Feldman and Feldman (Steven A. Feldman of counsel), for appellant.

Suffolk County District Attorney (Alfred Croce, Glenn Green and Marion Tang of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Edward J. Hennessey, J.), rendered July 14, 2021. The judgment, insofar as appealed from as limited by the brief, convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of disorderly conduct, and imposed sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

In an information charging defendant with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [1]) and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), defendant pleaded guilty to the reduced charges of facilitating aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511-a [1]) and disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20 [7]) in satisfaction of that information and other accusatory instruments. On appeal, defendant contends that his plea to disorderly conduct was not entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

"Generally, in order to preserve a claim that a guilty plea is invalid, a defendant must move to withdraw the plea . . . or else file a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant [*2]to CPL 440.10" (People v Peque, 22 NY3d 168, 182 [2013]; see People v Delorbe, 35 NY3d 112, 119 [2020]; People v Conceicao, 26 NY3d 375, 381 [2015]). However, a narrow exception exists "where the particular circumstances of a case reveal that a defendant had no actual or practical ability to object to an alleged error in the taking of a plea that was clear from the face of the record" (Conceicao, 26 NY3d at 381; see Delorbe, 35 NY3d at 119; People v Louree, 8 NY3d 541, 546 [2007]). Here, since defendant was sentenced in the same proceeding in which he entered his plea of guilty, he "faced a practical inability to move to withdraw [his] plea" (Conceicao, 26 NY3d at 382; see People v Thompson, 74 Misc 3d 134[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50278[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022]). Therefore, defendant's claim is preserved for appellate review (see People v Sougou, 26 NY3d 1052, 1054 [2015]; Thompson, 2022 NY Slip Op 50278[U]).

An allocution based on a negotiated plea need not elicit from a defendant specific admissions as to each element of the charged crime (see People v Goldstein, 12 NY3d 295, 301 [2009]; People v Marchese, 73 Misc 3d 144[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51237[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021]; People v Munoz, 62 Misc 3d 127[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51859[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018]). Nor is "[t]he court's duty to inquire further . . . triggered merely by the failure of a pleading defendant, whether or not represented by counsel, to recite every element of the crime pleaded to" (People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666 n 2 [1988]; see Goldstein, 12 NY3d at 301). Indeed, no catechism is required in connection with the acceptance of a plea and the Court of Appeals has refused to disturb pleas even when there has been absolutely no elicitation of the underlying facts of the crime (see Goldstein, 12 NY3d at 301; People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 350 [1967]). It is enough that the allocution shows that the defendant understood the charges and made an intelligent decision to enter a plea (see Goldstein, 12 NY3d at 301; Marchese, 2021 NY Slip Op 51237[U]; see also People v Arce-Ramirez, 71 Misc 3d 135[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50414[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021] [finding that, since a defendant can plead guilty to a crime for which there is no factual basis and even plead guilty to a hypothetical offense, a guilty plea will be sustained even in the complete absence of a factual recitation of the underlying circumstances of the offense where the defendant otherwise understood the nature of the charges and entered the plea voluntarily]).

Here, defendant, represented by counsel, clearly understood the nature of the charge to which he was pleading and willingly entered his plea to obtain the benefit of the bargain he had struck. Moreover, nothing defendant said or failed to say in his plea allocution to the charge of disorderly conduct negated any element of that offense or cast doubt on his admitted guilt of that offense which would have required further inquiry by the court before accepting the plea (see Lopez, 71 NY2d at 666). Overall, defendant's plea represented "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to" him (People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 19 [1983]; see North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25, 31 [1970]). Consequently, the record as a whole affirmatively discloses that defendant entered his plea to disorderly conduct knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently (see Thompson, 2022 NY Slip Op 50278[U]; Marchese, 2021 NY Slip Op 51237[U]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

GARGUILO, P.J., EMERSON and McCORMACK, JJ., concur.