| People v Dixon |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 08963 [167 AD3d 1052] |
| December 26, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| The People of State of New York, Respondent, v Billy Dixon, Appellant. |
The Legal Aid Society, New York, NY (Steven J. Miraglia of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Jean M. Joyce of counsel; Javon Henry on the brief), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Elizabeth Foley, J.), dated May 27, 2014. The order, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In this proceeding pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C [hereinafter SORA]), the Supreme Court assessed the defendant 105 points on the risk assessment instrument, within the range for a presumptive designation as a level two sex offender. The court denied the defendant's request for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level, and designated him a level two sex offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his request for a downward departure.
A defendant seeking a downward departure from a presumptive risk level has the initial burden of "(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [SORA] Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" (People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112, 128 [2011]; see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841, 861 [2014]; see also Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006]). If the defendant makes that twofold showing, the court must exercise its discretion by weighing the mitigating factor or factors to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of the defendant's dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism (see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d at 861; People v Champagne, 140 AD3d 719, 720 [2016]).
The defendant failed to identify the existence of any such mitigating factor (see People v Young, 158 AD3d 829, 830 [2018]). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's denial of the defendant's request for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level. Rivera, J.P., Sgroi, Hinds-Radix and Christopher, JJ., concur.