[*1]
McKay v Fairfield Manor at Douglaston, LLC Props.
2019 NY Slip Op 51879(U) [65 Misc 3d 152(A)]
Decided on November 21, 2019
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on November 21, 2019
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : THOMAS A. ADAMS, P.J., TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, ELIZABETH H. EMERSON, JJ
2018-2359 S C

Roland McKay, Appellant, Tara Johnson, Plaintiff,

against

Fairfield Manor at Douglaston, LLC Properties, Respondent.


Roland McKay, appellant pro se. Warren Berger, P.C. (Warren M. Berger of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Third District (Janine A. Barbera-Dalli, J.), enter0ed May 3, 2018. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, after a nonjury trial, dismissed so much of the action as was brought by plaintiff Roland McKay.

ORDERED that the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs commenced this small claims action to recover the sum of $5,000, alleging that defendant, their landlord, had leased a one-bedroom apartment to them and had charged them the monthly rent for a two-bedroom apartment. After a nonjury trial, the District Court dismissed the action. Plaintiff Roland McKay appeals.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Upon a review of the record, we find no basis to disturb the District Court's determination to dismiss so much of the action as was brought by plaintiff Roland McKay, since it provided the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807). McKay did not demonstrate that plaintiffs did not get the exact apartment they had contracted for, which apartment McKay testified he had seen [*2]before he had signed the lease. Furthermore, plaintiffs used both the master bedroom and a second room in the apartment as bedrooms, which was how the apartment was advertised and how they had intended to use it when they had signed the lease. Consequently, it is irrelevant that the room plaintiffs used as a second bedroom may have been labeled differently on the architect's plans.

Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

ADAMS, P.J., RUDERMAN and EMERSON, JJ., concur.



ENTER:


Paul Kenny


Chief Clerk


Decision Date: November 21, 2019