Village Motors, Inc., appellant pro se. Gabriella Smalls, respondent pro se (no brief filed).

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Maxine Sonya Broderick, J.), entered January 23, 2019. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $2,500.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the action.

In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover the principal sum of $5,000, based on her purchase of an allegedly defective used 2008 Honda Accord coupe from defendant, for which plaintiff asserted that she had paid $5,850 including fees and taxes. At a nonjury trial, defendant's witness alleged, and plaintiff did not dispute, that, on September 28, 2018, when plaintiff purchased the car, the odometer reading on the car had been over 100,000 miles. Plaintiff also introduced into evidence a printout of a text message from defendant, showing that, when the car had been offered for sale, defendant had represented that it had over 100,000 miles on its odometer. Plaintiff testified that, five days after her purchase, the car's check engine light had gone on, but that defendant had delayed checking the car until some weeks later, at which time its mechanic had been unable to diagnose any problem with the car's engine because the check engine light had gone off. Plaintiff [*2]also presented evidence that there came a time when the bumper fell off the car and its fog light and headlights fell out. Defendant's witness asserted that defendant had repaired those problems. On or about November 27, 2018, the car became inoperable. Plaintiff failed to identify the problem with the car; defendant's witness, however, opined that the engine had seized due to plaintiff's failure to maintain it. Following the trial, the District Court awarded judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $2,500.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

Since it was undisputed that the car had in excess of 100,000 miles on its odometer, defendant was not subject to liability under the Used Car Lemon Law (see General Business Law § 198-b). While defendant implicitly warranted that the car was "in condition and repair to render satisfactory and adequate service upon the public highway at the time of delivery" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 417), plaintiff failed to establish that, upon delivery, the car was not in such condition, and thus failed to demonstrate her entitlement to a judgment under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 417 (see Pinero v Puram, 49 Misc 3d 151[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51755[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015]). Moreover, plaintiff failed to establish a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code (see UCC 2-314 [2] [c]; see also Ewen v Congers Auto Sales, Inc., 39 Misc 3d 145[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50844[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]). We note that, although plaintiff testified that defendant had sold her the car subject to an oral 30-day express warranty, plaintiff failed to describe the terms of that warranty or how it had been breached. Thus, the evidence was inadequate to support a judgment in favor of plaintiff under any theory of liability. Consequently, the judgment did not provide the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807).

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment dismissing the action.

TOLBERT, J.P., GARGUILO and RUDERMAN, JJ., concur.

Paul Kenny