Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a) of the papers considered in review of this Motion:

Upon the foregoing cited papers and after oral argument on November 16, 2021, [*2]conducted virtually via Microsoft Teams, the Decision and Order, pursuant to CPLR §3212(g), on Plaintiff's cause of action for repairs in the amount of $20,000.00, rent in the amount of $20,000.00, failure to provide proper services in the amount of $20,000.00 and breach of lease or rental agreement in the amount of $20,000, with interest on the four causes of action from April 5, 2015, and on Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment or in the alternative, motion to transfer to Supreme Court, is as follows:

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED, and Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED to the extent that the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

On or about September 9, 2016, Plaintiff, who is self-represented, filed a summons and complaint seeking damages on the above-listed grounds.^[FN2] The Civil Court-issued form used by Plaintiff is an "Application for a Summons" which provides, in the "Reason for Claim" section, eight reasons for claims, e.g., "Failure to Provide", "Breach of" Details of Claim", "Other", etc. For each basis, there is at least one choice, e.g., under "Breach of" one can check-off "contract" or "lease". Plaintiff checked-off as her "Reason for Claim" the following: "Failure to provide" "repairs" and "proper service"; "Failure to return" "money"; "Breach of" "lease", and "Other". On the form Plaintiff specified as her reasons for her claims the following: "Repairs $20,000"; "Breach of Lease $20,000"; "Improper service $20,000"; and "Back Rent Money for OCA Mae Gonney $20,000". See Exhibit A to Notice of Motion, Affirmation and Affidavits. In the "Details of Claim" section, there is a sub-section provided that states "Amount of Claim: Limit $25,000 for each Cause of Action", and upon which Plaintiff wrote-in $80,000. See id. at Exhibit A.

The case then moved through the Civil Court over several years in which mostly procedural, as opposed to the substantive claims, were addressed. For example, on or about January 19, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR section 3211, arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff lacked standing because she had never been the lessee or tenant of the apartment and because she failed to meet Public Housing Law § 157(1)'s requirement that that she first present her claims to Defendant before filing suit. On or about April 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed an answer claiming to have been the tenant of record until she was removed from the lease on April 5, 2015, and further that she had provided notice of her claims to Defendant through conversations and correspondence with various NYCHA employees. See id. at Exhibit [*3]B. By decision dated November 24, 2017, the Civil Court, Judge Cenceria Edwards, denied Defendant's motion as untimely because it had been filed more than three months after being served with the summons and complaint, and adjourned into 2018. See id. at Exhibit B. Defendant then moved to re-argue the Court's decision, which Judge Edwards denied, with leave to renew upon submission of "all necessary papers", including a proposed answer. See id. at Exhibit C. Defendant renewed its defenses in a verified answer, including that Plaintiff lacked standing because she had never been the lessee of tenant or record and because she failed to serve a notice of claim in accordance with Public Housing Law § 157, and by decision dated October 25, 2018, the Civil Court, Judge Rosemarie Montalbano, granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment after Plaintiff failed to appear at court. See id. at Exhibits E and F. On or about August 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed an order to show cause to vacate the dismissal of her claims. By decision dated August 28, 2019, the Civil Court, Judge Jill R. Epstein, vacated the dismissal and ordered the case to be restored to the trial calendar for February 26, 2020. See id. at Exhibit G. On February 26, 2020, the case was adjourned to October 26, 2020. See id. at Exhibit H.

By notice of motion dated August 19, 2020, Defendant sought summary judgment or, in the alternative, to have the case transferred to Supreme Court. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant claimed that because Plaintiff failed to meet Public Housing Law § 157(1)'s requirements, her claims were barred. In support of its alternative motion for a transfer, Defendant asserted that the Civil Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff sought to recover a total of $80,000 plus interest for what it asserted was "truly one cause of action", thereby exceeding this Court's jurisdictional limit of $25,000 per cause of action pursuant to Sections 202 and 211 of the New York Civil Court Act ("CCA") and that this Court should transfer the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 6, Section 19f of the New York State Constitution. Defendant further claimed that Plaintiff's claims relating to Defendant's determination of succession rights to the apartment upon the death of a former tenant of record as well as rent calculations were reviewable exclusively in the Supreme Court through an Article 78 proceeding. Moreover, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff's repair claims could only be heard in the Housing Part of the Civil Court pursuant to CCA § 110(a).

Plaintiff's "Application for a Summons" suggests that her filing of four causes of action totaling in excess of $25,000 in Civil Court was proper because the Civil Court form, on its face, appears to contemplate that a plaintiff may proceed on more than one cause of action if no single cause of action exceeds $25,000. Defendant, in turn, argues that Plaintiff's four causes of action are really one, and because the claim exceeds the Civil Court's $25,000 statutory jurisdictional limit, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint must therefore be dismissed or, in the alternative, transferred to the Supreme Court. In the alternative, Defendant argues that if this Court asserts jurisdiction, it should dismiss Plaintiff's claims on the grounds that she has no standing to make the claims as she has never been the lessee or tenant of the Apartment 10H at 157 Belmont Avenue, Brooklyn. In any event, Defendant argues that the claims, including but not limited to the issue of owed "arrears", are without merit.

Pursuant to CCA section 202, the Civil Court, through December 31, 2021, had jurisdiction over money actions in which the amount sought to be recovered does not exceed [*4]$25,000.^[FN3] Where several causes of action are asserted in a complaint, and each of them would be within the monetary jurisdiction of the court if sued upon separately, the Civil Court has jurisdiction over the action. See generally Bay Crest Assn v. Paar, 47 Misc 3d 9, 2015 NY Misc. LEXIS 210 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2015); Klarer v. Fischer, 35 Misc 3d 136(A), 2012 NY Misc. LEXIS 2060 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2012).

However, in the instant case, Plaintiff's claims for repairs, rent, failure to provide proper services and breach of lease or rental agreement, with interest from April 5, 2015, are interrelated through Plaintiff's tenancy claim, which as per Plaintiff's complaint all arose on April 5, 2015, and therefore constitute a single cause of action. Cf. Utopia Heart Care, P.L.L.C. v. Gramercy Cardiac Diagnostic Servs., P.C., 63 Misc 3d 132(A), 2019 NY Misc. LEXIS 1270 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2019) (four $6500 installments claimed due on a contract should have been merged into a single cause of action totaling $26,000 rather than four causes of action, and attorney's fees also being claimed as a separate cause of action should have been merged into the one action as well); Klarer v. Fischer, 35 Misc 3d 136(A) (because plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees and for breach of contract are interrelated it was only one cause of action rather than two, and thus exceeded the jurisdictional limit); Bd. Of Managers of Sea Breeze II Condo. v. Kwiecinski, 2003 NY Misc. LEXIS 1471 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2003). A single cause of action cannot be divided by a plaintiff to circumvent the monetary jurisdictional limit of the court. Cf. Swiss Hamlet Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Souza, 13 Misc 3d 87 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2006) (separate actions that were really one cause of action should have been brought together, whereupon the jurisdictional limit would be exceeded). Accordingly, because the aggregate sum of Plaintiff's "four" causes of action (which this Court finds is really a single merged claim) exceeds the Civil Court's monetary jurisdictional limit, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and therefore the proceedings here must end and so the Court is constrained to dismiss the case without prejudice. Cf. Utopia Heart Care, P.L.L.C. v. Gramercy Cardiac Diagnostic Servs., P.C., 63 Misc 3d 132(A) (complaint dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Klarer v. Fischer, 35 Misc 3d 136(A) (because claims for attorney's fees and breach of contract were interrelated as they arose under one agreement, combined amount sought exceeded court's jurisdictional limits and had to be dismissed); Swiss Hamlet Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Souza, 13 Misc 3d 87 (as separate actions were really one cause of action that exceeded the jurisdictional limit, dismissal was warranted); Bing v. Fairchild Presidential Mgt. Corp, 5 Misc 3d 130(A) (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2004) (as plaintiff sought damages exceeding the civil court's jurisdictional limit, the complaint had to be dismissed unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the claimed amount to within the dollar limit); Bd. Of Managers of Sea Breeze II Condo. v. Kwiecinski, 2003 NY Misc. LEXIS 1471.^[FN4]

In view of the foregoing, this Court will not address whether Plaintiff has ever been the lessee or tenant of record and has standing to make the claims, nor whether the underlying claims, e.g., failure to make repairs or provide proper service, have any merit. See, e.g., Swiss Hamlet Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Souza, 13 Misc 3d 87 (as plaintiff's cause of action exceeded the court's jurisdictional limit, the court would not reach issue of whether homeowner association late fees were unreasonable).

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.