Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Tarrytown, Westchester County (Kyle C. McGovern, J.), rendered July 16, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, the accusatory instrument is dismissed, and the fine and surcharge, if paid, are remitted.

Defendant was charged with two counts of disorderly conduct and one count of resisting arrest. At a jury trial, the proprietor of a company that had contracted with a condominium in March 2013 to prune trees testified that he had damaged a lamppost in the condominium. Defendant, a resident of the condominium, who was equipped with a ladder and a camera, allegedly interfered with the pruning work, and took photographs. The proprietor of the company eventually contacted the police. A Tarrytown police sergeant testified that, at approximately 1:30 p.m. on March 28, 2013, he encountered defendant near a large YMCA parking lot. The sergeant asked to speak with him. Defendant raised his right arm, uttered two or three profanities, and allegedly yelled at the sergeant. The encounter with defendant lasted approximately 10 seconds. Defendant made no threats to the sergeant. A man, as well as a woman with two small children, stopped and looked "at the situation that was occurring." However, they did not become "actively involved in [the] situation."

The sergeant further testified that, while he was arresting defendant for using abusive and obscene language in a public place, defendant kept his arms down at his sides and refused to put his hands on top of the police vehicle. However, two other officers subsequently arrived, and defendant was eventually handcuffed. Defendant also refused to get into the police vehicle because it did not have seat belts. However, after the sergeant explained that New York law did not require police vehicles to be equipped with seat belts, and after the sergeant nudged defendant in his shoulder, defendant complied and entered the police vehicle.

The jury found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20 (3) (uses abusive or obscene language in a public place), and resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30). The jury found defendant not guilty of disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20 (2) (makes unreasonable noise).

The People correctly concede that defendant's conviction should be reversed and the accusatory instrument dismissed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), it was legally insufficient to establish defendant's guilt of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Baker, 20 NY3d 354 [2013]). The entire incident was very brief, and there was no evidence "that the bystanders expressed any inclination, verbally or otherwise, to involve themselves in the dispute between defendant" and the sergeant (id. at 363). Thus, the public harm element of disorderly conduct [*2]was not established (id. at 359-362; see People v Gonzalez, 25 NY3d 1100, 1101 [2015]; cf. People v Weaver, 16 NY3d 123 [2011]; People v Tichenor, 89 NY2d 769 [1997]; People v Parker, 47 Misc 3d 151[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50793[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]).

As the evidence was legally insufficient with respect to the conviction of disorderly conduct, the conviction of resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30) must also be reversed, as the arrest for disorderly conduct was not authorized (see People v Jensen, 86 NY2d 248, 253 [1995]; People v Lindsey, 52 AD3d 527, 529 [2008]; People v Greene, 221 AD2d 559, 560 [1995]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed, the accusatory instrument is dismissed, and the fine and surcharge, if paid, are remitted.

Brands, J.P., Marano and Tolbert, JJ., concur.