Supreme Court, Suffolk County, January 10, 2023

Law Office of Gregory A. Goodman, Jericho, for defendant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Centereach, for plaintiff.

It is ordered that the motion by the defendant for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), dismissing the plaintiff's complaint is granted.

In July 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover payment for medical services allegedly provided to the defendant at Stony Brook University Hospital. The services were rendered in September 2016. Prior to service of an answer, the defendant moves to dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant contends that the action is untimely pursuant to CPLR 213-d, which was enacted in April 2020, and provides that an action on a medical debt shall be commenced within three years of treatment. The plaintiff contends that the statute should not be applied retroactively and that prior law provides for a six year statute of limitations based on breach of contract.

As a general rule, statutory amendments are presumed to have prospective application unless the Legislature's preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly indicated (see Matter of Gleason [Michael Vee, Ltd.], 96 NY2d 117 [2001]; Matter of OnBank & Trust Co., 90 NY2d 725 [1997]). However, remedial legislation or statutes governing procedural matters should be applied retroactively (see Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577 [1998]; Becker v Huss Co., 43 NY2d 527 [1978]). Other factors in the retroactivity analysis include whether the Legislature has made a specific pronouncement about retroactive effect or conveyed a sense of urgency, whether the statute was designed to rewrite an unintended judicial interpretation and whether the enactment itself reaffirms a legislative judgment about what the law in question should be (see Matter of Gleason [Michael Vee, Ltd.]).

Here, the Legislature did not expressly indicate whether the statute was to apply retroactively but did provide that the act would take effect immediately (see L 2020, ch 56, § 1, part YY, {**78 Misc 3d at 439}§ 21). While this language is not alone determinative, it does evince a sense of urgency (see Brothers v Florence, 95 NY2d 290 [2000]; Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist.). The legislative history indicates that the purpose of the statute was to protect patients by shortening the statute of limitations for medical debt. Thus, the statute is remedial in nature. In addition, statutes of limitations are procedural in nature and are generally given retroactive effect (see Verra v Koluksuz, 74 AD2d 932 [3d Dept 1980], citing McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 55). Under these circumstances, the statute should apply not only to causes of action accruing after its effective date but also to previously accrued claims not yet interposed (see Brothers v Florence).

Accordingly, CPLR 213-d is applicable to this action. However, the application of the shortened limitations period would result in an immediate time bar since the plaintiff's action accrued in 2016. When a limitations period is statutorily shortened, due process requires that potential litigants be afforded a reasonable time for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect (see Brothers v Florence; Matter of Bayley Seton Hosp. v New York City Water Bd., 46 AD3d 553 [2d Dept 2007]; Matter of Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc. v Tweedy, 33 AD3d 794 [2d Dept 2006]). In very similar circumstances, the Court of Appeals held that a one year grace period for claims subject to a shortened limitations period was reasonable (see Brothers v Florence).

In this case, the statute was effective April 3, 2020, but the action was not filed until July 2022. Even considering the tolling of the statute of limitations that was in effect due to the pandemic (see Brash v Richards, 195 AD3d 582 [2d Dept 2021]), the toll ended as of November 4, 2020, and this action was not filed within one year of that date. Therefore, the action is untimely (see Brothers v Florence; see also McGuirk v City School Dist. of City of Albany, 116 AD2d 363 [3d Dept 1986]).

Accordingly, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.