Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, New York (Ashley R. Newman of counsel), for appellant.

Charles Wallshein, Melville, for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melissa A. Crane, J.), entered September 30, 2019, which denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its mortgage foreclosure complaint and granted defendants Quentin P. Caruana and Lina Caruana's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The motion court correctly dismissed the complaint as time-barred on the ground that the statement of intention filed by defendant Quentin P. Caruana in connection with his bankruptcy petition, in which he indicated, by checking a box, that the condominium would be retained and kept current, did not constitute the acknowledgment of the debt that is required to restart the expired statute of limitations under General Obligations Law § 17-101, as plaintiff urged.

Initially, we note that, while General Obligations Law § 17-101 applies to contractual debts generally, the provision applicable to mortgage foreclosures in particular, and therefore controlling in this case, is section 17-105 (1) (Batavia Townhouses, Ltd. v Council of Churches Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 189 AD3d 20, 2020 [4th Dept 2020]; National Loan Invs., L.P. v Piscitello, 21 AD3d 537, 538 [2d Dept 2005]).

General Obligations Law § 17-101 requires an acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay it; General Obligations Law § 17-105 (1) requires a promise to pay the debt. Quentin's bankruptcy petition did not satisfy either provision, because it merely listed the mortgage debt at issue, neither expressly acknowledging the debt nor promising to pay it (see Petito v Piffath, 85 NY2d 1, 8 [1994], cert denied 516 US 864 [1995]; Batavia Townhouses, Ltd., 189 AD3d 20, 27; Piscitello, 21 AD3d at 538). Concur—Gische, J.P., Gesmer, Kern, Kennedy, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2019 NY Slip Op 32888(U).]