Supreme Court, Saratoga County, February 8, 2022

Michael Hartnett, County Attorney, for respondents.

Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, LLP (Michael Koenig of counsel) for petitioner.

This matter comes before the court on a motion by respondents, pursuant to CPLR 3211, to dismiss the verified petition. Petitioner, formerly the County Administrator for the County of Saratoga, brought this proceeding seeking review of respondents' decision to terminate his employment and seeking an order reinstating him to his former position.

Respondents point out that petitioner's position was created by Local Law No. 7 (1979) of County of Saratoga § 3, which specifies that the County Administrator is appointed by the Board of Supervisors and "shall serve at the pleasure of the Board." Respondents also point out that, as an "unclassified" employee, petitioner was not entitled to the protections afforded by Civil Service Law § 75. Respondents thus argue that petitioner was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time at the discretion of the Board of Supervisors (Phillips v Town of Glenville, 160 AD3d 1264 [3d Dept 2018]). Therefore, respondents ask that the petition be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Petitioner makes two arguments in response. First, petitioner asserts that the Board of Supervisors did not have unfettered discretion. He cites case law for the proposition that he could not be terminated in bad faith or for improper or impermissible reasons (see e.g. Matter of Duncan v Kelly, 9 NY3d 1024 [2008]). Petitioner argues that respondents acted in bad faith and with improper motives by "scapegoating" him for an unpopular decision by the Board of Supervisors to increase compensation for essential employees who worked during the COVID-19 pandemic shutdown. Second, petitioner argues that the Board of Supervisors ignored the County's own policies, including its progressive discipline policy and work rules, by terminating him without pursuing progressive measures and affording him a hearing.

Petitioner's first argument fails because it relies upon a line of cases dealing with termination of probationary employees.{**74 Misc 3d at 972} Petitioner was not a probationary employee—having been a County employee for over 30 years and having worked as County Administrator for 10 of those years—and was thus not entitled to the protections that are sometimes afforded to probationary employees (see e.g. Matter of Zaretsky v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 196 AD2d 454 [1st Dept 1993]). Petitioner's second argument fails because respondents' disciplinary action policy, which states that appropriate procedures for termination of most employees can be found in the applicable collective bargaining agreement or in Civil Service Law § 75, further specifies that unclassified employees like petitioner are not protected by either of those procedures.

Petitioner's job was created by local law, which specifically provides that he served at the pleasure of the Board of Supervisors. He was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason (Phillips, 160 AD3d at 1267; see Maldonado v DiBre, 140 AD3d 1501 [3d Dept 2016]). Petitioner fails to identify a constitutionally impermissible purpose or statutory proscription that would provide an exception to this rule (see Smalley v Dreyfus Corp., 10 NY3d 55, 58 [2008]).

The parties' remaining contentions have been considered, but do not alter the outcome of this motion. Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the motion by respondents is granted in all respects, and the verified petition in this proceeding is hereby dismissed.