Law Offices of Jordan M. Hyman, PLLC (Jordan M. Hyman of counsel), for appellants. Jonathan D. Swotinsky, respondent pro se.

Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Lisa Lewis, J.; op 2022 NY Slip Op 50487[U] [2022]), entered April 19, 2022. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $7,034.52 against both defendants, jointly and severally.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified by vacating so much thereof as is against defendant Samson Management, LLC and by dismissing so much of the action as is asserted against it, and by reducing the award as against defendant Garth Associates, LLC to the principal sum of $4,834.52; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff sublet a coop apartment from defendant Garth Associates, LLC (Garth), which apartment was managed by defendant Samson Management, LLC (Samson). As a result of an October 15, 2018 fire in a different apartment in the same building, water penetrated plaintiff's apartment, and, during the ensuing months, mold developed. In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover the principal sum of $9,210.62, alleging that defendants failed to return a security deposit and prepaid rent, totaling $4,834.52, and also that his property was damaged by airborne mold that infiltrated his possessions after the fire.

At a nonjury trial, it was undisputed that, before the fire, plaintiff had failed to comply with the term of his lease requiring him to obtain renter's insurance. It was also undisputed that plaintiff had not caused the fire, but that, immediately following the fire, he had been forced to [*2]vacate the apartment because water used to fight the fire had infiltrated his apartment and rendered it uninhabitable. Several months after the fire, plaintiff and Garth, together with others, reached a settlement agreement (the Agreement). The Agreement defined the "Loss" as the October 15, 2018 fire. Under its terms, plaintiff chose a company which remediated the mold condition in the apartment and either cleaned or discarded plaintiff's property on site. In the Agreement, plaintiff released enumerated entities, including Garth and Samson, from liability for "any and all claims, . . . other than the amounts owed to Tenants by the Shareholder [Garth] for prepaid rent credits and security deposit upon vacating the Premises, inclusive of any and all claims that Tenant had and/or may have in the future against all Parties, . . . including all claims . . . arising in conjunction with the Loss, Personalty and Premises . . ." (underscoring in original). Although there were apparently discrepancies in copies of the Agreement that were shown to the court, and plaintiff's and Garth's signatures appeared on separate pages, plaintiff confirmed that the Agreement before the court included the terms to which he had agreed, and testified that any differences among the copies of the Agreement concerned terms that related to the other parties to the Agreement but not to plaintiff.

Following the trial, the Civil Court (Lisa Lewis, J.) declined to enforce the Agreement. It awarded plaintiff a judgment in the principal sum of $7,034.52, which included $2,200 for mold remediation, $2,984.52 in prepaid rent, and a $1,850 security deposit (see Swotinsky v Samson Mgt. LLC, 75 Misc 3d 1214[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50487[U] [Civ Ct, Queens County 2022]).

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807; see CCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). Although this deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126), in reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this court is as broad as that of the trial court, and this court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts (see Christopher v Topakian, 77 Misc 3d 126[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51101[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022]; see also Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]).

Plaintiff's landlord, defendant Garth, has made no argument to this court concerning plaintiff's entitlement to recover his prepaid rent and security deposit, and, thus, we find no basis to disturb so much of the judgment as awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $4,834.52 as against that defendant.

"[A]n agent for a disclosed principal 'will not be personally bound unless there is clear and explicit evidence of the agent's intention to substitute or superadd his personal liability for, or to, that of his principal' " (Savoy Record Co. v Cardinal Export Corp., 15 NY2d 1, 4 [1964], quoting Mencher v Weiss, 306 NY 1, 4 [1953]). Defendant Samson's status as an agent for defendant Garth in all its dealings with plaintiff was fully disclosed in the lease, lease rider, and renewal lease which plaintiff signed; those documents required plaintiff to make lease and [*3]security deposit payments to Samson, but only in its capacity as Garth's agent, and there was no evidence that Samson intended to substitute or add its liability to Garth's. Plaintiff thus did not have a cause of action against Samson either for breach of the lease or for the return of his security deposit or prepaid rent. Accordingly, so much of the judgment as was against Samson for, in effect, the return of plaintiff's security deposit and prepaid rent failed to render substantial justice between the parties (see CCA 1804, 1807).

Since the testimony demonstrated that the parties considered the Agreement to reflect their contractual understanding, the Civil Court's determination not to enforce its terms failed to render substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1804, 1807). The Agreement established plaintiff's and Garth's respective rights and responsibilities with respect to damage from mold and mold remediation, provided that plaintiff would pay for mold remediation for the personal property in the apartment, explicitly released Garth, and, as a third-party beneficiary, Samson, from all claims "with respect to the Loss," and discharged them from any present and future claims for damage "arising in conjunction with the Loss, Personalty and Premises." In this circumstance, the Civil Court's inclusion in its award of a component for mold remediation as against either defendant failed to render substantial justice between the parties.

We reach no other issue.

Accordingly, the judgment is modified by vacating so much thereof as is against defendant Samson Management, LLC and by dismissing so much of the action as is asserted against it, and by reducing the amount of the judgment awarded against defendant Garth Associates, LLC to the principal sum of $4,834.52.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.