[*1]
Paul J. Guida, Inc. v Eason
2017 NY Slip Op 50982(U) [56 Misc 3d 135(A)]
Decided on July 27, 2017
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on July 27, 2017
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : JAMES V. BRANDS, J.P., BRUCE E. TOLBERT, JERRY GARGUILO, JJ
2016-683 N C

Paul J. Guida, Inc., etc., Respondent,

against

Eddie Eason and Hilda Eason, Appellants.


Eddie Eason and Hilda Eason, appellants pro se. Bruce R. Bekritsky, Esq., for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Third District (Eric Bjorneby, J.), entered June 24, 2015. The judgment awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,967.19.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified by reducing the award in favor of plaintiff to the principal sum of $2,950.79; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this commercial claims action to recover the principal sum of $2,967.19 for four unpaid bills for four fuel oil deliveries made to defendants. After a nonjury trial, the District Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,967.19.

In a commercial claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807-A; see UDCA 1804-A; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). The deference accorded to a trial court's credibility determinations applies with even greater force to judgments rendered in the Commercial Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

Although the record supports the District Court's determination that defendants owed plaintiff for four unpaid fuel oil deliveries, the District Court miscalculated the total amount of the four unpaid bills. The bills were in the sums of $614.85, $614.85, $881.29 and $839.80, which equals $2,950.79 rather than the sum of $2,967.19, the principal amount awarded to plaintiff.

Consequently, substantial justice (see UDCA 1804-A; 1807-A) requires that the judgment [*2]be modified by reducing the award in favor of plaintiff to the principal sum of $2,950.79.

BRANDS, J.P., TOLBERT and GARGUILO, JJ., concur.


ENTER:


Paul Kenny


Chief Clerk


Decision Date: July 27, 2017