Ellen O'Hara Woods, for appellant. Rockland County District Attorney (Marissa L. Licata of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Stony Point, Rockland County (Frank J. Phillips, J.), rendered April 16, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of harassment in the second degree, and imposed sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]), unlawful imprisonment in the second degree (Penal Law § 135.05) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). The charges arose from allegations that defendant, while working as a special education teacher at Stony Point Elementary School, forcibly dragged the victim, an autistic student, across the classroom while the victim was screaming and yelling; placed the victim in a classroom closet; shut the closet door completely; and held the door shut for several minutes as the victim was screaming from within. Following a nonjury trial, the Justice Court acquitted defendant of endangering the welfare of a child and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, but convicted her of harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]).

Defendant's contention that the trial evidence was legally insufficient to establish her guilt of harassment in the second degree is unpreserved for our review, as she failed to renew her motion for a trial order of dismissal after presenting her own evidence (see People v Kolupa, 13 NY3d 786, 787 [2009]; People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 61 [2001]; People v Acevedo, 136 AD3d 1386, 1386 [2016]; cf. People v Finch, 23 NY3d 408, 412, 416 [2014]). In any event, viewing [*2]the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Delamota, 18 NY3d 107, 113 [2011]; People v Acosta, 80 NY2d 665, 672 [1993]), we find that the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]).

"A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person[, h]e or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same" (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]; see People v Repanti, 24 NY3d 706, 710 [2015]). Such intent may—and in most instances must—be established by inferences drawn from a defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances (see People v Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486, 489 [2011]; People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; People v Collins, 178 AD2d 789, 789 [1991]).

Here, the People presented evidence that, after seeing the victim engage in certain disruptive acts during a class, defendant grabbed the victim by her arm and hair, dragged the victim about 20 feet across the classroom floor as the victim was resisting, and forced her into the closet—thereby subjecting the victim to physical contact. The Justice Court was thus entitled to infer from defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances an intent to harass, annoy or alarm the victim (see People v Gordon, 23 NY3d 643, 650 [2014]; People v Collins, 178 AD2d at 789; People v Flores, 30 Misc 3d 135[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50152[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). Although defendant argues that her intent was to move the victim to a safe place for her to calm down, even assuming that this was defendant's ultimate motive, there was sufficient evidence to infer that defendant had the intent to harass, annoy or alarm the victim in order to achieve that objective (see People v Smith, 47 Misc 3d 153[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50816[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015]; People v Corona, 25 Misc 3d 129[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52107[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348-349), while according great deference to the trier of fact's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

GARGUILO, J.P., EMERSON and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.