Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department, October 18, 2024

Legal Aid Society (Denise Fabiano of counsel) for appellant.

Alvin Bragg, District Attorney (Robert Butlien of counsel), for respondent.

Judgment of conviction (David Frey, J., at suppression hearing; Althea E.M. Drysdale, J., at trial and sentencing), rendered October 17, 2018, reversed, on the law and the facts, motion to suppress granted and the accusatory instrument dismissed.

The court should have granted defendant's suppression motion. The suppression court's finding that the police had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle based on their observation of defendant committing two traffic infractions and driving erratically is unsupported by the record. The police officer did not testify that any traffic infraction or erratic driving was the basis for stopping defendant's vehicle (see People v Knupp, 159 AD3d 510, 511 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1118 [2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1119 [2018]).

Nor was the stop of defendant's vehicle justified by the community caretaking doctrine. The police testimony did not establish specific, objective, and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that defendant was in distress (People v Brown, 42 NY3d 270, 276-277 [2024]). The sole basis for the officer's belief that an occupant of the vehicle might need aid was his observation of the vehicle stopping for a few minutes at two stop signs. The officer did not testify that he saw or heard anything else that indicated someone was in distress or suggested a safety or equipment problem.

In any event, even assuming that the officer had a reasonable belief that someone in the vehicle was in distress, the police intrusion in this matter was not narrowly tailored to address the perceived need for assistance (see People v Serrano,{**84 Misc 3d at 50}229 AD3d 642, 645 [2d Dept 2024]). Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer went to the driver's side and asked defendant to put his window [*2]down and produce identification; the officer also asked defendant if he was "okay." Defendant, who did not appear to be in distress and did not respond, looked to the front seat passenger, who told the officer that defendant was fine but that he "did not speak much English." The officer never asked defendant if he or the passengers wanted medical attention. Since defendant did not appear to be in distress, the People have not demonstrated that the continued questioning of the defendant was an intrusion "commensurate with [any] perceived need for assistance" (People v Brown, 42 NY3d at 279 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Serrano, 229 AD3d at 645).

Accordingly, since the People did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the stop of defendant's vehicle was lawful or prove the legality of the police conduct, any statements that defendant made to law enforcement officials after the initial inquiry, as well as the results of the chemical breath test, must be suppressed.

Tisch, J.P., James and Perez, JJ., concur.