INTRODUCTION

This is a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 70. Petitioner is currently in the custody of the Albany County Sheriff while being treated at Albany Medical Center.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner, Jordan Young, has been charged with Menacing a Police Officer, a class D felony, and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree, a Class A Misdemeanor, based upon a January 24, 2022 incident wherein Mr. Young is alleged to have charged at a uniformed police officer while armed with a knife. The police officer then shot Mr. Young multiple times in the torso, causing him to suffer severe injuries for which he remains hospitalized at Albany Medical Center. On February 18, 2022, Mr. Young was arraigned in Albany City Court and remanded to police custody. Following a bail hearing conducted on February 24, 2022, Albany County Court Judge William Little denied Mr. Young's bail application and remanded him to custody pending trial. Mr. Young has now filed an application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking to have this Court set aside County Court's determination and direct a less restrictive means to assure his return to court. Oral argument was held on the record on March 21, 2022 at which time petitioner appeared remotely from his hospital bed at Albany Medical Hospital. His attorney appeared in person as well as attorneys from the County Attorney's Office and the Albany County Sheriff's Office. Notably, there were no appearances on behalf of the Albany County District Attorney's office. In relevant part, respondents took no position when asked by the Court whether in their view they thought petitioner was a flight risk.

In Matter of State of NY ex rel. Fischetti v Brann, 166 AD3d 29, 39 [1st Dept. 2018], the Court held,

"It is well established that [t]he action of the bail-fixing court is nonappealable, but may be reviewed in a habeas corpus proceeding if it appears that the constitutional or statutory standards inhibiting excessive bail or the arbitrary refusal of bail are violated. Further, the function of the habeas corpus court is one of collateral review of the determination of the nisi prius court; it is a second stage re-examination. The habeas corpus court is not to examine the bail question afresh or to make a de novo determination of bail.

Thus, the habeas corpus court ['s review] must of necessity be limited to consideration of the propriety of [the bail court's] determination in the light of the record on which it was made. In other words, [t] he scope of inquiry is whether or not the bail court abused its discretion by denying bail without reason or for reasons insufficient in law. And, where the record shows that the bail court considered the factors enumerated in CPL 510.30 (2) (a) and the denial is supported by the record, it is an exercise of discretion resting on a rational basis and thus beyond correction in habeas corpus." (internal quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added)

According to the applicable statute, County Court was required to release Mr. Young on his own recognizance, unless the Court makde an individualized determination that Mr. Young posed a risk of flight to avoid prosecution. See CPL § 510.10. If such a finding was made, County Court was required to select the least restrictive alternative and conditions that would reasonably secure Mr. Young's return to court. In making the determination, County Court was required to consider the factors outlined in CPL § 510.30, including Mr. Young's activities and history, the charges facing him, his prior criminal record if any, and his previous record of flight to avoid criminal prosecution. At the February 24, 2022 hearing, County Court concluded on the record the following:

"I've made an individualized determination and find that defendant possesses a risk of flight to avoid prosecution based on the potential sentence that he may face from this charge, as well as his four or five open cases in Albany City Court and Guilderland."

This Court finds such a conclusion was an abuse of discretion. There is no way to view the facts and the record in this matter and rationally conclude that petitioner is a flight risk. While the record establishes that Judge Little correctly listed the factors outlined in Section 510.30 of the Criminal Procedure law, he failed to set forth his specific reasons for concluding, based on the facts in this case, that petitioner was a flight risk. Petitioner is currently confined to a hospital bed and will require additional [*2]surgeries. Indeed, he was unable to attend in person today but instead appeared from his hospital bed. Therefore his current prognosis precludes any risk of flight. Furthermore, the record establishes that petitioner suffers from a mental illness and during the period of time in question, he had not taken his psychiatric medication. What is more, being shackled to a bed while recovering from severe gun shot wounds appears to violate petitioner's constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, the Court finds there are less restrictive means to reasonably assure petitioner's return to Court and compliance with Court conditions which are outlined below.

CONCLUSION

County Court abused its discretion when it determined to remand petitioner without bail. There is no way to view the facts and the record in this matter and rationally conclude that petitioner is a flight risk. Accordingly petitioner's writ of habeas corpus is granted; and the February 24, 2022 mandate/commitment order, issued by Albany County Court is vacated. For the foregoing reasons it is

ORDERED that petitioner is released on his own recognizance; and it is so

ORDERED, that petitioner must comply with the following non-monetary conditions of release:

1) Report to the Albany County Probation Department, via telephone from Albany Medical Hospital by close of business today; and

2) Comply with all terms of pretrial probation supervision deemed necessary and imposed by the supervising probation department, including but not limited to submitting to random drug and alcohol screening; and

3) Comply with all treatment and medications prescribed by his treating psychiatrists.

This memorandum constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the Court.^[FN1]