Plaintiff commenced this Small Claims action against defendant to recover $5,000.00 for lost rent for the months of July through September 2018 and for the costs she incurred to remove defendant's personal belongings from the subject premises. Defendant counterclaimed to recover $5,000.00 in damages for the loss of her valuables and personal belongings left at the subject premises and for the return of her security deposit. A trial in this matter was held on October 24, 2018. Defendant was given the opportunity to submit documentation by November 7, 2018 regarding the Section 8 rent payments she claimed plaintiff received subsequent to the July 2, 2018 Albany County Sheriff lock out executed at the subject premises and to submit an [*2]additional estimate for the cost of a refrigerator. After careful review of all of the testimony and documentary evidence in this case, the Court now makes the following findings of fact and decision of law:

Section 1804 of the Uniform City Court Act sets forth the procedure to be followed when conducting a Small Claims trial. The Court is required "to do substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law..." U.C.C.A. § 1804; see also, Blair v. Five Points Shopping Plaza, Inc., 51 AD2d 167 (3d Dept 1976).

In a prior landlord-tenant summary proceeding between these parties before this Court, a Warrant of Eviction was issued authorizing plaintiff to take legal possession of the subject premises on June 30, 2018. When defendant did not vacate the premises by June 30, 2018, the Albany County Sheriff's Office performed a lock out at the premises on July 2, 2018 whereby defendant's right to possession of the premises was extinguished. Plaintiff testified that when the lock out occurred, she was present and saw that defendant had personal belongings at the premises. According to plaintiff, when she discussed this situation with defendant she told defendant that defendant had 30 days to remove her belongings. Plaintiff testified that defendant had contacted plaintiff's office and an appointment was made for defendant to remove her personal belongings from the subject premises during the third week of July. Plaintiff did not recall the exact date within the third week of July for which this appointment was made. Plaintiff testified that defendant did not show up for the appointment and that defendant had left a voice message on plaintiff's answering machine stating that she was unable to keep that appointment because she did not end up getting a truck. Defendant, however, testified that she showed up on the day of the appointment but plaintiff did not, and she waited about an hour and no one arrived at the premises.

The factual allegations asserted by each party are in dispute as to the number of times defendant sought to retrieve her belongings and the efforts plaintiff made to allow defendant access to the premises after the July 2, 2018 lock out. Plaintiff testified that after defendant did not show for the appointment in the third week of July, the only other time defendant sought to contact plaintiff was on August 2, 2018 when, according to plaintiff, defendant left a message on plaintiff's office answering machine asking if she could pay rent and move back in. Defendant denied this allegation and testified that she only made that request of plaintiff before the July 2, 2018 lockout.

According to defendant, she made multiple attempts to contact plaintiff through text messages and phone calls to plaintiff's office as well as by going to plaintiff's office. Defendant testified that she was never able to reach plaintiff when she called plaintiff at her office to arrange to retrieve her belongings. At trial, defendant submitted as Exhibit A print outs of text messages she stated she sent to plaintiff. Defendant testified that when plaintiff first gave defendant her phone number, plaintiff told her that she goes by the name Shereen and that was why the name associated with the recipient of the subject text messages was Shereen. Defendant testified that she had sent a text message on or about July 7, 2018 requesting plaintiff to unlock the door at the premises so that she could get her insulin that she left in the refrigerator. On July 15, 2018, defendant sent a text message saying "I need to get my stuff out Saturday. I need my insulin out the refrigerator today. I need my insulin I'm out. I will call the sheriff. I need my insulin. I'm a Diabetic" (Defendant's Exhibit A). In a text message defendant sent on August 7, [*3]2018 at 12:01 PM, defendant pleaded with plaintiff stating "Please let me have my stuff. You got money from section 8 please let me have my things" (id.). Later in the day on August 7, 2018 at 2:25 PM, defendant sent a text message asking plaintiff "When can I get in. I've been trying to get in since the 7th of July since my insulin was inside. Mala when [] I get in" (id.). According to defendant, plaintiff never responded to these or any of defendant's other text messages, nor did defendant ever receive a response from Shereen who defendant later found out is plaintiff's daughter. In the prior landlord-tenant case between the parties involving the subject premises, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the May 19, 2018 written three day demand for rent notice submitted into evidence at trial was signed by Shereen Khan of NCS Property Management LLC.

On direct examination, defendant testified that on one occasion after the lock out she had gone to plaintiff's office to arrange an appointment to get her belongings in the month of July and, according to defendant, when she was at the office she spoke to plaintiff's daughter, Shereen Khan, who told defendant that she could go to the premises on that day and wait there for someone to meet her and allow her to have access to the subject premises. Although Shereen told her that she would have access that day, defendant testified that after Shereen went to the back of the office to speak to plaintiff, Shereen came back and told defendant she no longer could gain access that day. The Court notes that defendant was very specific in the details of her testimony, and the Court credits this testimony as truthful. According to defendant, after calling the police department to try to gain access to the premises to retrieve her belongings, she was told by a police officer that she would have to go to court to resolve issues involving personal property.

At trial, plaintiff called as a witness the first floor tenant at the subject premises, Ms. D. Ramsay, who had been plaintiff's tenant for about a year and eight months and had known defendant to be a former tenant at the premises. According to Ms. Ramsay, no other tenant moved into the subject premises after the July 2, 2018 lockout. Ms. Ramsay testified that there are 3 apartments in the subject building and a driveway at the premises which Ms. Ramsay can see looking out from her apartment. Ms. Ramsay testified that she called plaintiff on Aug 8, 2018 to tell her that defendant's former apartment had been broken into. To Ms. Ramsay's knowledge, plaintiff did not call the police to report the incident. Ms. Ramsay testified that in August someone came with what she described was a small to medium sized U-Haul truck and parked it in the driveway at the premises, that she saw men moving boxes and bags out of defendant's former apartment, and that when she first observed the truck in the driveway there was already stuff packed up inside the truck.

On cross examination, Ms. Ramsay testified that she did not see defendant the day of this incident, nor did she recognize any of the people she observed that day to be anybody who had ever lived with defendant at the premises. According to Ms. Ramsay, the only person she knew to have lived with defendant was defendant's son. Ms. Ramsay testified that one of the men packing up the truck was a person she had seen before around the neighborhood, but she did not know him personally. Ms. Ramsay testified that she believed the day of the U-Haul truck incident was August 8, 2018 and that the time was around noon as she was getting ready to leave the premises for work when she first saw the truck in the driveway. Ms. Ramsay testified that she never called the police after the U-Haul incident. About five to six days later on or about August 14, 2018, Ms. Ramsay testified that she called plaintiff to tell her she heard noises going on in [*4]defendant's former apartment. At trial, Ms. Ramsay gave detailed testimony about how one of the men who she had seen days earlier with the U-Haul truck approached her at the side of the subject building and told Ms. Ramsay he was defendant's brother and she did not have to worry about the personal belongings that had been taken away days earlier.

According to defendant, on August 8, 2018 she went to plaintiff's office and was told that there were no belongings left at the subject premises. She left and went to the premises, she saw the door open, and she then called the police. The officer who showed up at the premises on August 8, 2018 was Albany Police Officer J. Seward. Defendant testified that, while she and Officer Seward were at the premises on August 8, 2018, Officer Seward called plaintiff to request that she come to the apartment, but plaintiff never responded to his call nor did she show up at the premises. According to defendant, she left the premises after Officer Seward told her she had to leave, and she did not return. With respect to the August 14, 2018 incident involving the alleged brother of defendant, on cross examination Ms. Ramsay testified that she had never seen that man before at the subject premises. Defendant testified on direct examination that she has no living brothers and that the brother she had died in 2016. According to Ms. Ramsay, after the July 2, 2018 lock out the only occasions she had seen defendant come by the premises were when defendant was there to pick up her mail.

Officer Seward was called by defendant as a witness, and he testified that he met defendant at the premises on August 8, 2018 in response to a call defendant had made to the Albany Police Department to report that there was a burglary at the subject premises. Officer Seward testified that he had gone to the premises a total of about two or three times during the months of July and August of 2018 in response to defendant having complained that all of her personal property was in the premises and that plaintiff was not allowing her access to retrieve her belongings. On August 8, 2018, Officer Seward testified that the door to defendant's former apartment at the premises looked like it had been forced open. According to Officer Seward, he saw what looked like a furnished apartment that day, including couches, tables, chairs, clothing, and kitchen items that were inside the subject apartment on August 8, 2018 when he and defendant were there. Officer Seward testified that he called plaintiff at the number defendant provided to him, he left a message on the answering machine, and plaintiff never called him back. According to Officer Seward, defendant was visibly upset and she was concerned about her property.

Officer Seward testified that he initiated the request for the Albany Police Department to contact the City of Albany Department of General Services (DGS) to secure the door at the premises. Submitted into evidence by plaintiff was a DGS letter, dated August 9, 2018, which was sent to plaintiff noting that the door at the subject premises had been secured by DGS on August 8, 2018 and informing plaintiff that she was being billed $94.37 for the cost DGS incurred to secure the premises (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1).

Plaintiff's position advanced at trial was that defendant "broke in" to the subject apartment on August 8, 2018, had a U-Haul truck, and took her belongings. Plaintiff acknowledged at trial that defendant had valuable items at the premises which were still there as of August 8, 2018. In answer to questions posed to plaintiff at trial about the August 8, 2018 incident, she testified that she did not know the sequence of events as to when the items were removed on Aug 8, 2018 relative to when defendant called the police on that day, but she [*5]surmised that defendant must have broken into the apartment and removed her belongings after Officer Seward left the premises on that day. Plaintiff testified that she called the police about the August 14, 2018 incident, but did not call them after the August 8, 2018 incident. Defendant's position advanced at trial was that plaintiff did not properly safeguard defendant's belongings after the lock out, plaintiff refused defendant access to the premises, and plaintiff failed to properly secure the apartment which led to her belongings being stolen. Defendant testified that she believed there was a squatter who gained access to her former apartment.

At the first court appearance in this case before me, based upon the agreement reached by the parties, I directed that plaintiff provide defendant access to the subject apartment on the agreed upon date of September 26, 2018 for defendant to retrieve any and all of her personal property remaining at the premises. At trial on October 24, 2018, plaintiff acknowledged that the parties had arranged to meet on September 26, 2018 for defendant to get her belongings, but plaintiff testified that on that day defendant did not have a truck with her, she only had a small car, and so plaintiff did not provide defendant access to the apartment to retrieve any of her personal property. Plaintiff testified that she emailed defendant's attorney that day to tell him that defendant did not show up with a truck to get her belongings. As the judge who issued the directive at first appearance in this case, I took judicial notice at the trial that defendant was not required to have a truck in order to retrieve her belongings and, based on the Court's directive, plaintiff was required to allow defendant access to the subject apartment to get her remaining belongings on September 26, 2018.

In response to the Court's inquiry as to why plaintiff failed to provide defendant access to the apartment, plaintiff testified that her maintenance man had bagged up clothing and loose items in the apartment and "those bags were heavy and the items could not have been taken by defendant on Sept 26th". Plaintiff also testified that "toasters and small kitchen items" were some of the items left in the apartment on Sept 26, 2018. According to plaintiff, although defendant had a car that day, plaintiff decided she was only going to allow defendant access to the premises if defendant had a truck. Plaintiff further testified that the door to the apartment "had two nails in it" and because of the prior break ins she "only wanted defendant to get stuff all at one time". Finally, plaintiff testified that she emailed defendant's attorney twice to set up a new time to have defendant return with a truck, but she did not get a response from the attorney.

On cross examination, when asked were there any valuable items such as TVs, bedroom sets, and dining room furniture left in the premises on September 26, 2018, plaintiff answered no and acknowledged that those items were left at the premises on July 2, 2018, but testified that there were no valuable items in the premises on September 26, 2018.

Defendant testified that when she arrived on September 26, 2018 to the premises, she saw her belongings in about twenty bags left outside of the apartment at the side of the subject building with some of her clothing and other personal items all over the place and that none of her valuables were there. Defendant submitted photographs that she testified she took on September 26, 2018 (Defendant's Exhibit C). The Court finds that these photographs depict numerous black colored trash bags and clothing and other personal items strewn across the top of the bags and on the ground and up against the side of the subject building. Defendant testified that on September 26, 2018, she arrived with her daughter to see what size truck she may need based on the items remaining and that her plan was to then go rent a truck based on the size [*6]needed. When asked on cross examination why defendant did not take any of her belongings with her that day, defendant testified that she did not take any of the stuff left outside of the building because the items had mildew and were not in good condition.

In her closing remarks at trial, plaintiff stated that defendant did not show up for the first appointment in July to get her belongings and that she had "multiple opportunities" to get her stuff. Plaintiff asserted that it was in August when defendant got a truck, broke into the subject apartment, and got her valuables. Plaintiff noted that the last date on the printed out text messages defendant submitted into evidence was August 7, 2018, and plaintiff argued that there were no more text messages sent after August 7, 2018 because defendant got her belongings out of the premises on August 8, 2018. Finally, plaintiff stated that after more than a 30 day period expired after the July 2, 2018 lock out for defendant to have removed her belongings, plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 10, 2018 "so defendant could get her stuff".

In his closing remarks, defendant's attorney stated that defendant made multiple efforts to get her personal property, but plaintiff denied defendant access to the premises. He further argued that defendant did not break into the subject apartment and that defendant's valuable belongings left at the premises on July 2, 2018 were stolen because they were not properly safeguarded by plaintiff. Defendant's attorney noted that the items from the subject apartment which plaintiff left outside of the building were not in good condition, and defendant is entitled to the return of her $900 security deposit as plaintiff failed to establish that she incurred a cleaning cost for any conditions in the apartment that were beyond normal wear and tear. Defendant disputed the monthly rent amount authorized for July and argued, based on documentation submitted at trial, that the July rent was $1100 not $1200. Defendant's position was any award of damages for rent should be limited to the month of July and based on a rate of $1100.

The legal standard applicable in this case regarding defendant's personal property left in the subject premises after the July 2, 2018 lock out is as follows:

"A landlord has no absolute right to retain or destroy personal property belonging to a tenant. Even where a tenant is legally dispossessed, the landlord's rights extend only to the real property. He acquires no concomitant right to use or retain the tenant's personal property." Glass v. Wiener, 104 AD2d 967 (2d Dept 1984); see also, Price v. Hoyle, 82 Misc 2d 174 (Rockland Co. Ct. 1975 [whether a tenant abandoned the premises or was locked out, the landlord has no right to the tenant's personal property]). A landlord is required to "safeguard or store items of value left in the leased premises at the time of the execution of the warrant of eviction." Wilson v. CRL Management, Inc., 14 Misc 3d 231 (Rochester City Ct. 2006), citing Young v. Warehouse No. 2 Inc., 143 Misc 2d 350 (NY Civil Ct. 1989). In Facey v. Johnson (49 Misc 3d 1136 [NY Civil Ct. 2015]), the court held that where a tenant is removed from the premises pursuant to a Warrant of Eviction, but the tenant's items remain at the premises as in the case herein, the landlord assumes responsibility for the tenant's personal belongings.

In addition to a landlord's obligation to safeguard a tenant's personal property, where a tenant demands the return of his or her property, as was done in this case, the landlord must permit the tenant to go on the premises and remove the personal property. "A conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and without authority, assumes or exercises control over [*7]personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that person's right of possession." Colavito v. NY Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43 (2006). If a tenant's claim of conversion is established, the landlord would be responsible for the costs of the items that were not returned.

With respect to plaintiff's claim for lost rent involving the months of July through August 2018, the law does not support the granting of that claim. As a general rule, a surrender by operation of law of a tenant's right to possession of a premises will relieve a tenant of any subsequently accruing rents after the effective date of surrender. Schnee v. Jonas Equities, Inc., 103 Misc 2d 625 (NY Civil Ct. 1980), citing Gray v. Kaufman Dairy, 162 NY 388 (1900). Upon the execution of the July 2, 2018 Sheriff lock out in the instant case, defendant's right to possession of the premises was extinguished as was her obligation to pay rent. The standard of law involving fair use and occupancy, which plaintiff put forth as a basis to support her claim for loss of rent, is inapplicable here where there was a Sheriff lock out ending defendant's right to possession of the subject real property. See, e.g., Hermitage Co.v.Levine, 248 NY 333 (1928 [after tenant was ejected in summary proceedings, the lease was at an end and tenant's liability for rent does not survive]). In the Court's discussion below on damages, the Court will address plaintiff's entitlement to two days of rent for the month of July.

The Court finds that while defendant was at plaintiff's office in the month of July 2018 and Shereen had arranged for defendant to go to the premises to retrieve her belongings, that arrangement was cancelled due to plaintiff's decision to not allow defendant access to the subject apartment on that day. Plaintiff's action thwarted defendant's efforts to retrieve her personal property and interfered with defendant's legal right to possession of her personal property.

At trial, plaintiff testified that she knew there were valuable items at the premises as of August 8, 2018, including defendant's TVs and furniture. Having this knowledge required plaintiff to respond immediately and take action to safeguard those items when Ms. Ramsay informed her on August 8, 2018 that defendant's former apartment was broken into and men were moving defendant's personal property into a U-Haul truck. When Officer Seward called plaintiff on August 8, 2018, plaintiff should have returned his call at some point and certainly, after listening to the answering machine message left by Officer Seward, plaintiff should have made it a priority to meet him at the premises to find out the status of defendant's personal property.

The Court finds that defendant consistently contacted plaintiff by text messages, phone calls, and personal visits to plaintiff's office to retrieve her belongings in the month of July. The unanswered text messages defendant sent plaintiff demonstrates a pattern of plaintiff avoiding communication with defendant. The Court credits defendant's testimony that the phone number she was given by plaintiff was a number she could reasonably rely upon to contact plaintiff and make demands for the return of her personal property. Shereen Khan, who had a property management role with respect to the subject premises, could and should have encouraged plaintiff to arrange more than one date for defendant to access the premises to retrieve her belongings after the appointment did not go through in the third week of July of 2018 and after plaintiff had cancelled the appointment Shereen had directly made with defendant.

Defendant has established that she demanded plaintiff to return her belongings; in fact she pleaded with plaintiff to allow her access to the premises to retrieve her insulin and other valuable personal property. Defendant's actions clearly demonstrated that she in no way intended [*8]to abandon her personal property. When no intent of abandonment of a tenant's personal property is evinced, the law is clear that a landlord must safeguard a tenant's belongings for a reasonable amount of time which, pursuant to case law, generally is considered to be at minimum a 30 day period. However, a reasonable time period may be interpreted to be longer than 30 days based on the factual circumstances of the individual case. In this case, the facts show that there was a missed appointment which defendant claims was because plaintiff failed to show up at the premises, text messages sent by defendant that were unanswered by plaintiff, and a cancellation by plaintiff of an arrangement defendant had made with Shereen to access the premises.

The September 26, 2018 incident provides further evidence of plaintiff's ill-intentioned motives. No truck, no access is not an acceptable defense to defendant's claim that plaintiff denied her access to the premises to get her belongings on September 26, 2018 or, for that matter, on any other earlier occasion defendant sought to retrieve her personal property. Defendant having a truck rented and with her when she arrived at the premises to retrieve her remaining personal property was not a requirement contained in this Court's oral directive issued on the record in court on September 21, 2018. Moreover, the Court does not find credible plaintiff's testimony that, even though plaintiff acknowledged under cross examination that there no valuables left in the subject apartment on September 26, 2018, she did not want to undo the "two nails" in the door to allow defendant access to the apartment unless defendant had a truck and was able to remove all of her remaining belongings "at one time". Plaintiff's purported concern to secure belongings in the apartment that were of no value is not believable, nor should defendant have been denied the opportunity to enter the apartment that day to carry out by hand and pack into her car any or all of her remaining personal property.

The Court concludes that plaintiff denied defendant access to retrieve her belongings on more than one occasion, that plaintiff's lack of communication and unresponsiveness thwarted defendant's efforts to retrieve her belongings within a reasonable time frame and, accordingly, plaintiff interfered with defendant's legal right to possession of her personal property. The facts of this case support a claim by defendant for conversion, thereby establishing liability against plaintiff for damages for defendant's unreturned personal property.

Based on the facts and evidence presented in this case, the Court further finds that there is insufficient proof to show that it was defendant who broke into her former apartment and removed her valuables. The text messages of August 7, 2018 reveal that defendant was frustrated and was literally begging plaintiff to allow her to access the apartment. These circumstances the day before the August 8, 2018 incident together with defendant's actions in calling the police on August 8, 2018 to report a burglary are inconsistent with defendant allegedly having deceitfully arranged to rent a U-Haul truck for August 8, 2018 and to have men ready to move her belongings out of the premises after Officer Seward left the premises that very same day. Rather, the proof presented by defendant supports the Court's finding that plaintiff failed to properly safeguard defendant's property after the lock out, as she was required by law to do.

Plaintiff sought to recover the $115 fee associated with the Sheriff lock out, and that amount of damages will be granted together with two days of rent for the two days in July where defendant had possessory rights to the premises up until the July 2, 2018 lock out. While the [*9]Section 8 documents submitted by the parties have conflicting information as to when the increased rent amount of $1200 was to take effect, plaintiff's document (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) contained a check mark next to the category called "Rent Adjustment" and stated the "The Housing Authority approved changes in contract rent". This box was unchecked in defendant's document (Defendant's Exhibit D). Based on that additional language in Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, the Court is assessing the per diem rent amount for the month of July 2018 to be based on a $1200 monthly rent amount. Plaintiff is therefore granted $77.42 for two days of rent in July 2018 ($1200 divided by 31 [number of days in July] multiplied by 2). The total amount of these damages awarded to plaintiff is $192.42.

Plaintiff's additional claims for the $200 cost of cleaning services and $350 for the cost of disposing items at the subject premises are denied based on this Court's finding that plaintiff illegally denied defendant access to the apartment whereby defendant should have been afforded the opportunity to remove her own personal property and undertake efforts to meet the applicable standard that the premises be left in a broom clean condition.

Defendant's counterclaim for the return of her $900 security deposit is granted as there is no factual or legal basis for plaintiff to have kept this deposit. This $900 shall be offset by the total amount of damages plaintiff was awarded. Plaintiff may therefore deduct $192.42 from the security deposit and shall return to defendant the remainder in the amount of $707.58.

With respect to damages for defendant's unreturned personal property, based on the sufficiency of the paid receipts and estimates defendant submitted into evidence, the following damages shall be awarded to defendant:

(1) Refrigerator - defendant submitted two estimates for the purchase of a new refrigerator. Plaintiff claimed that she had provided defendant with a refrigerator when defendant first moved into the premises. Defendant testified that the refrigerator plaintiff supplied stopped working properly and had to be replaced with a new refrigerator that defendant bought. The Court accepts defendant's testimony as credible. Based on the principles of substantial justice, the Court finds that of the two estimates defendant submitted, the lowest of the two amounts of $899 will be awarded to defendant for a Whirlpool refrigerator sold by Lowe's, plus the 8% tax amount ($71.92), for a total amount of damages of $970.92. The estimate included the cost for a 5 year warranty for the refrigerator. This cost is not to be granted as no testimony was received regarding whether defendant had purchased a similar warranty for the replacement refrigerator she previously had bought.

(2) Queen size bed set - Defendant submitted a paid receipt for this purchase. The purchase price, inclusive of taxes, was $678.23 and this amount in damages is granted.

(3) Television - Defendant submitted a paid receipt for a Phillips TV in the amount of $645.84, which included taxes. Defendant testified that she had four TVs at the premises. Defendant's claim for damages for the $645.84 cost she expended to purchase one TV is granted.(4) Defendant submitted multiple estimates for various bedroom furniture and other items, but the only item where two estimated costs were submitted was for a dresser/chest of drawers; one for $338 and one for $298. There was a discount taken off of each of these costs reflected on the estimates. The discount off of the lowest estimate of $298 was $60.21, bringing the total cost to $237.79, plus taxes of $19.02. Defendant is thus awarded $256.81 in damages for this one item.

Accordingly, defendant's counterclaim is granted in the total amount of $2,551.80 for her personal property replacement costs. Together with the granting of $707.58 on defendant's counterclaim for the return of her security deposit, the Court hereby awards defendant damages in the amount $3,259.38. A judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff for $3,259.38 plus the $5.47 filing fee for a total judgment amount of $3,264.85 has been issued (a Small Claims Judgment form is provided to each party, included with this decision)

One additional issue the Court must address is with respect to the Section 8 rent payments defendant testified plaintiff received. The Court notes that Shereen Khan is listed as "Owner" of the subject premises (169 Livingston Avenue, Apt. 2, in Albany, NY) on the Section 8 documentation the parties submitted at trial (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 and Defendant's Exhibit D). The "Tenant Full Check History" document submitted at trial as Defendant's Exhibit E lists a start date for "Landlord/HAP" payments for "Tenant: Cynthia Pickens" of August 1, 2017 and an end date of August 3, 2018. This document lists the payments "Recipient Shereen Khan" received during that time period, including a payment of "$395.00" via "Check Date 07/02/2018" and a payment of "$1,006.00" via "Check Date 08/01/2018". Based upon the legal standards set forth in this decision and the Court's finding that defendant's obligation to pay rent ended when the July 2, 2018 lockout extinguished defendant's right to possession of the subject premises, I have included as a recipient of this decision a representative of the Section 8 Program administered through the Albany Housing Authority. Defendant's claim raised at trial that plaintiff improperly received Section 8 rent payments for the months of July and August 2018 is a claim to be addressed by the Section 8 program. This claim does not provide a legal basis upon which the Court could grant damages to defendant.

In conclusion, for the reasons set forth herein, judgment is hereby awarded to defendant and against plaintiff in the total amount of $3,264.85 ($3,259.38 in damages and a $5.47 filing fee).