[*1]
Ally Fin., Inc. v Laguna
2019 NY Slip Op 51781(U) [65 Misc 3d 1222(A)]
Decided on November 8, 2019
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Richmond County
Grey, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on November 8, 2019
Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County


Ally Financial, Inc., Plaintiff

against

Ruth Camacho Laguna, Defendant




CV-6756-18/RI
Lisa Grey, J.

 

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219 (a), of the papers considered in the review of thisMotion:

Papers Numbered

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, with annexed exhibits (dated March 5, 2019)

Defendant's Oppositon to Plaintiff's Motion, and

Cross-Motion to Amend Answer

(dated August 14, 2019) 2

Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition (dated August 29, 2019) 3

The plaintiff, Ally Financial, Inc. (hereinafter, "Plaintiff"), moves for an order granting summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 against Ruth Camacho Laguna (hereinafter, "Defendant"), for $8,940.60 in damages resulting from a breach of contract. The action was commenced by summons and complaint, filed with the Court on November 13, 2018, to which Defendant filed an answer stating "financial hardship" as her sole defense. The parties appeared on September 10, 2019, with Plaintiff represented by counsel and Defendant appearing pro se, and the Court's decision was reserved.

In support of its motion, Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Twanya Braden, an employee responsible for maintaining Plaintiff's records with respect to servicing Defendant's loan, in which Ms. Braden identifies a copy of the lease agreement entered by Plaintiff and Defendant on February 24, 2016 (hereinafter, "the lease agreement"), wherein Defendant agreed to pay to Plaintiff a sum of $37,913.04 in seventy-two (72) monthly installments of $526.57 for the purchase of a motor vehicle. Ms. Braden also identifies a letter, dated March 31, 2017, sent from Plaintiff to Defendant informing Defendant that the vehicle had been repossessed due to [*2]Defendant's breach of the agreement, and advising Defendant that the vehicle would be sold unless certain conditions were met. She further states that, on May 4, 2017, the vehicle was sold to the highest bidder at a private, licensed dealers-only auction for $15,900.00. Finally, Ms. Braden identifies another letter, dated May 9, 2017, sent from Plaintiff to Defendant informing Defendant that the vehicle had been sold, outlining various credits and expenses, and stating that Defendant owed to Plaintiff a balance of $8,940.60.

Defendant filed a cross-motion seeking to amend her answer by adding the folliwng affirmative defenses: (1) she disputes the amount of the debt, (2) the sale of the collateral property was not commercially reasonable, and (3) the collateral property was sold without prior notice to Defendant. While leave to amend pleadings should be liberally granted (CPLR 3025 [b]), it must be denied where the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient as a matter of law or is totally devoid of merit (Morton v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp., 32 AD3d 381 [App Div 2d Dept 2006]). There is no such finding here. Paragraph 2 (f) of the lease agreement states that, in the event of repossession, the vehicle would be sold and the proceeds would be applied to the total amount owed. Thus, the lease is a secured transaction governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which requires that all aspects of the sale were commercially reasonable (UCC 9-626 [a] [2]).

Accordingly, Defendant's cross-motion is granted and the amended answer submitted by Defendant is deemed filed.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if "upon all the papers and proofs submitted, the cause of action shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any of the parties." (CPLR 3212). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should only be employed when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues (Chiara v Town of New Castle, 126 AD3d 111, 125 [App Div 2d Dept 2015], citing Millerton Agway Cooperative, Inc. v Briarcliff Farms, Inc., 17 NY2d 57 [Ct App 1966]). In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of establishing that all aspects of the sale of the vehicle were commercially reasonable. The Appellate Division has held that a question of whether the sale of the vehicle was done in a commercially reasonable manner is an issue of fact to be determined at trial (Ford Motor Credit Co., Inc. v Racwell Constr., Inc., 24 AD3d 500, 501 [App Div 2d Dept 2005]).

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. Both sides are to appear for trial on Tuesday, December 3, 2019, at 9:30am.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.



Dated: November 8, 2019

_______________________________

Staten Island, New York

Hon. Lisa Grey

Judge, Civil Court