Quality Choice Healthcare, Inc. v County of Orange, N.Y.
2020 NY Slip Op 20264 [70 Misc 3d 223]
October 9, 2020
Brown, J.
Supreme Court, Orange County
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, January 20, 2021


[*1]
Quality Choice Healthcare, Inc., Doing Business as Quality Choice Correctional Healthcare, et al., Plaintiffs,
v
County of Orange, New York, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Orange County, October 9, 2020

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Joseph A. Maria, P.C., White Plains, for plaintiffs.

Langdon C. Chapman, County Attorney, Goshen, for County of Orange, New York, defendant.

{**70 Misc 3d at 224} OPINION OF THE COURT
Craig Stephen Brown, J.

It is hereby ordered that the plaintiffs' motion for recusal is denied.

In this breach of contract action the plaintiffs seek the recusal of the undersigned. The primary basis of plaintiffs' application is that defendant's counsel, as well as counsel's wife, are listed as "Facebook" friends on the undersigned's election campaign Facebook page circa 2015. Ironically, plaintiffs' counsel hosted two campaign election events in 2019 for the prior justice [*2]assigned to this case and did not view that as a basis for recusal. Counsel actually argued that the recusal of that prior judge would not have been appropriate, despite counsel having hosted campaign election events.[FN*] Notwithstanding plaintiffs' claim to the contrary, "the mere status of being a 'Facebook friend,' without more, is an insufficient basis to require recusal" (Advisory Comm on Jud Ethics Op 13-39 [2013]). Further, a judge's impartiality may not "reasonably be questioned (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1])" and there is no "appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]) based solely on having previously 'friended' certain individuals who are now involved in some manner in a pending action" (Advisory Comm on Jud Ethics Op 13-39 [2013]).

As a secondary basis for recusal, plaintiffs claim that an Orange County Judge and colleague of the court is a "potential witness" in this matter. The history of the instant case includes a claim by plaintiffs that defense counsel should be disqualified as counsel for the defendant because he too was going to be called as a witness by the plaintiffs. Justice Steven Milligram, before his untimely passing, denied that application and found that plaintiffs' motion in that regard "borders on frivolous and fails to demonstrate that the disqualification . . . is warranted." There appears to be a history of such claims being made in the instant matter. In any event, another local judge being a "potential witness" is an insufficient basis for the undersigned's recusal.

The summons and complaint, dated September 16, 2016, was filed in the instant matter on September 23, 2016. Upon the case being assigned, plaintiffs moved for the matter to be{**70 Misc 3d at 225} transferred to Westchester County. The request for transfer was reviewed and denied by the Honorable Alan Scheinkman. It appears that plaintiffs have been actively exercising their rights to apply for the transfer of venue, and to remove or to maintain judges or counsel assigned to the case since the commencement of this action. A court has a duty to avoid any appearance of impropriety. Appearances of impropriety can come in different forms. One form is that the judge cannot be fair and impartial due to some potential or perceived conflict of interest; another is that a party can change a forum or a judge that is more favorable to that party by "manipulating" the court system. It is imperative that courts guard against all appearances of impropriety. Under the circumstances of the instant matter, plaintiffs' application for recusal gives the appearance of judge shopping.

"Where, as here, 'no legal basis for disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14 is alleged, a Court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience' " (Matter of Rodriguez v Liegey, 132 AD3d 880, 880 [2d Dept 2015], quoting Matter of Grucci v Villanti, 108 AD3d 626, 627 [2013], and citing People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]). The plaintiffs have "failed to set forth any demonstrable proof of bias or prejudgment of the matter to warrant recusal" (id., citing Matter of Grucci v Villanti, 108 AD3d at 627; Matter of Alyssa A. [Michelle N.—Sandra N.], 79 AD3d 740, 741-742 [2010]; Vogelgesang v Vogelgesang, 71 AD3d 1131 [2010]; Matter of O'Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000 [2009]). [*3]Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for an order of recusal must be denied (see e.g. Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, 175 AD3d 676 [2d Dept 2019]).



Footnotes


Footnote *:Interestingly, the instant case actually was pending at the time the events were hosted by counsel when that judge was running for election. The judge was later assigned to the instant matter when that judge took the bench less than six months after the events took place.