Upon the reading and filing of the following papers in this matter: (1) Notice of Motion by the plaintiff, dated September 27, 2016, and supporting papers; and now

UPON DUE DELIBERATION AND CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT of the foregoing papers, the motion is decided as follows: it is

ORDERED that plaintiff's application (seq. #002), which is wrongly denominated as a [*2]motion to restore, and which seeks a default order of reference in this foreclosure action, is hereby denied and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff shall promptly serve a copy of this Order upon the defendant-homeowner(s) at all known addresses and upon all other answering defendants, via First Class Mail, and shall promptly file the affidavit(s) of such service with the County Clerk.

By Order, dated March 11, 2016, this Court denied, without prejudice, plaintiff's prior application for a default order of reference. Nevertheless, in support of the current motion, plaintiff's counsel now avers that "[n]o previous application has been made for the relief requested herein." Plaintiff's counsel also wrongly avers that this Court's March 11, 2016 Order dismissed plaintiff's action. In fact, however, the Order simply states that "plaintiff's application . . . for an order of reference . . . is hereby denied without prejudice and with leave to resubmit upon proper papers, for failure to seek judgment within one year of the alleged default and failure to otherwise show why the complaint should not be dismissed, as required by CPLR §3215(c)." Instead of resubmitting a motion with the mandated proofs required under CPLR 3215(c), plaintiff's instant motion improperly seeks restoration of a case that has not been dismissed, nor disposed of in any other manner.

Pursuant to CPLR §3215(c), "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." The policy underlying the statute is to prevent parties who have asserted claims from unreasonably delaying the termination of actions, and to avoid inquests on stale claims (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Hiyo, 130 AD3d 763, 13 NYS3d 554 [2d Dept 2015]; Giglio v NTIMP, Inc., 86 AD3d 301, 926 NYS2d 546 [2d Dept 2011]).

Upon a showing of the requisite one year of delay, dismissal is mandatory in the first instance (see Pipinias v J. Sackaris & Sons, Inc., 116 AD3d 749, 983 NYS2d 587 [2d Dept 2014]; Giglio v NTIMP, Inc., 86 AD3d 301, 926 NYS2d 546 [2d Dept 2011]). Failure to take proceedings for entry of judgment may be excused, however, upon a showing of sufficient cause. To establish "sufficient cause," the party opposing dismissal must demonstrate that it had a reasonable excuse for the delay in taking proceedings for entry of a default judgment and that it has a potentially meritorious action (see Ohio Savings Bank v Decaudin, 129 AD3d 925, 10 NYS3d 443 [2d Dept 2015]; LNV Corp. v Forbes, 122 AD3d 805, 996 NYS2d 696 [2d Dept 2014]).

The plaintiff has failed to comply with this Court's March 11, 2016 Order regarding plaintiff's failure to seek judgment within one year of the alleged default, and failed to prove a reasonable excuse for the delay (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Hiyo, 130 AD3d 763, 13 NYS3d 554 [2d Dept 2015]; Pipinias v J. Sackaris & Sons, Inc., 116 AD3d 749, 983 NYS2d 587 [2d Dept 2014]; GMAC v Minewiser, 115 AD3d 707, 981 NYS2d 580 [2d Dept 2014]; Giglio v NTIMP, Inc., 86 AD3d 301, 926 NYS2d 546 [2d Dept 2011]; London v Iceland Inc., 306 AD2d 517, 761 NYS2d 862 [2d Dept 2003]; State Street Bank and Trust Co. v Francis, 284 AD2d 324, 725 NYS2d 562 [2d Dept 2001]; Riggi v Sommerville, 273 AD2d 290, 710 NYS2d 543 [2d Dept 2000]; Demery v New York, 149 AD2d 405, 542 NYS2d 971 [2d Dept 1989]; Manago v Giorlando, 143 AD2d 646, 533 NYS2d 106 [2d Dept 1988]).

Furthermore, the Court's March 11, 2016 Order also clearly states, in relevant part, that it is:

ORDERED that with regard to any . . . future applications by the plaintiff, if the Court determines that such . . . applications have been submitted, without proper regard for the applicable statutory and case law, or without regard for the required proofs delineated herein, the Court may, in its discretion, dismiss this case or deny such applications with prejudice and/or impose sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR §130-1, and may deny those costs and attorneys fees attendant with the filing of such future applications.

In submitting the current motion, plaintiff's counsel has misrepresented the motion history of this case, misrepresented the prior Order and procedural posture of this case, failed to satisfy the proofs required by the prior Order, and has failed to submit "sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed," as required by CPLR 3215(c). Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff's motion is denied and the complaint is dismissed.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.