Supreme Court, Suffolk County, July 28, 2022

Caitlin Brooke Marie Corrigan, petitioner pro se.

Alyssa L. Garone, Assistant County Attorney, Hauppauge, for respondents.

[*2]It is ordered that the motion of petitioner (seq 001) is denied. Ordered that the cross motion (seq 002) of the respondents for dismissal of the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (7) is granted under the circumstances presented. It is further ordered that the petition is dismissed.

The case at bar is a petition pursuant to CPLR article 78 and Election Law § 16-102 (2). Petitioner, seeking to be a candidate for the Republican party in the 1st Congressional District, filed a certificate of designation as well as designating petitions for the Republican primary. She was disqualified by the respondents. Unless specified otherwise, all calendar dates refer to 2022.

Petitioner has filed the instant application which asserts that the respondents' disqualification was, among other things, arbitrary and capricious and in violation of lawful procedure and in denial of her due process rights under the New York State Constitution. Further, the petitioner asks for an order directing her restoration to the ballot in time for the August 23, 2022 Republican primary. The court must note that this article 78 proceeding was commenced in the following sequence: the original petition relating to the certificate of designation was filed on June 14 and served on June 21. The amended article 78 proceeding which challenged the disqualification of Ms. Corrigan's designating petition was filed on July 5.

In lieu of answering the petition, respondents have moved for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (7), granting dismissal of the petition in its entirety (Election Law § 16-102 [2]).

The thrust of the respondents' motion is one of timeliness (CPLR 3211 [a] [5]). Additionally, respondents contend that the petition lacks merit even if the court disregards the failure of Ms. Corrigan to meet applicable time constraints (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).{**77 Misc 3d at 311}

In the oft cited case of Kamchi v Weissman (125 AD3d 142, 150 [2d Dept 2014]), the Court stated: "In assessing the adequacy of a complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and afford the plaintiff 'the benefit of every possible favorable inference' " (citing J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co., 21 NY3d 324, 334 [2013], quoting AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]; see Sacher v Beacon Assoc. Mgt. Corp., 114 AD3d 655, 656 [2d Dept 2014]; Young v Brown, 113 AD3d 761, 761 [2d Dept 2014]).

It is against this standard of review that the sufficiency of the petition must be measured.

Respondents' counsel notes that in light of the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Harkenrider v Hochul (38 NY3d 494 [2022]), the lower court (Sup Ct, Steuben County, McAllister, J.) was obliged to redraw congressional and state senate maps. Justice McAllister issued an order [*3]on May 11, 2022, setting a calendar for the August 23, 2022 primary election and determining the methods of ballot access. The two methods of securing a place on the ballot were filing a certificate of designation or a designating petition (see 2022 NY Slip Op 32400[U] [2022]; petitioner's exhibit E).

Ms. Corrigan filed a certificate of designation on May 31, 2022 (respondents' administrative return exhibit A-1). An examination of this one-page document shows that in the section providing for the political party of the candidate, petitioner indicated "N/A."

The Board notified petitioner by letter dated June 8, 2022, that the certificate of designation she filed was determined to be invalid on the grounds that "the Certificate did not state the Party and/or stated a party that does not exist as required by the designating form and therefore the form is insufficient" (respondents' administrative return exhibit A-4).

Additionally, petitioner filed a designating petition with the Board of Elections. The respondents rejected this document (more accurately documents) as well, based on it being filed after the June 10, 2022 deadline imposed by Justice McAllister. It is uncontroverted that Ms. Corrigan's petition was postmarked on June 10. It was not received, however, until June 13.

Moreover, the respondents contend that this article 78 proceeding is untimely.{**77 Misc 3d at 312}

In opposing the respondents' motion, the petitioner's answering papers, at 86 pages, are far in excess of the 7,000-word maximum allowed under 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. The respondents requested the court reject Ms. Corrigan's papers. Although such an action was within the court's prerogative pursuant to the rule in Macias v City of Yonkers (65 AD3d 1298 [2d Dept 2009]; see 215 Siegel's Practice Review, Court by Rule Can Impose Page Limits on Submissions, But Can't Accept Paper That Exceeds Limit and Just Disregard Excess Parts at 3 [Nov. 2009]), since the petitioner is self-represented and not an attorney, the interests of justice require that the technical defects in her court filings be overlooked in order to ascertain if there is merit to the arguments contained therein.

Accordingly, we have afforded her moving papers every favorable inference and give a broad and liberal interpretation to her arguments (Moore v County of Rensselaer, 156 AD2d 784 [3d Dept 1989]). Cognizant of our duty to attempt the resolution of the dispute on the merits (see Smithtown Gen. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 111 AD2d 382 [2d Dept 1985]), we have disregarded the technical defects in Ms. Corrigan's motion papers to ascertain if they contain any legal argument which has a bearing on the issues presented before the court.

One defective aspect of the petitioner's answering papers cannot be overlooked. The court must admonish the petitioner for certain intemperate language used in her papers wherein she accuses Ms. Garone of incompetence and/or deliberately misleading the court. Ms. Corrigan is not an attorney. By her own statements, however, she has attended prestigious institutions of higher learning and holds a Master's degree in Divinity. Although she is not to be held to the standards of a lawyer under the Rules of Professional Conduct, Ms. Corrigan must still conduct herself in a professional manner. As such, the court found her personal remarks directed at Ms. Garone to be insulting in addition to being legally incorrect (see Capetola v Capetola, 96 AD3d 612, 613 [1st Dept 2012]). An effective advocate, regardless of whether they hold a Juris Doctor's degree, does not need to resort to such language. Indeed, it is the obligation of the judge to insure indecorous behavior does not occur (see 22 NYCRR 100.3 [B] [2]). Petitioner also derides legal writing as "the most elitist, pompous, and complex writing I have ever experienced in my life" (letter to the court dated July 20, 2022). We must inform the petitioner that over the centuries unto the present day, our society owes a great debt to{**77 Misc 3d at 313} those luminaries of the bench and bar who, in employing the legal writing she condemns, have proved themselves to be true guardians of liberty. We commend petitioner to study the works of the great jurists, thus realizing this profound knowledge witnessed by the maxim "multa [*4]ignoramus quÆ nobis non laterent si veterum lectio nuit familiaris" (10 Coke 73).^[FN*]

The gravamen of Ms. Corrigan's argument is that she was a properly designated candidate on May 18, 2022, so her removal from the ballot is an illegal act (aff of Ms. Corrigan at 6). "There is no law that allows the Suffolk County Board of Elections to invalidate my candidacy after the New York State Board of Elections already determined my petition was valid on May 18, 2022 and placed me on the Ballot" (aff of Corrigan at 8, para d). Part of her authority for making this statement is reliance on a purported communication she had with Justice McAllister's law clerk. Ms. Corrigan recorded this conversation and provided a copy to the court (petitioner's exhibit 3).

Petitioner also indicates that she timely commenced this action on June 14, 2022 (aff in opp at 6).

Petitioner's contention is that her oversight in neglecting to list her party as Republican on the certificate of designation was cured by her amended certificate of designation, dated June 14, 2022, and letter to the Board dated June 13, 2022 (respondents' administrative return exhibit A-5-10), and that this "cure" should be accepted "as a nunc pro tunc correction" (petitioner's opp at 19). Additionally, petitioner appears to argue that the omission should have been considered de minimis by the respondents in light of other documentation she submitted which clearly indicated her party affiliation. Moreover, it is asserted that since Ms. Corrigan's candidacy had been approved by the State Board of Elections prior to Harkenrider's mandate, her filings for the 1st Congressional District Republican primary should be considered pro forma.

Ms. Corrigan advances her arguments with commendable vigor and great skill. Ultimately, however, they prove to be chimerical.

The court must initially address the sufficiency of the proof submitted by the movants.

It is well settled law that when administrative agencies make decisions that are subject to judicial review, the decision itself{**77 Misc 3d at 314} must be "sufficiently definite to inform the court and the parties as to the findings made and the basis of the findings" (Sidor v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 32 AD2d 944, 945 [2d Dept 1969], citing Matter of Moudis v Macduff, 286 App Div 485, 486 [1st Dept 1955]).

In the matter before us, the respondents' exhibits contain the minutes of the proceeding which demonstrate their reasoning in declining to accept the petitioner's certificate of designation. A fair reading of the administrative return satisfies the court that the findings of the Board of Elections lend themselves to intelligent review.

The next point of discussion is the standard of review in a proceeding under CPLR article 78. In order to overturn an administrative agency's determination, the court must find that the respondents acted in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner, i.e. "when it [was] taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts" (Matter of Bard Coll. v Dutchess County Bd. of Elections, 198 AD3d 1014, 1017 [2d Dept 2021], citing Matter of Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist. v Town of Hempstead Indus. Dev. Agency, 196 AD3d 486, 487 [2d Dept 2021], quoting Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]; see CPLR 7803 [3]). [*5]

In its examination of the record, the court must not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency responsible for making the determination" (Matter of Cohen v State of New York, 2 AD3d 522, 525 [2d Dept 2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]). So long as the conclusion of the agency is supported by the record, the court is bound to uphold it even if a different outcome "could be reached as a result of conflicting evidence." (Cohen at 525, citing Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]; Matter of Lane Constr. Corp. v Cahill, 270 AD2d 609 [3d Dept 2000]; Matter of Save Our Forest Action Coalition v City of Kingston, 246 AD2d 217, 221 [3d Dept 1998].)

In the case at bar, the proof regarding the certificate of designation is unequivocal. There was an error in filling out the form which the respondents, in exercising their prerogative, had the authority to reject as insufficient. Their action cannot be deemed arbitrary in any respects.

Assuming, arguendo, that the court accepted Ms. Corrigan's argument concerning the validity of the certificate of designation, it would still be necessary to deny her the sought-after relief in her petition.{**77 Misc 3d at 315}

Election Law § 16-102 (2) provides:

"A proceeding with respect to a petition shall be instituted within fourteen days after the last day to file the petition, or within three business days after the officer or board with whom or which such petition was filed, makes a determination of invalidity with respect to such petition, whichever is later."

The petition before the court is styled as an article 78 proceeding and asserts claims under the Federal and State Constitutions. The rule stated in Matter of Ciotti v Westchester County Bd. of Elections (109 AD3d 988, 989 [2d Dept 2013]), however, opines that "this proceeding is governed by the statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2)" (citing Matter of Independence Party of Orange County v New York State Bd. of Elections, 32 AD3d 804, 804 [2d Dept 2006]; Matter of Lewis v Garfinkle, 32 AD3d 548, 549 [2d Dept 2006]; Matter of Scaringe v Ackerman, 119 AD2d 327, 328-329 [3d Dept 1986], affd 68 NY2d 885 [1986]; see also Matter of Haight v Knapp, 88 AD3d 921, 923 [2d Dept 2011]).

It is beyond cavil that the respondent Board of Elections notified petitioner by letter dated June 8, 2022, that the certificate of designation was found to be invalid. (Respondents' administrative return exhibit A-4.) Pursuant to the aforementioned statute, petitioner had until June 14, 2022, to commence a proceeding, in order to challenge that administrative determination. As stated by the Court in Matter of Nunziato v Messano (87 AD3d 647, 648 [2d Dept 2011]), the commencing of the action includes serving all necessary parties. As the moving papers demonstrate, however, Ms. Corrigan did not serve her original petition on the Board of Elections until June 21, 2022, at 3:10 p.m. (respondents' exhibit C).

Therefore, the court is constrained to dismiss petitioner's claims arising from the respondents' rejection of the certificate of designation.

The court now turns to the actions of the respondents vis-à-vis the filing of the designating petition.

The Harkenrider court also provided for ballot access by means of the filing of a new party designating petition with the appropriate board of elections by June 10, 2022. (2022 NY Slip Op 32400[U]; petitioner's exhibit E.) Justice McAllister ordered "all filings required to be made at the appropriate board of elections with no filings permitted by mail except to the extent that any mailed filing is actually received by the last date allowed" (2022 NY Slip Op 32400[U], *3). [*6]{**77 Misc 3d at 316}

The respondent Board received, by mail, petitioner's Republican party designating petition naming Ms. Corrigan as a candidate for the Office of Congressional Representative (NY 1st CD). Although it was postmarked on June 10, it arrived on June 13, 2022 (respondents' administrative return exhibit A-16-410).

On June 21, 2022, the Suffolk County Board of Elections met to rule on the propriety of Ms. Corrigan's designating petition. (Respondents' administrative return exhibit A-417-418.) The minutes of the meeting reveal the following: the respondents determined that the submission of the petition was untimely on the basis of its failure to comply with the June 10, 2022 deadline as directed by Harkenrider. (Respondents' administrative return exhibit A-417-418.) As pointed out by Ms. Garone in her eloquent brief, petitioner's own proof (exhibit L) includes a United States Postal Service receipt which indicates that the designating petition was only mailed on June 10, 2022.

Once again, the court finds that the respondents' actions, in the exercise of their administrative responsibilities, "had a rational basis in the record" (Matter of Sternberg v New York State Off. for People with Dev. Disabilities, 204 AD3d 680, 682 [2d Dept 2022]). Conversely, for the respondents to have accepted the late filing of the designating petition would have been in contravention of the provisions of Harkenrider. Such a decision would have clearly been "without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts" (Sternberg at 682 [internal quotation marks omitted], citing Matter of McCollum v City of New York, 184 AD3d 838, 839 [2d Dept 2020], quoting Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]).

The failure of Ms. Corrigan to file her designating petition within the parameters of the Harkenrider schedule are compounded by the delays in bringing this petition before the court.

Since the respondents disallowed the designating petition of Ms. Corrigan on June 21, the last date on which she could commence a proceeding was June 24 (Election Law § 16-102 [2]). Petitioner, however, filed and served her amended petition on July 5, 2022 (see petitioner's exhibit A). Petitioner did not file and serve the present order to show cause until July 11.

Ms. Corrigan argues that the time frame for review of the claims asserted herein should be the original petition of June 14 (served on June 21) and not the later date. Once again, the court disagrees with this view.{**77 Misc 3d at 317}

In order for the court to apply the earlier filing date to the amended petition for purposes of calculating the time limitations under Election Law § 16-102 (2), it would be necessary to invoke the relation-back doctrine. Its elements are set forth by the Court in Rivera v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr. (175 AD3d 522, 524 [2d Dept 2019]):

"To establish the applicability of the relation-back doctrine, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence; (2) the new party is united in interest with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that he or she will not be prejudiced in maintaining his or her defense on the merits; and (3) the new defendant knew or should have known that, but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against him or her as well" (citations omitted).

Petitioner's argument to the contrary, the claim arising out of the rejection of the [*7]designating petition did not occur until after the events complained of in the original article 78 action. The relation-back doctrine cannot be applied under these circumstances (Cooper v Sleepy's, LLC, 126 AD3d 664, 665-666 [2d Dept 2015]).

Petitioner has made reference to an earlier lawsuit, LaLota v Corrigan (index No. 607687/2022), and the findings in that case (letter from petitioner to the court dated July 20, 2022). Ms. Corrigan's reliance on the holding in that matter is misplaced. The lack of identity of parties precludes the use of judicial estoppel (Moran Enters., Inc. v Hurst, 160 AD3d 638, 639-640 [2d Dept 2018]). Additionally, the doctrine of "law of the case" also does not lend itself to rulings by the court in LaLota v Corrigan (Strujan v Glencord Bldg. Corp., 137 AD3d 1252, 1253 [2d Dept 2016]).

The remaining contentions of the petitioner have been carefully considered but ultimately fail to persuade the court that Ms. Corrigan has a viable cause of action.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the motion of the respondents will be granted, and the petition shall be dismissed.

This order also constitutes the judgment of the court.