Petitioner brings this proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim against the respondents, City of Mount Vernon and Elon R. Valentine. The respondents oppose the motion on the ground that it is untimely.

This is a claim to recover monetary damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on August 15, 2018. The motor vehicle accident occurred on Audrey Avenue in the City of Mount Vernon, County of Westchester, State of New York. Specifically, it is alleged that petitioner's vehicle was parked on Audrey Avenue when it was struck by a motor vehicle owned by the City of Mount Vernon and operated by Elon R. Valentine. As a result of the motor vehicle accident, petitioner states that she rented a motor vehicle while the necessary repairs were made to her vehicle.

Petitioner maintained a policy of insurance on her vehicle through GEICO. She alleges that GEICO timely served a notice of claim for the amount of damages covered by the applicable insurance policy. The purported claim, which was not annexed to the moving papers, is alleged to have provided the essential facts constituting the claim, such as the date of the motor vehicle [*2]accident, location of the accident, brief description of how the accident occurred, and the amount of the claim.

The instant action is to recover the rental expenses paid as a result of the motor vehicle accident, which petitioner claims wasn't covered in the claim brought by her insurance carrier.

GML § 50-e (1)(a) provides that a notice of claim be served within 90 days after a claim arises. The Court has broad discretion to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim under certain statutorily permitted circumstances. In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Platt v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 105 AD3d 1026, 1027 [2013]; Matter of Acosta v City of New York, 39 AD3d 629, 630 [2007]; Matter of Henriques v City of New York, 22 AD3d 847, 848 [2005]). The court's discretion to grant the late notice of claim is allowed, so long as the motion is made within one year and 90 days after the date of the occurrence (see Bourguignon v City of New York, 157 AD2d 644 [2d Dept 1990]).

Here, the petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim and for the delay in filing the petition (see Matter of Bell v City of New York, 100 AD3d 990 [2012]). The petitioner's ignorance of the law did not constitute a reasonable excuse (see id.; Matter of Taylor v County of Suffolk, 90 AD3d 769, 770 [2011]; Meyer v County of Suffolk, 90 AD3d 720, 721 [2011]).

Moreover, as respondents indicate, the statute of limitations has run. General Municipal Law § 50—i(1)(c) provides that any action for damage to personal property against a municipality shall be commenced within one year and 90 days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based (see Broyles v Town of Evans, 147 AD3d 1496, 1497 [4th Dept. 2017]). It is undisputed that this motor vehicle accident occurred on August 15, 2018. To date, petitioner has not filed a notice of claim, more than one year and six months after the date of the accident. Where the statute of limitations has run, the Court is without discretion to permit service of a late notice of claim. "To permit a court to grant an extension after the statue of limitations has run would, in practical effect, allow the court to grant an extension which exceeds the statute of limitations, thus rendering meaningless that portion of section 50—e which expressly prohibits the court from doing so." (Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 954-955 [1982]).

In conclusion, petitioner has not met her burden for leave to file a late notice of claim. To grant relief to the petitioner in this case, the court would be completely undermining and rendering inapplicable the requirements set forth in GML § 50-e.

Accordingly, it is

ADJUDGED that the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

The Court considered the following papers on this motion:

Notice of Motion to File Late Notice of Claim, dated January 14, 2020; Affirmation in Opposition, dated January 27, 2020; Reply Affidavit, dated February 14, 2020.