Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Diana M. Boyar, J. at plea; Heidi C. Cesare, J. at re-plea and sentencing), rendered March 14, 2016, convicting him, upon a plea of guilty, of disorderly conduct, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Diana M. Boyar, J. at plea; Heidi C. Cesare, J. at re-plea and sentencing), rendered March 14, 2016, affirmed.

In view of defendant's knowing waiver of the right to prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally valid because it described facts of an evidentiary nature establishing reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of third-degree assault (see Penal Law § 120.00). The "physical injury" element of the offense was satisfied by allegations that defendant struck the complainant "about the face with a closed fist," causing "swelling, bruising, redness and substantial pain." Based on these allegations, a reasonable person could infer that the victim felt "substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00[9]; see People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]; People v Mercado, 94 AD3d 502 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 999 [2012]), a term which simply means "more than slight or trivial pain" (People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 [2007]). Defendant's intent to cause physical injury was readily inferable from his actions (see Matter of Edward H., 61 AD3d 473, 473 [2009]).

All concur

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.