that the court must conduct a hearing pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code to determine whether to sustain the petition's claim that the leases comprise "unconscionable contractual provisions." (Executive Law § 63 [12].) Uniform Commercial Code article 2-A "applies to any transaction, regardless of form, that creates a lease." (UCC 2-A-102.) Therefore UCC 2-A-108 (1) and (2), governing unconscionable lease provisions and conduct used to induce execution of leases or to collect lease payments, applies.

"Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (1) or (2), the court, on its own motion or that of a party, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the lease contract or clause thereof, or of the conduct." (UCC 2-A-108 [3].)

At this juncture, however, the court is not making a finding of unconscionability, but is merely determining whether the petition sufficiently pleads unconscionability. (See Matter of State of New York v Avco Fin. Serv. of N.Y., 50 NY2d 383, 390 [1980]; Green v 119 W. 138th St. LLC, 142 AD3d 805, 809 [1st Dept 2016].) No hearing is required before respondents answer the petition.

2. Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability

By alleging that lessees lacked a meaningful choice, the petition sets forth a claim of unconscionability. (Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d 1, 10 [1988]; Matter of State of New York v Avco Fin. Serv. of N.Y., 50 NY2d at 389; Dabriel, Inc. v First Paradise Theaters Corp., 99 AD3d 517, 520 [1st Dept 2012].) Procedural unconscionability relates to a contract's formation and encompasses the use of high pressured tactics or deception; the contract's legibility; the education, experience, and language ability of the party claiming unconscionability;{**60 Misc 3d at 877} and the disparity of bargaining power. (Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d at 11; State of New York v Avco Fin. Serv. of N.Y., 50 NY2d at 390; Green v 119 W. 138th St. LLC, 142 AD3d at 809; Dabriel, Inc. v First Paradise Theaters Corp., 99 AD3d at 520.) Substantive unconscionability relates to the contract's terms and analyzes whether they are unreasonably favorable to one party. (Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d at 12; Green v 119 W. 138th St. LLC, 142 AD3d at 809; Dabriel, Inc. v First Paradise Theaters Corp., 99 AD3d at 521.) At oral argument the Northern Leasing respondents maintained that procedural unconscionability applied to the ISOs, while substantive unconscionability applied to respondents, as drafters of the leases.

The petition pleads claims of procedural unconscionability through allegations both of the lessees' circumstances and of respondents' conduct. Petitioners allege that lessees' education was limited and that lessees were immigrants with limited fluency in English, elderly and disabled, and thus vulnerable to aggressive, high pressured, and deceptive tactics. The petition alleges that Northern Leasing respondents' salespersons made false promises to lessees, did not provide complete copies of the leases to lessees, and then enforced unsigned and forged leases.

Substantively, petitioners allege that the leases include unconscionable noncancellation, forum selection, and service by mail provisions. Similarly to the "standard" ISO agreements, the Northern Leasing respondents rely only on unauthenticated, inadmissible, allegedly typical leases to rebut the petition's allegations of substantive unconscionability. (AQ Asset Mgt. LLC v Levine, 128 AD3d at 621; Amsterdam Hospitality Group, LLC v Marshall-Alan Assoc., Inc., 120 AD3d at 432-433; IRB-Brasil Resseguros S.A. v Portobello Intl. Ltd., 84 AD3d at 637-638; Advanced Global Tech., LLC v Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 44 AD3d at 318.) Even if the court considers these leases, their bold or enlarged print does not diminish their unconscionability for lessees who do not understand English or lack education. (See Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d at 11; State of New York v Avco Fin. Serv. of N.Y., 50 NY2d at 390; Green v 119 W. 138th St. LLC, 142 AD3d at 809; Dabriel, Inc. v First Paradise Theaters Corp., 99 AD3d at 520.)

3. The Noncancellation Provision

Noncancellation provisions are ordinarily enforceable. "In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease the lessee's promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and{**60 Misc 3d at 878} independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods." (UCC 2-A-407 [1].) This irrevocability does not apply, however, to the lessees who claim the credit card equipment was never delivered to them. The petition's allegations that lessees' signatures were forged and that lessees did not receive complete copies of their leases similarly negate the propositions that, as a matter of law, the lessees were bound by the terms of the leases they signed, and their failure to read the leases before signing them is no defense. (Arnav Indus., Inc. Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder & Steiner, 96 NY2d 300, 304 [2001], overruled on other grounds by Oakes v Patel, 20 NY3d 633, 645 [2013]; Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d at 11.)

4. The Forum Selection Provision

[3] Forum selection provisions also are enforceable, unless shown to be unreasonable. (Bank Hapoalim [Switzerland] Ltd. v Banca Intesa S.p.A., 26 AD3d 286, 288 [1st Dept 2006].) Forum selection provisions that violate public policy are unreasonable and unenforceable. (See Public Adm'r Bronx County v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 93 AD3d 620, 621 [1st Dept 2012].) The parties do not dispute that a forum selection provision in the Northern Leasing respondents' leases designates New York County as the exclusive forum for litigating claims under the leases. The petition alleges that a majority of the lessees and guarantors reside outside New York State and that the cost of appearing in court or retaining a New York attorney is burdensome. The petition further alleges that respondents obtained over 19,000 default judgments in respondents' actions against lessees or guarantors to collect payments under their leases between 2010 and 2015. The [*5]petition's allegations thus support an inference that the trials in New York County were so impracticable and inconvenient as to deprive the lessees of their "day in court" and compel the court to decline enforcement of the forum selection provision. (Yoshida v PC Tech U.S.A. & You-Ri, Inc., 22 AD3d 373, 373 [1st Dept 2005]; see Public Adm'r Bronx County v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 93 AD3d at 621.)

Respondents' collection actions are not lawsuits where plaintiffs, if they choose to sue, are limited to a particular forum. (See British W. Indies Guar. Trust Co. v Banque Internationale A Luxembourg, 172 AD2d 234, 234 [1st Dept 1991]; Harry Casper, Inc. v Pines Assoc., L.P., 53 AD3d 764, 765 [3d Dept 2008]; LSPA Enter., Inc. v Jani-King of N.Y., Inc., 31 AD3d{**60 Misc 3d at 879} 394, 395 [2d Dept 2006]; Di Ruocco v Flamingo Beach Hotel & Casino, 163 AD2d 270, 271-272 [2d Dept 1990].) In respondents' actions, defendants do not choose to engage in litigation. They are faced with the choice only between defending far from their home and business or forgoing a defense.

A forum selection provision is also unenforceable if it is part of an agreement permeated with fraud. (DeSola Group v Coors Brewing Co., 199 AD2d 141, 141-142 [1st Dept 1993]; see Public Adm'r Bronx County v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 93 AD3d at 621.) As set forth above, the petition alleges that leases were not signed by the lessees, were materially altered, or contained forged signatures and that lessees received an incomplete or no copy of the lease. These allegations, combined with the petition's further allegations that the Northern Leasing respondents' salespersons falsely represented that the leased equipment was free, a cost saving benefit, and cancelable and that lessees would acquire ownership of the equipment at the end of the lease term, raise an inference that the leases' formation is permeated with fraud. (DeSola Group v Coors Brewing Co., 199 AD2d at 141.)

5. The Alternative Service Provision

Contracting parties may agree to means of service alternative to the statutorily required means. The typical leases that the Northern Leasing respondents present, on which petitioners may rely to oppose dismissal (see Mitchell v Calle, 90 AD3d 584, 585 [1st Dept 2011]; Ayala v Douglas, 57 AD3d 266, 267 [1st Dept 2008]; Navedo v Jaime, 32 AD3d 788, 789-790 [1st Dept 2006]; Thompson v Abbasi, 15 AD3d 95, 97 [1st Dept 2005]), permit service of process commencing litigation of claims under the leases by mail to the mailing address in the lease or to the lessee's or guarantor's current or last known address when the litigation is commenced. Alternative means of service to which contracting parties freely agree are also enforceable. (Knopf v Sanford, 150 AD3d 608, 610 [1st Dept 2017]; Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 78 AD3d 137, 141 [1st Dept 2010]; Clovine Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v Kindlund, 211 AD2d 572, 573 [1st Dept 1995]; Credit Car Leasing Corp. v Elan Group Corp., 185 AD2d 109, 109 [1st Dept 1992].) Even agreed upon waivers of service are enforceable. (Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 78 AD3d at 140.)

The only "mailing address" in the lease, however, is for the lessee. The guarantor's address in the lease is a "Home Address." {**60 Misc 3d at 880}(Aff of Jay Cohen exhibits 1-1 at 2; 1-2 at 1; 1-3 at 1; 1-4 at 2; 1-5 at 2; 1-6 at 1; 1-7 at 1; 1-8 at 1; 1-9 at 1; 1-10 at 2; 1-11 at 2; 1-12 at 2; 1-13 at 1; 1-15 at 2.) Thus, since the lease permits service at the guarantor's current or last known address or at the lessee's mailing address in the lease, respondents may serve the guarantor at the latter address. Moreover, even if respondents were to serve guarantors or lessees at their current or last known address, nothing in these leases notifies guarantors or lessees to update their addresses in the lease if their addresses change. Even if parties to a lease reasonably might do so while the lease is in effect, once it has expired, which is when respondents typically commence litigation under the lease, it is unreasonable to expect that parties would update their addresses for an entity with which they no longer conduct business. Even if leases do notify parties to update their address, such a notice is ineffective if, as the petition alleges, the lessors and guarantors do not receive a copy of that provision or, of course, if they have never signed the lease. For all these reasons, service by mail to the mailing address in the lease and not necessarily to the lessee's or guarantor's residence or place of [*6]business may be unconscionable because the service is not reasonably calculated to provide notice to the lessee or guarantor. (US Const Amend XIV; NY Const, art I, § 6; Matter of Orange County Commr. of Fin. [Helseth], 18 NY3d 634, 639 [2012]; Ruffin v Lion Corp., 15 NY3d 578, 582 [2010]; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9-10 [2003]; see California Suites, Inc. v Russo Demolition Inc., 98 AD3d 144, 150 [1st Dept 2012]; Matter of Reinhard v City of New York, 34 AD3d 376, 377 [1st Dept 2006].)

The petition alleges further that the leases include automatic renewal provisions, without agreement to renew the lease, and that respondents do not advise lessees of the end of their lease term, but continue deducting payments under the lease after the lease term has ended: effectively a never ending lease. These facts and their absurd result raise a plausible claim that no agreed upon alternative service provision extends after the life of the lease, when respondents typically commence litigation under the lease.

Respondents insist that the automatic renewal provisions were valid and that respondents owed no duty to inform lessees of the end of their lease term. Accepting these propositions of law, however, does not overcome the petition's further allegations that the Northern Leasing respondents obstructed{**60 Misc 3d at 881} lessees' cancellation of their leases, whether before or after the lease term or any renewal. According to petitioners, the Northern Leasing respondents failed to make their salespersons or other representatives available to lessees to transact any further business after the leases' execution and failed to provide any address for lessees to return unwanted equipment.

In sum, the petition's allegations and lessees' supporting affidavits set forth the lease provisions claimed to be unconscionable and demonstrate deception, including withholding from lessees complete copies of their leases and forgery of their signatures, and other indicia that lessees did not knowingly and freely give their consent to the leases' terms. (State of New York v Avco Fin. Serv. of N.Y., 50 NY2d at 390.) Petitioners thus sustain their claims of various categories of "unconscionable contractual provisions." (Executive Law § 63 [12].)

Petitioner Attorney General seeks to dissolve Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., due to its fraudulent and illegal activity.

"The attorney-general may bring an action for the dissolution of a corporation upon one or more of the following grounds: . . . .

"(2) That the corporation has exceeded the authority conferred upon it by law, or has violated any provision of law whereby it has forfeited its charter, or carried on, conducted or transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal manner, or by the abuse of its powers contrary to the public policy of the state has become liable to be dissolved." (Business Corporation Law § 1101 [a]; see State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d at 87; People v Oliver Schools, 206 AD2d 143, 145 [4th Dept 1994].)

Business Corporation Law § 1101 (a) thus grants petitioner Attorney General standing to vindicate the State's right to remedy a corporation's fraudulent acts and dissolve a corporation that has abused the State's grant of corporate status. (State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d at 88; People v Oliver Schools, 206 AD2d at 145-146.)

[4] The petition alleges that a consent order and judgment dated February 28, 2013, in a prior action,

"permanently enjoined Respondents from engaging in any deceptive, fraudulent or illegal practices in{**60 Misc 3d at 882} violation of, inter alia, New York Executive Law § 63 (12) and New York General Business Law ('GBL') § 349 in connection with 'any collection or attempted collection of taxes and/or related administrative fees through any means from lessees or former lessees.' " (Verified petition ¶ 15.)

As well as detailing, as discussed above, the persistent fraudulent and illegal transaction of business to which the Northern Leasing respondents subjected innumerable lessees [*7]over a span of years through drafting leases and securing the lessees, the petition alleges that the Northern Leasing respondents disobeyed this order. Together, these allegations plead a significant, serious, and continuing abuse of a public right justifying dissolution. (People v Oliver Schools, 206 AD2d 143, 147 [4th Dept 1994].)

Even if the court denies the motion to dismiss the claims against the Northern Leasing respondents, they independently seek dismissal of the claims against respondent Hertzman. The petition alleges that Neil Hertzman is Northern Leasing's vice-president of customer service and collections. The consent order and judgment designated Hertzman as the liaison for handling complaints and gave him authority to resolve them. The petition alleges that Hertzman participated in collection of lessees' debts under their leases and knew of Northern Leasing's fraudulent and deceptive acts, as required for liability under Executive Law § 63 (12). Petitioners' allegations of Hertzman's involvement and participation in the day-to-day operations of Northern Leasing's collections adequately plead fraud by Hertzman, as a corporate officer. (Pludeman v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d at 492-493; DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C., 78 AD3d at 443.) Hertzman's position also raises a reasonable inference that he acted on Northern Leasing's behalf. (DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C., 78 AD3d at 444.)

Although Hertzman's affidavit is not documentary evidence under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) (Serao v Bench-Serao, 149 AD3d at 646; Lowenstern v Sherman Sq. Realty Corp., 143 AD3d at 562; City of New York v VJHC Dev. Corp., 125 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2015]; Art & Fashion Group Corp. v Cyclops Prod., Inc., 120 AD3d at 438), his affidavit nonetheless describes his position and how Northern Leasing handles lessees' complaints. His affidavit describes how Northern Leasing's records contradict{**60 Misc 3d at 883} lessees' claims, but does not negate any of the petition's allegations establishing his individual liability. Instead, by confirming his employment with the Northern Leasing respondents, Hertzman underscores his association with their operations, rather than dissociating himself from them. (DDJ Mgt., LLC v Rhone Group L.L.C., 78 AD3d at 444.)

The attorney respondents move to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground that their representation of the Northern Leasing respondents in their actions under the leases was constitutionally protected activity. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, derived from Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (365 US 127 [1961]) and Mine Workers v Pennington (381 US 657 [1965]), protects the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to petition the government for governmental action, including through litigation (Villanova Estates, Inc. v Fieldston Prop. Owners Assn., Inc., 23 AD3d 160, 161 [1st Dept 2005]; I.G. Second Generation Partners, L.P. v Duane Reade, 17 AD3d 206, 208 [1st Dept 2005]; Singh v Sukhram, 56 AD3d 187, 191 [2d Dept 2008]) and any incidental activity. (Nineteen Eighty-Nine, LLC v Icahn Enters. L.P., 99 AD3d 546, 547 [1st Dept 2012]; see Posner v Lewis, 18 NY3d 566, 572 [2012].) The attorney respondents bear the initial burden to demonstrate the doctrine's applicability so as to bar petitioners' claims. (See Nineteen Eighty-Nine, LLC v Icahn Enters. L.P., 99 AD3d at 547; Arts4All, Ltd. v Hancock, 25 AD3d 453, 454 [1st Dept 2006].)

The sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to abuse of a governmental process, rather than its outcome. (Singh v Sukhram, 56 AD3d at 192.) To plead the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the petition must allege facts allowing an inference that respondents lacked a genuine interest in seeking governmental action (Villanova Estates, Inc. v Fieldston Prop. Owners Assn., Inc., 23 AD3d at 161; Singh v Sukhram, 56 AD3d at 192) and that their use of the litigation process in that quest was objectively baseless. (I.G. Second Generation Partners, L.P. v Duane Reade, 17 AD3d at 208; Singh v Sukhram, 56 AD3d at 192.)

[5] Petitioners' allegations of respondent Sussman's testimony that 90% of defendants sued by respondents defaulted, yet they continue to serve defendants by mail as the leases allow,{**60 Misc 3d at 884} fail to demonstrate that the attorney respondents' actions were baseless. The allegations that the attorney respondents shared office space with the Northern Leasing respondents, shared access to [*8]their computer database, and knew of lessees' complaints of misrepresentation by salespersons and of forgery do not allow an inference that the attorney respondents knew their litigation to enforce the leases was objectively baseless, to establish the sham exception. (I.G. Second Generation Partners, L.P. v Duane Reade, 17 AD3d at 208; see Singh v Sukhram, 56 AD3d at 192.) Nor do the attorney respondents, as legal counsel retained by the Northern Leasing respondents, lack an interest in a favorable outcome of the actions under the leases. (Singh v Sukhram, 56 AD3d at 193; see Posner v Lewis, 80 AD3d 308, 316 [1st Dept 2010], affd 18 NY3d 566 [2012].) Any lack of due diligence by the attorney respondents in investigating their claims falls short of raising an inference that they knew the actions commenced on respondents' behalf were baseless. Petitioners thus fail to sustain their claims against respondents Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., Sussman, and Babad.

Petitioner Judge Fisher seeks to vacate default judgments respondents obtained in their actions to recover damages for breach of the leases.

"An administrative judge, upon a showing that default judgments were obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, illegality, unconscionability, lack of due service, violations of law, or other illegalities or where such default judgments were obtained in cases in which those defendants would be uniformly entitled to interpose a defense predicated upon but not limited to the foregoing defenses, and where such default judgments have been obtained in a number deemed sufficient by him to justify such actions set forth herein, and upon appropriate notice to counsel for the respective parties, or to the parties themselves, may bring a proceeding to relieve a party or parties from them upon such terms as may be just." (CPLR 5015 [c].)

At oral argument, Judge Fisher clarified that she did not collaterally attack prior court orders by seeking to vacate default judgments sustained upon denial of a defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment. The petition's allegations that lessees'{**60 Misc 3d at 885} consent to jurisdiction in New York County and to service by mail, in leases that lessees have not executed or of which they have not received complete copies, is ineffective, for the reasons explained, plead claims that other default judgments were obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, unconscionability, or lack of due service. (Id.)

Respondents contend that Judge Fisher has failed to comply with the statute's notice requirement, which, other than "appropriate notice to counsel for the respective parties, or to the parties themselves," is undefined. (CPLR 5015 [c].) If filing and serving the petition commencing this proceeding is not "appropriate notice," the consent order and judgment provided respondents additional prior notice.

Respondents further contend that laches bars Judge Fisher's claims. Even if Judge Fisher delayed the institution of her claims, respondents fail to identify any change in their position during the lapse of time or other prejudice from it to support a defense of laches. (EMF Gen. Contr. Corp. v Bisbee, 6 AD3d 45, 55 [1st Dept 2004]; Rosenthal v City of New York, 283 AD2d 156, 161 [1st Dept 2001]; Cohen v Krantz, 227 AD2d 581, 582-583 [2d Dept 1996].)

For the reasons explained above, the court grants the Northern Leasing respondents' motion to the extent of dismissing petitioners' claims under General Business Law § 349 and claims under Executive Law § 63 (12) and CPLR 5015 (c) insofar as they are based on illegal conduct in violation of General Business Law § 349, but otherwise denies those respondents' motion. (CPLR 404 [a]; 3211 [a] [1], [5], [7].) The court also grants the motion by respondents Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., Sussman, and Babad to dismiss the petition against these attorney respondents. (CPLR 404 [a]; 3211 [a] [7].)