Nassau County Legal Aid Society (Tammy Feman and Daniel P. Schumeister of counsel), for appellant. Nassau County District Attorney (Monica M.C. Leiter of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from judgments of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (William Hohauser, J., at pleas; Eileen Goggin, J., at sentencings), rendered March 2, 2020. The judgments convicted defendant, upon his pleas of guilty, of driving while ability impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, respectively, and imposed sentences.

ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Defendant was charged in an information with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (Penal Law § 220.03) and, in a separate simplified traffic information, with driving while ability impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [4-a]). Thereafter, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to both charges and was subsequently sentenced to concurrent three-year terms of probation for each conviction, his driver's license was suspended, and surcharges and fees were imposed.

On appeal, defendant contends, among other things, that his guilty pleas must be vacated because he never affirmatively pleaded guilty and did not admit to any conduct underlying the charges, which facts bring the case within the People v Lopez (71 NY2d 662 [1988]) exception to [*2]the preservation requirement.

"Generally, in order to preserve a claim that a guilty plea is invalid, a defendant must move to withdraw the plea . . . or else file a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10" (People v Peque, 22 NY3d 168, 182 [2013]; see People v Williams, 27 NY3d 212, 214 [2016]; People v Conceicao, 26 NY3d 375, 381 [2015]; People v Tyrell, 22 NY3d 359, 363-364 [2013]; Lopez, 71 NY2d at 665). However, a narrow exception to the preservation requirement has been recognized where the particular circumstances of a case reveal that a defendant had "no practical ability to object to an error" in the taking of a plea, "which is clear from the face of the record" (Peque, 22 NY3d at 182; see Williams, 27 NY3d at 221-222). A review of the record herein indicates that defendant pleaded guilty in January 2019 and was sentenced in March 2020. During this time period, defendant had ample opportunity to move to withdraw his pleas on the same grounds he now advances on appeal. As defendant failed to take advantage of that opportunity, he has not preserved his current claim for appellate review (see Williams, 27 NY3d at 214, 225).

In any event, the record does not support defendant's claims of error as it is well settled that a plea allocution based on a negotiated plea does not require a defendant to make specific admissions as to each element of a charged offense (see People v Goldstein, 12 NY3d 295, 301 [2009]; People v Marinos, 209 AD3d 875 [2022]), and a plea will be upheld if it was entered into voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently (see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 548 [1993]). Here, defendant understood the charges and made an intelligent, knowing and voluntary decision to enter his guilty pleas (see Goldstein, 12 NY3d at 301; Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d at 548; Marinos, 209 AD3d 875).

We pass on no other issue.

Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

GARGUILO, P.J., EMERSON and DRISCOLL, JJ., concur.