On a prior motion in this action, this court granted defendants' request for sanctions under 22 NYCRR part 130, and awarded sanctions in the form of defendants' "reasonable attorney fees [*2]in this action," with the amount of those fees to be determined by a motion on notice. (See Coakley v Berger, 2022 NY Slip Op 51014[U], at *3-5, 6 [Sup Ct, NY County Oct. 14, 2022].) Defendants now move without opposition from pro se plaintiff to determine their reasonable attorney fees. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Defendants have submitted detailed time records, reflecting a total of 190.8 hours billed on this case by two attorneys—a special counsel to the firm, and a junior associate. (See NYSCEF No. 65.) That total is substantial. But under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the number of hours is reasonable. The court reaches a different conclusion about the rates at which those hours were billed. Defendants seek a total of $197,530 in fees—an average billing rate of $1,035 an hour. (See id. at 4-5; NYSCEF No. 64 at ¶ 3 [attorney affirmation].) This rate exceeds what is reasonable for fee-shifting purposes.

A party seeking an attorney-fee award must support its claimed hourly rate (or rates) with evidence of the "customary fee charged for similar services by lawyers in the community with like experience and of comparable reputation to those by whom the prevailing party was represented." (Gamache v Steinhaus, 7 AD3d 525, 527 [2d Dept 2004] [internal quotation marks omitted].) The brief affirmation submitted by defendants' counsel in support of their fee motion does not include this information. Indeed, the affirmation does not contain any information to support or justify the claimed hourly rates, such as either attorney's background or experience.^[FN1] (See NYSCEF No. 64 at ¶¶ 3-6.)

Additionally, the time records submitted by defendant reflect that 142.6 of the total 190.8 billable hours expended on this matter (or 75%) were billed by the senior attorney on the case at $1,250 an hour, while only 48.2 hours (or 25%) were billed by his junior colleague at $400 an hour. (See NYSCEF No. 65 at 4.) This billable-hours ratio is the reverse of the typical pattern. (See Beastie Boys v Monster Energy Co., 112 F Supp 3d 31, 51 [SD NY 2015] [noting that the "ratio of associate to partner hours on pretrial work typically reflects more associate than partner hours—often significantly more"].)

This court does not suggest that counsel's staffing or billing was excessive. As the court's prior decision reflects (see Coakley, 2022 NY Slip Op 51014[U], at *1-2, *3-4), this matter was of great personal and professional importance to defendants. It is entirely possible that counsel's "charge from its clients was simply to win, irrespective of cost." (Beastie Boys, 112 F Supp 3d at 52.) The question for fee-shifting purposes, though, is not "a particular client's subjective desires or tolerance for spending" (id.), but the objectively reasonable fee that the client's adversary should be forced to bear. In that respect, a court must give weight to the fact that a reasonable party typically "wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively." [*3](Simmons v New York City Transit Auth., 575 F3d 170, 174 [2d Cir 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Taking these considerations into account given the nature and circumstances of this litigation, the court concludes that defendants should be awarded a total of $104,940 in fees (rather than the $197,530 claimed), reflecting an average billing rate of $550 an hour.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendants' motion for an award of attorney fees is granted in part and denied in part; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants are awarded a judgment against plaintiff for $104,940; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants shall serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on plaintiff and on the office of the County Clerk, which shall enter judgment accordingly.