Plaintiff commenced this action by summons and complaint on March 5, 2018 to recover the sum of $1,607.40 for services provided to its assignor Dianna Beltran. Defendant Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation ("defendant" or "MVAIC") now moves for summary judgment dismissing this action based upon the assignor's purported ineligibility for MVAIC benefits under Article 52 of the New York Insurance Law.

On September 20, 2016, Beltran was hit by a car (the "Striking Vehicle") while crossing the street (Pollack Affirm., Ex. E [Police Report]). On November 1, 2016 Beltran sought treatment from plaintiff for injuries resulting from the accident (Compl. at ¶11). On or around October 18, 2016, Beltran sent MVAIC an Application for No-Fault Benefits (Pollack Affirm., [*2]Ex D), a police accident report for the September 20, 2016 accident (Pollack Affirm., Ex. E), and proof of Beltran's New York state residency (Pollak Affirm., Ex. F). On October 21, 2016, MVAIC received a Notice of Intention to Make Claim ("NOI") for assignor, Beltran (Pollak Affirm., Ex. G). The NOI indicated that the Striking Vehicle was registered in Utah with license plate C020YK. The police accident report also included this license plate number for the Striking Vehicle (Pollak Affirm., Ex. E).

On October 28, 2016, MVAIC sent a coverage request letter to Beltran's counsel, requesting, as relevant here, written confirmation as to whether the Striking Vehicle had insurance (Pollak Affirm,. Ex. I). A second coverage request seeking this information was issued on November 28, 2016 (Id.). A third coverage request seeking this information was sent on December 28, 2016 (Id.). On January 30, 2017, a fourth coverage request was sent requesting this information (Id.).

On December 15, 2016, MVAIC received a bill from plaintiff in the amount of $1,607.40 for service rendered on November 1, 2016 (Pollak Affirm., Ex. C). On December 27, 2016, MVAIC issued another coverage request letter and, after received no response, a final coverage request letter on February 1, 2017 (Pollack Affirm., Ex. C).

On March 22, 2017, MVAIC issued a letter to Beltran and her known providers, advising that Beltran had not yet established that she was a "covered person" under Article 52 of the Insurance Law and that written verifiable confirmation of the insurance or lack of insurance for the Striking Vehicle was outstanding (Pollak Affirm., Ex. K).

In support of its motion defendant submits, inter alia, the affidavit of one its qualification examiners, Tarik Pollins, which details MVAICs practices and procedures in sending out coverage request letters and receiving and reviewing mail (Pollins Aff. at ¶¶5-9). Pollins avers that based upon review of file and knowledge of MVAICs procedures, MVAIC has not yet received responses to coverage request letters (Id. at ¶13-14).

As a threshold matter, the Court rejects plaintiff's argument that defendant's motion is untimely. The instant motion was properly served within 120 days of the filing of the notice of trial in this case (CPLR 3212[a]). The Court also rejects defendant's argument that this proceeding is barred by decisions in prior arbitration proceedings between MVAIC and other entities which have also been assigned Beltran's first-party no-fault benefits. A "prior arbitration proceeding involving one claimant provider seeking reimbursement of assigned first-party no-fault benefits does not preclude another provider from commencing its own action seeking reimbursement of assigned no-fault benefits, even where the claims have been assigned by the same individual and have arisen from the same accident" (Alev Med. Supply, Inc. v Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Misc 3d 132(A) [App Term, 2d Dept 2012]; see also A.B. Med. Services PLLC v USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 9 Misc 3d 19, 23 [App Term, 2d Dept 2005]).

Turning to the substance of defendant's motion, the Court finds that defendant has established its entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law based upon plaintiff's failure to exhaust "all remedies against the vehicle's owner before seeking relief from MVAIC," a "condition precedent to commencing an action against MVAIC" (A.C. Med. P.C. v MVAIC, 61 Misc 3d 1215(A) [Civ Ct, Kings County 2018]; TAM Med. Supply Corp. v. MVAIC, 58 Misc 3d 143(A) [App. Term, 2d Dept, 2017]).

Where "plaintiff and its assignor [are] aware of the identity of the owner of the vehicle that plaintiff's assignor was driving at the time of the accident, plaintiff, as assignee, [is] required [*3]to exhaust its remedies against the vehicle's owner before seeking relief from MVAIC" (Five Boro Psychological Services, P.C. v MVAIC, 27 Misc 3d 130(A) [App Term, 2d Dept 2010] [internal citations omitted]; see also B.Y., M.D., P.C. v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 31 Misc 3d 148(A) [App Term, 2d Dept 2011]). In this case, as plaintiff may be able to ascertain the identity of the owner and operator of the Striking Vehicle through its license plate, it must establish that it has exhausted all reasonable efforts to do so before it can bring a claim against MVAIC (See Compas Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 58 Misc 3d 129(A) [App Term, 2d Dept 2017]; see also Yi Song He v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 128 AD3d 525, 525 [1st Dept 2015] [petition for leave to bring an action against MVAIC pursuant to Insurance Law §5218 properly denied where two license plates were identified as belonging to the offending motor vehicle yet petitioner did not identify any effort made to investigate ownership of vehicle]). Since plaintiff has provided no evidence to MVAIC or the Court of any effort to find the owner or operator of the Striking Vehicle, its claim against MVAIC is premature and must be dismissed (Id.).

In opposition, plaintiff argues only that summary judgment is inappropriate because an issue of fact exists as to the mailing of the coverage request letters defendant sent to Beltran. Specifically, plaintiff argues that defendant did not have "good cause" to send these letters and that issues of fact also exist as to whether they were timely mailed. This argument is without merit, however, as it incorrectly applies the requirements for "verification letters" in 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 to the coverage request letters issued here (See Canon Chiropractic P.C. v MVAIC, 41 Misc 3d 1237(A) at fn 1 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2013]). These letters are not the same — verification letters are intended to "verify the economic loss or claims of the Plaintiff assignor" while coverage request letters "seek[] to qualify the applicant for MVAIC benefits" (Exclusive Med. Supply, Inc. v MVAIC, 35 Misc 3d 1209(A) [Civ Ct, Kings County 2012]) and the requirements of the former do not apply to the latter (Id.; see also MB Advanced Equip., Inc. v MVAIC, 48 Misc 3d 1049, 1054 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2015]).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.