Robert E. Silverberg, Esq., for appellant. Jay A. Press, P.C., for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Robert E. Pipia, J.), entered August 22, 2016. The order denied defendant John R. DePaolo's motion for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first cause of action as was asserted against him as sought to recover for breach of a service contract and upon his personal guaranty, both dated July 15, 2005.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, without costs, and defendant John R. DePaolo's motion for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first cause of action as was asserted against him as sought to recover for breach of a service contract and upon his personal guaranty, both dated July 15, 2005, is granted.

Plaintiff commenced this action against 606 Second Avenue Restaurant Corp., Doing Business as Christina's (corporate defendant), and John R. DePaolo. Insofar as relevant to this appeal, DePaolo moved for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first cause of action as was asserted against him as sought to recover for his alleged breach of an alarm installation and monitoring contract, dated July 15, 2005, that plaintiff had entered into with the corporate defendant, which contract allegedly was automatically renewed on July 15, 2010, and upon [*2]DePaolo's personal guaranty of the corporate defendant's contract. The July 15, 2005 alarm installation and monitoring agreement was in effect for five years and contained, in pertinent part, the following five-year renewal provision:

"RENEWALS: The term of this agreement shall be for a period of five years. This agreement shall renew itself for a period of five years and for successive periods of one year thereafter under the same terms and conditions, unless either party gives written notice to the other by certified mail, ret[urn ] receipt requested, of their intention not to renew the contract at least 30 days prior to the expiration of any term"

The July 15, 2005 contract is signed by DePaolo on behalf of the corporate entity, and DePaolo's signature appears a second time thereon whereby he personally guaranteed the corporate defendant's performance. According to the terms of the agreement, there was a $30 monthly fee to be paid by the corporate defendant for plaintiff's services. In support of the motion, both DePaolo and an officer of the corporate defendant alleged that plaintiff had never sent a notice alerting them of the automatic renewal of the contract. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff's president alleged that the agreement had been renewed for an additional five-year term commencing on July 15, 2010, as the corporate defendant had made several payments pursuant to the agreement after July 15, 2010. By order entered August 22, 2016, the District Court denied DePaolo's motion.

As the July 15, 2005 agreement involves the ongoing monitoring by plaintiff of an alarm system at the corporate defendant's premises, it is a contract for services and, under the circumstances, is governed by General Obligations Law § 5-903 (2). Pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-903 (2), where a contract for service, maintenance, or repair is automatically renewable for a period of more than one month unless the recipient of the service gives notice that he wants the contract to terminate, the person furnishing the service must provide to the person receiving the service a timely statutory notice of the renewal thereof (see NYDIC/Westchester Mobile MRI Assoc. v Lawrence Hosp., 242 AD2d 686 [1997]). "The purpose of the notice provision is to protect service recipients from the harm of unintended automatic renewals of contracts for consecutive periods" (Healthcare I.Q., LLC v Tsai Chung Chao, 118 AD3d 98, 104 [2014]).

Since it was uncontroverted that plaintiff had not complied with its obligation under General Obligations Law § 5-903 (2) to provide timely written notice of the automatic renewal of the agreement, the renewal of the service agreement is unenforceable (see General Obligations Law § 5-903 [2]) and, thus, the contract expired on July 14, 2010. Indeed, if, as plaintiff contends, the payments made after July 15, 2010 were to be considered a waiver of the benefit of the statute, then it would "effectively nullify the only purpose of [General Obligations Law § 5-903 (2)], which is to render such [automatic renewal provisions unenforceable] unless the statutory notice is given" (Johnson v UniFirst Corp., 67 AD3d 1442, 1444 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Consequently, DePaolo's purported obligations under the alleged renewed service agreement and his personal guaranty thereof are unenforceable against him, as [*3]his obligations terminated on July 14, 2010 upon the expiration of the contract.

Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant John R. DePaolo's motion for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first cause of action as was asserted against him as sought to recover for breach of a service contract and upon his personal guaranty, both dated July 15, 2005, is granted.

MARANO, P.J., GARGUILO and BRANDS, JJ., concur.