| People v Stephensbush |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 03830 [172 AD3d 1118] |
| May 15, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| The People of the State of New York,
Respondent, v Christopher Stephensbush, Also Known as Bris, Appellant. |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Dina Zloczower of counsel), for appellant.
John M. Ryan, Acting District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Aurora Alvarez-Calderon of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph A. Zayas, J.), dated April 11, 2017, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The defendant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of sex trafficking. After a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C [hereinafter SORA]), at which the defendant sought a downward departure from his presumptive level three risk designation, the Supreme Court designated the defendant a level three sex offender.
A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of "(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" (People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112, 128 [2011]; see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841, 861 [2014]; see also Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]). If the defendant makes that twofold showing, the court must exercise its discretion by weighing the mitigating factor to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of the defendant's dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism (see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d at 861; People v Champagne, 140 AD3d 719, 720 [2016]).
Here, the circumstances identified by the defendant were adequately taken into account by the Guidelines, or were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Francis, 30 NY3d 737, 743-751 [2018]; People v Rocano-Quintuna, 149 AD3d 1114, 1115 [2017]; People v Pendleton, 112 AD3d 600, 601 [2013]; People v Robertson, 101 AD3d 1671, 1672 [2012]). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny the defendant's application for a downward departure from his presumptive level and to designate him a level three sex offender. Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Duffy, JJ., concur.