Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Charlotte E. Davidson, J.), rendered January 10, 2019, after a nonjury trial, convicting it of failing to display a motor vehicle tax sticker in violation of Administrative Code of the City of NY § 11-809, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Charlotte E. Davidson, J.), rendered January 10, 2019, affirmed.

Defendant was issued a summons for violating section 11-809 of the Administrative Code of the City of NY, upon allegations that its "dump truck had no valid NYC tax stamp displayed." Title 11, Chapter 8 of the Administrative Code imposes a tax on certain commercial motor vehicles used in New York City provided that the vehicle is "used principally in the city or used principally in connection with a business carried on within the city" (Administrative Code § 11-801[3]; 19 RCNY 6-01). The Code also establishes a presumption that such vehicles are used principally in the city or used principally in connection with a business carried on within the city "until the contrary is established" (Administrative Code § 11-804; accord 19 RCNY 604).

The verdict convicting defendant of failure to display a motor vehicle tax sticker (see Administrative Code § 11-809) was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the court's determination concerning credibility. Even assuming that defendant rebutted the presumption that the vehicle at issue was used principally in the city, it failed to rebut the presumption that the vehicle was "used principally in connection with a business carried on within the city" (Administrative Code § 11-804). Contrary to defendant's argument, the presumption that the vehicle was used principally in connection with a business carried on within the city was not rebutted by evidence of the particular truck's mileage within the city (see 19 RCNY 6-02[a]), or the testimony of its safety and compliance manager that defendant did business in New Jersey where its sole office was located. Indeed, despite repeated prompting by the court to provide any "helpful testimony" relating to the extent the business was carried on in New York City versus New Jersey, counsel responded that defendant's sole witness could not [*2]testify "as to the extent of operations in one place," and defendant provided no other evidence in this regard.

We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining contention.

All concur

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.