New York Wellness, PT, PC v Plymouth Rock Assur.
2021 NY Slip Op 21259 [73 Misc 3d 682]
September 29, 2021
Epstein, J.
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, December 1, 2021


[*1]

New York Wellness, PT, PC, as Assignee of Joy Fearon, Plaintiff,
v
Plymouth Rock Assurance, Defendant.

Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County, September 29, 2021

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Brand Glick & Brand, P.C., Garden City (Todd Hyman of counsel), for defendant.

The Rybak Firm PLLC, Brooklyn (Oleg Rybak of counsel), for plaintiff.

{**73 Misc 3d at 683} OPINION OF THE COURT
Jill R. Epstein, J.

Defendant, Plymouth Rock Assurance, moves by notice of motion dated May 10, 2019, for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) and 308 dismissing the instant action for improper service and for summary judgment in favor of [*2]defendant pursuant to CPLR 3212 due to, inter alia, exhaustion of defendant's insurance coverage. As to the jurisdictional claim, it is defendant's contention that since plaintiff, New York Wellness, PT, PC as assignee of Joy Fearon, served defendant via FedEx, and not "personally," that no jurisdiction was obtained over defendant, as defendant never returned a signed acknowledgment of service as required by CPLR 312-a. CPLR 312-a provides that such mail service is complete only upon the return of a signed acknowledgment.

Defendant's argument might typically be justified. In this instance, however, plaintiff submits the affidavit of its process server, David Lett, sworn to on January 21, 2021, and annexed as exhibit 1 to the affirmation in opposition of Oleg Rybak, Esq., dated April 9, 2021. The affidavit of service, which is factually unrefuted by defendant, states that Mr. Lett served the summons and complaint upon defendant on December 31, 2020, at 1:14 p.m., via FedEx, with tracking No. 782107818732, mailed to 901 Franklin Avenue, Garden City, NY 11530. It is defendant's position that this manner of service is insufficient as defendant failed to return a signed acknowledgment of service. However, the affidavit of Mr. Lett makes clear that when he attempted to personally serve the papers upon defendant, he was advised by "Jim W. Security Guard/Legal" that the office was closed due to COVID-19 and that the legal department instructed that the summons and complaint be served "via Fed-Ex" to the address at 901 Franklin Avenue. Mr. Lett described the security guard as being a male, with brown skin and gray hair, approximately 55 years old, 5 feet, 10 inches tall and approximately 200 pounds. Defendant submits nothing to contradict either the attempted service upon "Jim W. Security Guard/Legal" or that the service policy at the time of service, as described by plaintiff, was in any way inaccurate.{**73 Misc 3d at 684}

On one hand, defendant's agent told the process server that the summons and complaint was to be served by FedEx, and on the other hand, defendant, having received the FedEx transmission, asserts that service was incomplete because defendant chose not to return a signed acknowledgment of service. The document was served in the manner in which the process server was directed to serve it. It is understandable that during the pandemic, with employees working remotely, defendant's counsel may have chosen to modify the manner in which it would accept and process service. What is not understandable, is defendant's attempt to benefit from its own service requirement in order to put plaintiff in an untenable position.

It should be noted that defendant objects to a purported delay in plaintiff meeting its briefing schedule herein. However, defendant had adequate time to reply to plaintiff's opposition and did, in fact, interpose such a reply. There is no prejudice to defendant from any purported delay.

"A defendant seeking to vacate a default in answering or appearing upon the ground of excusable default must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action." (Community Preserv. Corp. v Northern Blvd Prop., LLC, 140 AD3d 689, 690 [2d Dept 2016].) The communications between the parties clearly indicate that defendant knew of this claim, whether or not it returned a signed authorization.

As the court finds defendant's argument as to personal service disingenuous, the motion to dismiss is denied in all respects and there is no need to examine the balance of defendant's arguments as they are moot. The court need not look to the defendant's allegation of a meritorious defense unless and until defendant shows a reasonable excuse for its default. ([*3]Lemberger v Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 33 AD3d 671 [2d Dept 2006].) Instructing plaintiff as to specific service requirements due to a pandemic, and, thereafter, objecting to plaintiff's compliance with that specified manner of service is not such a reasonable excuse.

Plaintiff is correct in stating that defendant's "excuse was vague, undetailed and unsubstantiated, [and] it did not constitute a reasonable excuse for the default" (Atlantic Radiology Imaging, P.C. v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 50 Misc 3d 147[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50321[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]).

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that defendant's motion for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) and{**73 Misc 3d at 685} 308 dismissing the instant action for improper service is denied in all respects.