| People v Butler (Rayfus) |
| 2020 NY Slip Op 50761(U) [67 Misc 3d 144(A)] |
| Decided on June 25, 2020 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Julio Rodriguez III, J., at suppression motion; Geraldine Pickett, J., at trial and sentencing), rendered May 31, 2013, after a jury trial, convicting him of driving while intoxicated per se, and imposing sentence.
Per Curiam.
Judgment of conviction (Julio Rodriguez III, J., at suppression motion; Geraldine Pickett, J., at trial and sentencing), rendered May 31, 2013, affirmed.
While an individual charged with driving while intoxicated has a right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test, it is only a qualified right to counsel, not a constitutional one (see People v Smith, 18 NY3d 544, 549-550 [2012]; People v Higgins, 124 AD3d 929, 933 [2015]). To invoke this right, the request must be specific and unequivocal (see People v Keener, 138 AD3d 1162, 1163 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1134 [2016]).
Here, the suppression court, which adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a judicial hearing officer, properly determined that defendant did not make a specific and unequivocal request to speak to an attorney before deciding to submit to the breathalyzer test that established a .157 blood alcohol content (People v Curkendall, 12 AD3d 710, 715 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 743 [2004]; People v Vinogradov, 294 AD2d 708, 709 [2002]; cf. People v Mora-Hernandez, 77 AD3d 531 [2010]). The credited evidence, including the videotape of defendant's breathalyzer test, established that defendant, while "speaking incessantly" for nearly thirty minutes and mentioning that he had a lawyer, never requested to see or speak with his lawyer or any other lawyer regarding the decision to take the breath test, and repeated that he was not refusing to take a breathalyzer test.
Even assuming that defendant's statement "you can call my attorney all day" could be viewed as defendant making "a specific request for an attorney vis-a-vis th[e] decision" to submit to a chemical test (People v Higgins at 933-934, quoting People v Curkendall, 12 AD3d at 715), the officer responded "call your lawyer if you want." Defendant, however, never took the officer [*2]up on this offer nor made any further mention of his attorney. Thus, it cannot be said that police "prevent[ed] access between [defendant] and his lawyer" in connection with such decision (People v Gursey, 22 NY2d 224, 227 [1968]; see People v Smith, 18 NY3d at 550; People v Keener, 138 AD3d at 1164). Accordingly, the motion to suppress the test results and defendant's subsequent statements was properly denied.
All concur.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.