Defendant is charged with several violations of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law including failure to exercise dure care in violation of VTL § 1146(A), failure to use designated lane in violation of VTL § 1128(C), failure to yield the right of way in violation of VTL § 1151(A), moved from lane unsafely in violation of VTL § 1128(A), and failure to keep right in violation of VTL § 1120(A). The charges stem from an alleged incident that took place in the City of Beacon on September 12, 2022. By Notice of Motion and attorney affirmation, Defendant is seeking dismissal of the charges alleging that her statutory right to a speedy trial has been violated. Defendant moves for dismissal of the charges pursuant to CPL § 170.30(e), § 30.30(1)(d) and (e) and § 245.50(3) based on the People's alleged failure to announce their readiness for trial within the applicable statutory period. To date, the People have not filed any opposition papers or otherwise responded to Defendant's Notice of Motion.

Generally, the determination as to whether the People have satisfied their obligation under CPL § 30.30 is done by computing the time between the filing of the accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under CPL § 30.30(4) and then adding any post-readiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People for which no statutory exclusions apply (People v. Headley, 100 AD3d 775 [2nd Dep't 2012]). The defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the People were not ready for trial within the statutory time period. If that initial showing is made, the burden then shifts to the People to establish whether there are any periods of excludable delay (People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859 [1986]). While the People have not filed any opposition to the instant motion, as the motion turns on a legal issue regarding the applicability of the speedy [*2]trial provisions to traffic infractions, the Court must first address that issue before any factual analysis can be conducted.

As an initial matter, Defendant avers that the People's April 26, 2023 certificate of compliance was untimely as it was filed outside the thirty-day statutory requirement. However, in relevant part, CPL § 245.10(1)(a)(iii) provides that a prosecutor's discovery obligations do not apply to a simplified information charging a traffic infraction under the vehicle and traffic law. Therefore, the People were under no obligation to provide voluntary discovery to the Defendant and therefore the April 26, 2023 certificate of compliance could not have been untimely pursuant to that statute. Defendant further argues that CPL § 30.30(1)(d) requires the People to establish their readiness for trial within thirty days from the commencement of an action where the defendant is charged with traffic violations. In support of this argument, Defendant cites to § 30.30(1)(d) which states that the People must be ready for trial within "thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of which is a crime." In support of this position, Defendant further cites to CPL § 30.30(1) and Penal Law 55.10(1-4). In pertinent part, CPL § 30.30 (1)(e) states that "for the purposes of this subdivision, the term offense shall include vehicle and traffic law infractions." Penal Law § 55.10(4) defines a traffic violation as an offense and therefore, Defendant argues, the speedy trial provisions apply and instant tickets should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds. However, that section specifically says that an offense which is defined as a traffic infraction "shall not be deemed a violation by virtue of the sentence prescribed therefor." In other words, regardless of the sentence, a traffic infraction is not a violation. Additionally, Penal Law § 10.00(3) defines a violation as "an offense, other than a traffic infraction, to which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days cannot be imposed." (emphasis added). In the instant matter, the Defendant is not charged with any violations, and the provisions of § 30.30(1)(d) do not apply when a defendant is only charged with a traffic infraction. Instead, pursuant to the language in the statute, the only time traffic infractions are subject to the CPL § 30.30 time limitations is when they are charged jointly with a felony, misdemeanor, or violation. Defendant's summary of the holding of People v. Galindo omits the Court of Appeal's relevant discussion of the issue presented in this matter. Specifically, the Court of Appeals opined that "[t]here is no evidence to suggest that the governmental delay the legislature sought to address through the criminal speedy trial statute exists where the criminal action only involves a traffic infraction" (People v. Galindo, 38 NY3d 199, 206 [2022]). This interpretation confirmed prior appellate court history. In People v. Vasquez, the Appellate Term, Second Department, held that "[a]s the accusatory instruments charging defendant with committing traffic infractions only remain outside the ambit of CPL § 30.30, defendant is not entitled to relief under the amended speedy trial statute with respect thereto" (People v. Vasquez, 75 Misc 3d 49, 52 [App. Term. 2nd Dep't 2022]). In short, when as here, a defendant is charged only with traffic infractions the speedy trial provisions of CPL § 30.30 do not apply.

In view of the foregoing, Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instruments on speedy trial grounds is DENIED.

The foregoing shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.