Decedent died at age 81 on April 7, 2022. His wife Susan had predeceased him in 2020, and he was survived by his distributee son John R. Shanor, III (hereafter, John III). His sons Richard, Sr., and James had both predeceased him, leaving their children as decedent's additional distributees: Richard, Jr. [hereafter, RJ] and Aren (the children of son Richard Sr.), and Joseph and Thomas (the children of son James), all of whom were adults at the time of decedent's death.

Decedent's Will, dated December 14, 2020, left his entire estate to John III, and left nothing to his distributee grandchildren: "I have expressly made no provisions for . . . the issue of my predeceased sons Richard and James. This is not an oversight on my part, but is being done intentionally for reasons which are known to both me and each of them."

Joseph and Thomas consented to the Will's being admitted to probate; and, although duly cited, RJ and Aren did not appear or object. This Court granted probate of the Will by decree dated June 22, 2022, and issued letters testamentary to the nominated co-executors — decedent's "long standing financial advisor ROBERT M. GLASER and my long standing attorney [*2]JEFFREY F. VOELKL, ESQ." — that same date.

On July 8, 2022, RJ and Aren filed a verified claim against the estate "in the amount of $2,252,595.19, plus statutory interest from August 11, 2006, through the date of payment." The claim was formally rejected by the estate by letter dated November 12, 2022. On February 22, 2023, RJ and Aren filed a petition asking this Court to determine the validity of their claim. Process was issued, and the executors filed a verified answer with affirmative defenses on May 1, 2023. A motion for accelerated judgment dismissing the claim was also filed by the executors, with an opposing motion seeking judgment in their favor filed by RJ and Aren [hereafter sometimes referred to as claimants].

The matter having been finally submitted, I now find and decide as follows.

In April, 2003, claimants' parents, Genelle and Richard Shanor, Sr., were tragically killed in a boating accident in Jupiter, Florida, while riding in a boat owned by decedent and operated by decedent's son, John III.^[FN1] At the time of Genelle's and Richard's death, RJ was eight years old and Aren was 10. Estates were opened in this court for Genelle [Erie County Surrogate's Court file #2003-2103] and for Richard [Erie County Surrogate's Court file #2003-2102]. By decrees of this Court [HOWE, J.], Arlene S. Garland, Genelle's mother, was appointed fiduciary of both estates.

In her capacity as fiduciary of both Genelle's and Richard's estates, Arlene filed a wrongful death action in the Erie County Supreme Court against "John R. Shanor, Jr." (the within decedent) and "John R. Shanor, III", seeking money damages arising out of the 2003 Florida boating accident.^[FN2] The parties stipulated on the issue of liability by executing a written stipulation, and an inquest was ordered on damages. That inquest was held before the Hon. Patrick NeMoyer, who issued a decision and order on August 11, 2006, granting judgments in favor of the two minor children, RJ and Aren.

The "Stipulated Settlement and Agreement Not to Execute" [hereafter, the Stipulation], signed by all parties and counsel, including Julie and Philip Garland (RJ's and Aren's then-guardians), was entered into the Supreme Court record on, July 24, 2006. The stipulation contained a number of provisions, including the following:

Plaintiff and Guardians covenant that they will not record any judgment granted in the State Court Action against Defendants, and will not execute the judgment against any of the assets of the Defendants, except to the extent of insurance benefits under the RLI and/or Andover Policies. Plaintiff and Guardians covenant that they will pursue recovery only to the extent of the coverage afforded by the RLI and Andover Policies to satisfy any judgment, and will not pursue collection from the individual assets of Defendants.

On or about November 27, 2006, the judgments, signed by Supreme Court, were docketed with the Erie County Clerk's office. This was not discovered by any interested party [*3]until 2012, when John III discovered the judgment on a title report. Counsel for the Plaintiffs in the wrongful death action were informed, and documents titled "Termination, Release and Discharge of Judgment" were filed with the Erie County Clerk's office, extinguishing the judgments which had been filed.

When a claim is disputed, either a claimant or fiduciary may petition the court to determine the validity and enforceability of the claim (SCPA 1809).

Here, both claimants and the co-fiduciaries advance a number of arguments and exhibits in support of their respective contentions. However, I find that the dispositive documentary submission is the 2006 Stipulation, which provides that the parties agree not to execute a judgment or pursue assets of any of the defendants—which included decedent—other than their insurance coverages.

Claimants, in their papers seeking to have this Court uphold their claim, concede the existence of the Stipulation but contend that

"the Settlement Agreement provides that the parties would not seek to enforce any judgment against the defendants' assets during their lives, but such an agreement fails to release the Decedent's Estate and does not provide an agreement among the parties thereto that any judgment would not be enforceable against the Decedent's Estate or, even, John III's estate following his death."

Claimants also state that the revocation of the judgment which was filed in the Erie County Clerk's Office was without authorization.

Although the Stipulation does, in fact, lack any specific reference to its binding effect upon the parties' heirs, assigns, executors, or other successors-in-interest, such omission does not, contrary to the claimants' contention, serve as a basis to grant the relief they seek.

Over one-hundred and twenty years ago, our Court of Appeals, in Chamberlain v. Dunlop, 126 NY 45, 52 (1891) citing Kernochan v. Murray, 111 NY 306 (1888), pointedly observed that "[t]he presumption is that the party making a contract intends to bind his executors and administrators, unless the contract is of that nature which calls for some personal quality of the testator, or the words of the contract are such that it is plain no presumption of the kind can be indulged in" (see also, Stile v. C-Air Customhouse Brokers-Forwards, Inc., 204 AD3d 429 [2022]). Kernochan v. Murray, relied on by the Chamberlain court, put the principle even more simply: "it is a presumption of law that, in the absence of express words, that the parties to a contract intend to bind not only themselves, but their personal representatives" (supra, at 308).

Chamberlain and Kernochan, and their progeny, could not be more on point in the case now before me. The Stipulation provision at issue expressly, plainly, and unequivocally, limited any damages recovery to specified insurance assets of the defendants, and it went on to provide that no recovery would be pursued from the "individual assets of the Defendants."

There is nothing ambiguous about the Stipulation terms. It is clear, concise and comprehensive, and it is iron-clad in its limitation of any damages recovery as coming from insurance proceeds only and not from any "individual assets" of either defendant.

I have considered claimants' other arguments for relief and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated. I conclude that the claim filed by RJ and Aren [*4]against this estate must be, and it hereby is, dismissed.

This decision shall constitute the Order of the Court, and no further order shall be required.