In this action arising from an alleged financial scam, defendants Hang Seng Bank Limited and Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (moving defendants) ask this court to dismiss the claims against them of plaintiff, Judith B. Heich, for lack of personal jurisdiction under CPLR 3211 (a) (8). The motion is granted without opposition.

Moving defendants argue that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them for two reasons: (i) Plaintiff assertedly failed to serve them properly; and (ii) moving defendants have no contacts with New York State.

1. Defendants contend that service was defective for two reasons. First, they assert that they are incorporated and headquartered in Hong Kong (see NYSCEF No. 11 at ¶ 3; NYSCEF No. 12 at ¶ 3), that plaintiff was therefore required to serve them by the means set forth in the Hague Convention, and that plaintiff did not do so. (See Amerasia Bank v Saiko Enters., 263 AD2d 519, 520 [2d Dept 1999] ["Where service of process is made in a foreign country that is a signatory of the Hague Convention . . . , compliance with the procedures of the Hague Convention is mandatory in State court proceedings."].) Second, they assert that plaintiff attempted to serve them only by delivering the summons and complaint to a bank branch of HSBC USA. They contend this method of service is independently invalid because "HSBC Bank USA, N.A. is not [defendants'] agent for service of process and is not authorized to accept service of process" on their behalf. (NYSCEF No. 11 at ¶ 14; NYSCEF No. 12 at ¶ 14.)

These service arguments, although plausible, are not sufficient to warrant dismissal, because moving defendants have not provided the necessary factual support. In particular, defendants' contention about how plaintiff attempted to serve them (delivery to an HSBC branch) is made only in defendants' counsel's memorandum of law—not in an affidavit. Nor has plaintiff filed affidavits of service on moving defendants. The court declines to dismiss the claims against moving defendants on improper-service grounds.

2. Defendants also contend that plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because this court would lack general and specific personal jurisdiction over them even if service were proper. The [*2]court agrees with this contention.

A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign corporations "when their affiliations with the [s]tate are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum [s]tate." (Aybar v Aybar, 37 NY3d 274, 289 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted].) The foreign corporation's "place of incorporation and principal place of business are paradigm . . . bases for general jurisdiction." (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted].) Here, moving defendants have provided affidavits representing that they are headquartered and incorporated in Hong Kong; and that they do not own property, have employees, or solicit business in the United States. (See NYSCEF No. 11 at ¶¶ 3-13; NYSCEF No. 12 ¶¶ 3-13.) The court concludes that it does not have general jurisdiction over defendants.

With respect to specific personal jurisdiction, the amended complaint does not allege any basis to exercise longarm personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants under CPLR 302 (a). At most, the amended complaint could be read to allege in general terms that the moving defendants committed a tort outside New York State that caused an injury to property inside New York State within the meaning of CPLR 302 (a) (3), by allegedly participating in a conspiracy to convert funds of plaintiff held in a New York bank account. (See NYSCEF No. 4 at ¶ 20.) But CPLR 302 (a) (3) permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction only when the defendant (i) regularly does business in New York, derives substantial revenue from commercial activity in New York, or otherwise engages in a persistent course of conduct in New York; or (ii) derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. Moving defendants' affidavits represent, in essence, that these defendants transact no business and engage in no activity in New York State, or the United States more generally, beyond maintaining correspondent bank accounts. (See NYSCEF No. 11 at ¶¶ 5-13; NYSCEF No. 12 at ¶¶ 5-13.) Given these representations—which plaintiff has not disputed—no basis exists for this court to exercise longarm personal jurisdiction over moving defendants.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion of defendants Hang Seng Bank Limited and Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to dismiss plaintiff's claims against them under CPLR 3211 (a) (8) for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted, and plaintiff's claims against these defendants are dismissed, with costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further

ORDERED that the action is severed and continued against the remaining defendants; and it is further

ORDERED that the caption be amended to reflect the dismissal and that all future papers filed with the court bear the amended caption; and it is further

ORDERED that the moving defendants serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on all parties; on the office of the General Clerk, which is directed to update its records to reflect the change in the caption; and on the office of the County Clerk, which shall enter judgment [*3]accordingly.