| People v Ferrer (Angel) |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 50391(U) [75 Misc 3d 129(A)] |
| Decided on May 12, 2022 |
| Appellate Term, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Abena Darkeh, J. at plea, Steven M. Statsinger, J. at sentencing), rendered September 10, 2015, convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal contempt in the second degree, and imposing sentence.
Per Curiam.
Judgment of conviction (Abena Darkeh, J. at plea, Steven M. Statsinger, J. at sentencing), rendered September 10, 2015, affirmed.
Since defendant waived prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument is assessed under the reasonable cause standard applicable to a misdemeanor complaint (see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the instrument was jurisdictionally valid because it described facts of an evidentiary nature establishing reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of criminal contempt in the second degree (see Penal Law § 215.50[3]). The instrument alleges that on November 12, 2014, defendant signed a five-year order of protection "in court" that directed him to "stay away" from Emilia Ribot. The instrument further alleges that on three subsequent dates - May 14, 2015, May 21, 2015 and June 3, 2015 - defendant intentionally disobeyed the order when he went to Ribot's apartment and "banged on her door for five minutes" while "cursing and screaming to be let inside" (see People v Salazar, 290 AD2d 256 [2002], lv denied 97 NY2d 760 [2002]). These factual allegations are sufficient to particularize the crime charged and protect against a constitutional double jeopardy violation (see People v Kaplan, 125 AD3d 465 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1203 [2015]; People v Ellison, 106 AD3d 419 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1004 [2013]). Any further challenges to the validity of the order of protection were "matter[s] to be raised as a defense to the contempt charge, not by insistence that this [accusatory instrument] was jurisdictionally defective" (People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 577 [2004][internal quotation marks and alterations omitted]).
Our previous affirmance of the conviction that resulted in the issuance of the order of protection (see People v Ferrer, 73 Misc 3d 148[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50007[U] [App Term, 1st [*2]Dept 2022], lv denied 38NY3d950[2022]), renders defendant's remaining argument academic.
All concur
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.