J. Scott Porter, Seneca Falls, for defendant-appellant.

Scott D. McNamara, District Attorney, Utica (Steven G. Cox of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Michael L. Dwyer, J.), rendered February 28, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of making a terroristic threat (two counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of two counts of making a terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20 [1]). Although defendant was not required to preserve his contention that County Court imposed illegal consecutive sentences (see People v Houston, 142 AD3d 1397, 1399 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1146 [2017]), he was required, and failed, to preserve his related contention that the indictment is multiplicitous (see People v Kobza, 66 AD3d 1387, 1388 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 939 [2010]). In any event, both contentions lack merit. An indictment is considered multiplicitous when a single offense is charged in more than one count (see People v Alonzo, 16 NY3d 267, 269 [2011]; People v Sprague, 151 AD3d 1921, 1922-1923 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1023 [2017]). Here, inasmuch as the events underlying the two counts occurred at distinct times on different days and as separate transactions, they did not constitute a " 'single, uninterrupted occurrence' " (Alonzo, 16 NY3d at 270; see generally People v Moffitt, 20 AD3d 687, 690-691 [3d Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 854 [2005]), and thus the indictment was not multiplicitous. Further, because the acts underlying the crimes were separate and distinct, the imposition of consecutive sentences was permissible (see People v Fuentes, 52 AD3d 1297, 1301 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 736 [2008]).

Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Carni, J.P., Lindley, NeMoyer, Curran and Bannister, JJ.