Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a)

Petitioner commenced this licensee holdover proceeding seeking possession of Apartment 5K at 50 Lincoln Road, Brooklyn, New York ("Subject Premises") by service of 10 Day Notice to Quit (Notice) as well as Notice of Petition and Petition.

Respondent, by counsel, interposed an answer containing various defenses and counterclaims. Respondent now moves this court pursuant to CPLR §3212 for an order dismissing the proceeding based on the allegation that the predicate notice is defective as it fails to state facts upon which this proceeding is based, and for failure to name a necessary party, to wit, the estate of the deceased tenant of record. Petitioner cross moves for discovery. [*2]Respondent's motion and petitioner's cross-motion are consolidated for disposition.

The branch of respondent's motion seeking an order dismissing the proceeding for insufficiency of the predicate notice is granted. The Notice in pertinent part states: "You are in possession of said premises as a licensee of the former tenants of record, who was the tenant of the undersigned and who was entitled to possession of the above stated premises at the time the license was granted to you. The former tenants of record are no longer entitled to possession of the above stated premises by reason of the fact that that [sic]. The former tenants of record have removed themselves from the premises and your right of possession terminated at the same time. The undersigned is not entitled to possession thereof and demands same."

Respondent argues that the notice does not provide any facts to support petitioner's claims. Specifically, the notice does not allege the names of the former tenants, nor does it state the dates of when or how the tenants removed themselves from the premises or how they are no longer entitled to possession. Petitioner opposes and alleges that the notice is sufficient on its face, and argues that a Notice to Quit does not need to be as detailed as notices which may be subject to cure.

The sufficiency of the Notice to Terminate is measured by its "reasonableness in view of all attendant circumstances" (Hughes v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 AD2d 4, 17 [1st Dept 1996]). A notice which provides "the necessary additional information to enable the tenant-respondent to frame a defense . . . is adequate to meet the tests of reasonableness and due process" (Jewish Theological Seminary of America v. Fitzer, 258 AD2d 337, 338 [1st Dept 1999]; see also, Rascoff/Zsyblat Org., Inc. Directors Guild of Am., Inc., 297 AD2d 241, 242 [1st Dept 2002]). Thus, a notice "need not lay bare a landlord's trial proof" (McGoldrick v. DeCruz, 195 Misc 2d 414, 415 [App. Term 1st Dept 2003]).

Petitioner's argument that this standard does not apply to licensee proceedings brought under RPAPL§ 713(7) is misplaced. The standard requiring the particularization of the facts has long been extended to licensee proceedings brought under RPAPL §713. (See, G.A.G Enterprises LTD v. Gonzalez, NYLJ, June 15, 1988, p.30 col. 6 [Civil Ct. Kings Co.]; Valrose Realty co v. Dewinger, NYLJ February 2, 1990, p.23, c. 3 [Civ. Ct. NY Co.]; Cypress Holding Corp v. Nivar, NYLJ July 1989, p.20, c. 2 [Civ. Ct. Bx. Co.] holding that predicate notices in proceedings commenced pursuant to RPAPL 711 or 713 require precise statement of the grounds and facts upon which petitioner relies).

Measured by those standards, the Notice fails to sufficiently particularize the facts of petitioner's claim to allow respondent to frame a defense against them. The notice does not specify who the prior tenants of record were, how they vacated and how they are no longer entitled to possession. The notice as plead leaves the occupants guessing as to the claims against them and how to defend against them. Its worth noting, and it is undisputed by petitioner, that the tenant of record passed away and NOT " removed themselves from the premises," which information if known to petitioner should have been plead with specificity. Therefore, the notice is bereft of particularity, the statements are conclusory, and do not set forth the facts upon which the petitioner relies. (See G.A.G Enterprises LTD v. Gonzalez, NYLJ, June 15, 1988, p.30 col. 6 [Civil Ct. Kings Co.])

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the proceeding is dismissed without prejudice. The court does not need to reach the balance of respondent's motion and petitioner's cross [*3]motion as moot. This constitutes the Decision/Order of the Court.