David Zevin, Roslyn, for appellant.

Naness, Chaiet & Naness LLC, Jericho (Clifford P. Chaiet of counsel), for Joseph Benden and another, respondents.

Clifton Budd & DeMaria, LLP, New York (Douglas P. Catalano of counsel), for Ilene L. Nathanson and others, respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert R. Reed, J.), entered June 25, 2020, which granted defendants' CPLR 3211 (a) motions to dismiss the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reinstating plaintiff's cause of action for defamation, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff's allegations challenge the "academic and administrative standards and decisions" of defendant Long Island University (LIU) and two of its employees (Keles v Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 74 AD3d 435, 435 [1st Dept 2010], lv dismissed 16 NY3d 890 [2011], cert denied 565 US 884 [2011]). Accordingly, although she variously frames her claims in statute, tort, contract, and quasi-contract, plaintiff was required to bring those challenges via CPLR article 78, rather than in a plenary action, subject to the four-month limitations period applicable to article 78 proceedings (see Gary v New York Univ., 48 AD3d 235, 236 [1st Dept 2008]). Since plaintiff undisputedly did not bring her claims within that time frame, they are time-barred.

Plaintiff's claims against defendant Bayview Manor LLC (Bayview) are rooted in Bayview's service as LIU's agent in the provision of an educational internship, and her claims against Bayview and its employee likewise relate to matters of pedagogy and educational decisions. Thus likewise, plaintiff was required to bring her claims against Bayview in an article 78 proceeding, since those claims amount to a challenge to educational decisions (see Matter of Vellios v Serio, 1 Misc 3d 487, 489 [Sup Ct, NY County 2003]), except her claims as to defamation. In her tenth cause of action, plaintiff alleges that Bayview and its employee libeled her in her profession, which constituted slander per se. At least some of the alleged defamatory statements were concrete and verifiable, which, if false, would arguably both overcome the qualified privilege and tend to establish all of the elements of her defamation claim. Accordingly, plaintiff's defamation claim states a cause of action and is reinstated.

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Kapnick, J.P., Webber, Gesmer, Scarpulla, Shulman, JJ. [Prior Case History: 67 Misc 3d 1244(A), 2020 NY Slip Op 50819(U).]