| Matter of Ashanti v New York City Conflicts of Interest Bd. |
| 2021 NY Slip Op 06069 [199 AD3d 438] |
| November 9, 2021 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| In the Matter of Karl J. Ashanti, Petitioner, v New York City Conflicts of Interest Board, Respondent. |
Karl J. Ashanti, petitioner pro se.
Georgia M. Pestana, Corporation Counsel, New York (Philip W. Young of counsel), for respondent.
Determination of respondent, dated September 19, 2019, finding, after a hearing, that petitioner violated New York City Charter § 2604 (b) (3), (b) (7) and (b) (2) and 53 RCNY 1-13 (b), and ordering him to pay an aggregate civil penalty of $8,500, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Carol R. Edmead, J.], entered September 8, 2020), dismissed, without costs.
The determination that petitioner violated the above-cited Charter provision and City rule is supported by substantial evidence (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176 [1978]). Initially, there is no basis for disturbing the Administrative Law Judge's credibility determinations. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the evidence presented at the hearing raised a reasonable inference that he disclosed his position with an agency of the City of New York in order to obtain a personal advantage in negotiations on behalf of his wife. The penalty imposed for each of the three sustained charges does not shock the conscience (see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 233, 240 [1974]), especially in light of the evidence that petitioner, an attorney held to a higher ethical standard, had been warned about the conflict of interest but continued to pursue his wife's case against a subsidiary of another City agency and that petitioner used City letterhead to advance a legal position contrary to the City's interests.
We reject petitioner's due process claim. Petitioner had an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (see generally Matter of Kigin v State of N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bd., 24 NY3d 459, 469 [2014]). We also reject petitioner's claim of agency bias, particularly in the absence of any evidence that the outcome of the proceeding flowed from the alleged bias (see Matter of Cyrus v O'Neill, 184 AD3d 499, 500 [1st Dept 2020]). Concur—Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Oing, Moulton, Scarpulla, JJ.