The defendant is charged with one (1) count of Assault in the Third Degree in violation of PL § 120.00(1), and one (1) count of Harassment in the Second Degree in violation of PL § 240.26(01).

Defendant now moves for an order 1) dismissing the accusatory instrument on the ground of facial insufficiency; 2) suppressing evidence of her statements to police, or in the alternative, granting a Huntley hearing; 3) compelling the People to provide defendant with any and all Rosario and Brady material; 4) precluding the People from introducing at trial evidence of her prior criminal convictions, any underlying bad acts, and all prior uncharged criminal, or wrongful conduct; 5) compelling the People to provide defendant with discovery and a bill of particulars; 6) directing the transcription of hearing minutes at least 20 days prior to commencement of trial; and 7) granting her the right to make additional pretrial motions.

It is alleged that on January 15, 2019, at approximately 1:00 p.m., at Mount Vernon High School, located at 100 California Road, in the City of Mount Vernon, County of Westchester and State of New York, Mount Vernon Police Department School Resource Officer, Detective Jean-Jerome responded to a call inside the subject premises of a past assault. Upon his arrival at Room 104, Detective Jean-Jerome spoke with the victim J.V., who stated that he had a verbal argument with a fellow student, K.W., which led to each student slapping one another. He then stated that he was jumped by fellow students, and after being separated, the defendant, mother of K.W. punched him in the face causing a laceration to his lip.

Detective Jean-Jerome then spoke with a Gregory Fuller, who stated that as he [*2]came out of the cafeteria, he saw a fight going on. He ran over to the fight and tried to separate the students. While attempting to walk J.V. away from the fracas, the defendant swung over Mr. Fuller's left arm and struck J.V. in the face.

The defendant was subsequently placed under arrest and transported to Mount Vernon Police Headquarters. While at Mount Vernon Police Headquarters the defendant stated to members of the Mount Vernon Police Department that she did not punch the kid, but since she got arrested for it, she should have punched him.

Defendant seeks to dismiss the misdemeanor information based on facial insufficiency. In order for an information to be facially sufficient, it (and/or any supporting depositions accompanying it) must allege nonhearsay allegations of fact of an evidentiary character that establish, if true, every element of the offense charged (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1] [c]; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986]). These requirements are jurisdictional (see People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225 [2009]; People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d at 731), and the failure to meet these requirements may be asserted at any time, with the exception of the requirement of nonhearsay allegations, which is waived if it is not timely raised by motion in the trial court (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354). The law does not require that the most precise words or phrases which most clearly express the thought be used in an information, but only that the crime be sufficiently alleged so that the defendant can prepare himself for trial, and so that he will not be tried again for the same offense (see People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 [2004]; People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 360).

A person is guilty of Assault in the Third Degree when "[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person." PL § 120.00(1). The term "physical injury" is defined as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." PL § 10.00(9). While "substantial pain" must be "more than slight or trivial pain," the "pain need not ... be severe or intense to be substantial." People v. Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 (2007). Therefore, where a defendant is charged with Assault in the Third Degree, the information "must set forth sufficient factual allegations to warrant the conclusion that the victim suffered an impairment of physical condition or substantial pain and otherwise is fatally defective." People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]).

In this case, the supporting deposition sworn to by the complainant indicates that he was slapped by a female student and jumped by two male students, and then after getting up off the ground, the defendant punched him on the right side of his face. Lastly, he stated that he went to the nurse's office and was treated for his injuries which he described as "a cut on the upper left side of his lip and inside on left side."

Where an information alleges both a deliberate act of violence and that that act caused "substantial pain," the prima facie case requirement is met. In other words, there is a "reasonable inference" that if a person reports having experienced "substantial pain," she did, in fact, experience substantial pain. People v Morris, 44 Misc 3d 810 (NY Co. Crim. Ct. 2014). Here, the allegations failed to establish that the injuries the complainant suffered caused him any pain, much less substantial pain, nor does it allege that the injuries impaired his physical condition. Moreover, not only does the Court find that the injuries complained of, the laceration to his upper lip and inside lip, to [*3]be deficient to establish a physical injury, these injuries were not directly attributed to the defendant's conduct. After describing his injuries in the supporting deposition, the complainant indicated that he wanted to press charges against "them," implying that the defendant's daughter and/or boys that jumped him just prior to the defendant having punched him in the face, may have also been responsible for his injuries.

Accordingly, since the evidentiary facts do not support every element of the offense, the Assault in the Third Degree charged is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed.

As to Count Two of the Information, in order to be facially sufficient, an accusatory instrument charging the offense of Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]) must establish that the defendant struck, shoved, kicked or otherwise subjected another person to physical contact, or attempted or threatened to do the same, and did so with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm the other person.

A review of the information and supporting depositions reveal that same complies with the requirements of CPL § 100.15. Furthermore, a review of the accusatory instrument provides reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense of Harassment in the Second Degree. Certainly, the supporting depositions state clearly and succinctly that defendant intervened in a physical altercation by punching the victim in the face with a closed fist.

In a motion to suppress a statement, all that is required to warrant a Huntley hearing is the mere claim that the defendant's statement was involuntary. People v. Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 (1980); People v. Bingham, 144 AD2d 682 (2d Dept. 1988); Matter of Brian E., 206 AD2d 665 (3d Dept. 1994). Therefore, defendant's motion for a Huntley hearing is granted.

The Sandoval motion is granted on consent, and shall be renewed before the trial judge. Since the People have not indicated that they plan to introduce any evidence of defendant's prior bad acts on their direct case, the motion for a Ventimiglia hearing is denied as premature at this time. In the event the People later indicate they plan to introduce such evidence, the defendant may renew the motion before trial.

Since the People have consented to open file discovery in accordance with C.P.L. § 240.20, that portion of the defendant's motion seeking to compel discovery is denied. The names and addresses of prospective witnesses are not subject to pretrial discovery (People v Hvizd, 70 Misc 2d 654 [County Ct. Westchester 1972]). The People also agree to provide the defendant with Brady material as it becomes available, as such, that branch of defendant's motion is denied. Defendant is, however, granted leave to renew her application for Brady material before the trial Judge (see CPL § 240.45; People v White, 178 AD2d 674 [2nd Dept 1991]; People v Goins, 73 NY2d 989 [1989]). The defendant also seeks disclosure of Rosario material which the People have acknowledged will be provided in a timely manner and as such, defendant's request for Rosario material is also denied at this time.

Defendant's motion to require that any pre-trial hearings in this case be held at least twenty days in advance of the trial is denied. In the event the Defendant seeks production of the minutes of any pre-trial hearing prior to trial, that request will be considered by the Court at the time it is made.

The defendant's request for a bill of particulars is denied on the basis that the misdemeanor information with the supporting deposition, provides sufficient information delineating defendant's alleged conduct at the time of the incident.

Lastly, defendant's reservation of her right to file further motions is unauthorized pursuant to CPL § 255.20(3). Any other motions shall be summarily denied absent a showing of good cause.

Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the information as facially insufficient is granted, solely to Count One, Assault in the Third Degree. The People are granted leave to move to amend or otherwise cure the defects in the information consistent with CPL §§ 30.30 and 170.30. The motion for a Huntley hearing is granted. Defendant's motion for a Sandoval hearing is granted and respectfully referred to the trial judge. That branch of defendant's motion for a Ventimiglia hearing is denied as premature. Defendant's request to file additional motions is denied subject to rights under CPL 255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown. Defendant's request for discovery and a bill of particulars is denied. The People are reminded of their continuing obligation to supply all Brady and Rosario material.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.