Courts - Small Claims - Subject Matter Jurisdiction under CCA 1801 - Claimant as Tenant or Lessee - Legislative Intent

Joseph A. Altman, P.C., Fleetwood (Joseph A. Altman of counsel), defendant pro se.

Eli Bogom-Shanon, claimant pro se.

This action having appeared on the calendar for defendant's motion to dismiss and for trial, the court heard oral argument from the parties, held the motion in abeyance, and proceeded to trial. After considering the parties' papers and arguments, defendant's motion to dismiss this small claims action for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2) and (8) is denied{**85 Misc 3d at 1101} for the reasons set forth below, and the court will rule on the trial separately.

At the outset, the court notes the strong disfavor for pretrial motions to dismiss small claims actions, as "[t]he informality and convenience of small claims practice is necessarily frustrated by requiring pro se litigants to respond to formal motion practice under the CPLR prior to the hearing of their case." (Polanco v City of New York, 81 Misc 3d 138[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51431[U], *1 [App Term, 1st Dept 2023], quoting Friedman v Seward Park Hous. Corp., 167 Misc 2d 57, 58 [App Term, 1st Dept 1995].) Exceptions exist for clear issues of law however, and "[d]efendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is such a motion that may be considered." (See Ivanov v O'Connor, 84 Misc 3d 1202[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 51338[U], *2 [Civ Ct, NY County, Sept. 27, 2024].) As defendant seeks dismissal for lack of both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the court addresses those objections in turn.

Small Claims Court Jurisdiction

Small claims cases "are heard in dedicated parts of four of New York's limited jurisdiction trial courts: the New York City Civil Court, the District Courts of Long Island, the [*2]City Courts elsewhere in the State, and the Town and Village Courts, also known as Justice Courts," which are governed by the New York City Civil Court Act, the Uniform District Court Act, the Uniform City Court Act, and the Uniform Justice Court Act, respectively. (See Gerald Lebovits et al., Small Claims Manual at 1, 7 [6th ed 2022].) In each different local court act, service (personal jurisdiction) issues are addressed in their respective sections 1803, while subject matter jurisdiction is defined by the local court's respective section 1801.

Claimant Has Established Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant

As to personal jurisdiction, the court notes that personal jurisdiction in small claims is derived from the simplified service procedures outlined in CCA 1803 (a) rather than CPLR article 3. (See Sanchez v El Flaco Parking Lot, 2023 NY Misc LEXIS 27120, *3 [Civ Ct, Bronx County, Dec. 20, 2023, index No. SC-615-23/BX, Krist, Ref.] [collecting authorities].) CCA 1803 (a) states in pertinent part that a small claims action may be commenced by sending notice of

"such claim by ordinary first class mail and certified mail with return receipt requested to the party complained against (1) at his residence, if he{**85 Misc 3d at 1102} resides within the city of New York, and his residence is known to the claimant, (2) at his office or place of regular employment within the city of New York if he does not reside therein or his residence within the city of New York is not known to the claimant, or (3) where claimant is or was a tenant or lessee of real property owned by the defendant and the claim relates to such tenancy or lease and the notice of claim cannot be sent under paragraph one or two of this subdivision, at any place in the state where plaintiff may mail or otherwise deliver rent" (emphasis added).

There is no dispute in the record that defendant does not reside or maintain an office within the City of New York and thus, service pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) was not available. On the other hand, there is also no dispute that "claimant is or was a tenant or lessee of real property owned by the defendant and the claim relates to such tenancy or lease" (CCA 1803 [a] [3]). Further, defendant's address in Fleetwood, NY to which the statement of claim was directed—which the court notes is the same business address defendant lists in filing this motion—is a "place in the state where plaintiff may mail or otherwise deliver rent," pursuant to CCA 1803 (a) (3).

Service to such an address is undisputably permissible where, as here, defendant himself affirmatively stated to the court (in seeking an adjournment) that he neither lives in nor maintains an office within the confines of the City of New York. (Aff of unavailability dated Jan. 5, 2024 ¶ 3.) As service of the small claims notice is presumed to have been completed 21 days after mailing by the clerk, and absent other evidence that service was not completed (which has not been shown), the court has personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to CCA 1803 (a). (See Sheikh v Bohtis, 68 Misc 3d 1223[A], 2020 NY Slip Op 51052[U], *4-5 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2020] [discussing small claims service by mail in denying motion to vacate default].) Accordingly, the court denies the branch of defendant's motion challenging personal jurisdiction.

Claimant Has Established Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Defendant

Turning to subject matter jurisdiction, the question is a bit more complicated, although the result is the same. CCA 1801 provides for subject matter jurisdiction over "small claims," brought before the court. Small claims are defined to include any action commenced by an aggrieved party "where claimant {**85 Misc 3d at 1103}is a tenant or lessee of real property owned by the defendant and the claim relates to such tenancy or lease, and such real property is situated within the city of New York." (CCA 1801 [emphasis added].) Notably, unlike in CCA 1803, CCA 1801 omits the words "or was." It is upon that omission that defendant bases his lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction defense as the parties [*3]do not dispute that claimant has vacated the premises at issue and thus "was," not "is," a tenant. (Aff of unavailability ¶ 4; aff in supp ¶ 6; aff in reply ¶ 9.) On its face, therefore, CCA 1801 would appear not to confer jurisdiction over this action, as the parties do not dispute that claimant has vacated the premises at issue. (Aff in opp ¶¶ 7-8.) Although that would appear to end the question, it does not.

In opposition, claimant cites (¶¶ 10-11 of his opposition), among other authorities, the court's own handbook for small claims litigants, which states that

"[i]f the defendant . . . owns property you are/were renting (and your claim is related to your tenancy or lease) in New York City, you can use the Small Claims Court [in the] County where the defendant owns property you are/were renting (and your claim is related to your tenancy or lease)." (New York State Unified Court System, A Guide to Small Claims & Commercial Small Claims in New York City, Nassau County, Suffolk County at 6 [July 2024 ed].)^[FN1]

Additionally, claimant asserts that "the legislative history of Section 1801 of New York's Small Claims Act" supports jurisdiction. (Aff in opp ¶ 11.) The court agrees. Indeed, the overwhelming legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended for CCA 1801 to apply to former and current tenants (see 2021 NY Assembly Bill A00297, enacted as L 2021, ch 485).

Legislative Intent of the 2021 Small Claims Act Amendments

The First Department has been clear that in interpreting statutes, "the spirit and purpose of the act and the objects to be accomplished must be considered and given effect, and the literal meanings of words are not to be adhered to or suffered to defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted." (Matter of Turner v Department of Fin. of City of N.Y., 242 AD2d 146, 147 [1st Dept 1998]; see also People v Vespucci{**85 Misc 3d at 1104}, 144 AD2d 48, 55 [2d Dept 1988] [director of the Organized Crime Task Force could apply for eavesdropping warrants because "literal construction" of a statute is inappropriate when it "circumscribes its application" and "fails to meaningfully incorporate as guiding criteria the policy objectives sought to be achieved by Congress in utilizing the statutory term" (citations omitted)], affd 75 NY2d 434 [1990], cert denied 498 US 814 [1990]; King v Burwell, 576 US 473, 493 [2015] [cautioning that courts should not interpret "statutes to negate their own stated purposes" in interpreting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act], quoting New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v Dublino, 413 US 405, 419-420 [1973].)

Even where statutory language has been questioned as potentially "ambiguous or inartful," courts have noted where "clear legislative intent would disfavor" a litigant's argument in rejecting the literal construction defendant urges here. (Isaly v Garde, 83 Misc 3d 379, 389 [Sup Ct, NY County, Feb. 13, 2024], citing Vespucci, Turner, and King, as amended 2024 NY Slip Op 30877[U] [Sup Ct, NY County, Mar. 18, 2024], interim stay pending appeal denied, case No. 2024-02593, slip op at 2 [1st Dept, June 5, 2024] [Kern, J., in chambers], stay denied 2024 NY Slip Op 71498[U] [1st Dept, July 25, 2024].) The court also notes that "New York has committed itself to a full exploitation of jurisdiction" in taking an expansive view of [*4]jurisdiction in the past, which further supports interpreting this statutory conundrum. (Ivanov, 84 Misc 3d 1202[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 51338[U], *2 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

In 1993, the Binghamton City Court noted what it called "a gap . . . in the statute" in small claims jurisdiction across the state (governed here by CCA 1801 and 1803), creating a situation where "out of county landlords may sue their resident tenant in the Small Claims Part but the resident tenant is denied the ability to sue his/her out of area landlord whose physical contacts with this county are minimal," and adding that "[i]t is hoped that the New York Legislature will amend the statute to correct this imbalance." (Solomon v Correll, 157 Misc 2d 387, 389 [Binghamton City Ct 1993]; see also Valentino v Principio, 174 Misc 2d 709, 710 [Geneva City Ct 1997] [citing Solomon and repeating call for legislative action].) Commentators and legislators noted the issue as well. (See e.g. Small Claims Manual at 22-23, 23 n 74 [citing Solomon and Valentino]; Joseph Latwin, Security Deposits, Small Claims, and Gophers, 47{**85 Misc 3d at 1105} Westchester Bar J 15, 15-16 [2023]; Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2021, ch 485.)

In response, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, 2021 NY Assembly Bill A00297 (chaptered as L 2021, ch 485), entitled "AN ACT to amend the uniform city court act, the uniform district court act, the uniform justice court act and the New York city civil court act, in relation to obtaining jurisdiction over certain defendants." As Assemblymember Gottfried noted in his sponsoring memorandum, the purpose of chapter 485 was to establish "small claims court jurisdiction when the claimant is or was a tenant or lessee, the defendant is the property owner, the claim relates to such tenancy or lease, and the property is situated within the county," and specifically to alleviate "an unfair burden on the tenant in terms of the return of their security deposit or other claims," in express response to Solomon. (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2021, ch 485 at 6 [emphasis added].) Thus, on October 22, 2021, the Legislature passed an act to amend the sections 1801 and 1803 of all four small claims acts for the express purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over landlords in real property actions who may reside and maintain an office outside the respective jurisdiction.

To that end, chapter 485 identically amended all four sections 1803 to address service where "claimant is or was a tenant or lessee of real property owned by the defendant and the claim relates to such tenancy or lease." (See UDCA 1803 [a] [3]; UCCA 1803 [a] [3]; UJCA 1803 [a] [3]; CCA 1803 [a] [3].) However, while UDCA 1801, UCCA 1801, and UJCA 1801 were also all identically amended to confer jurisdiction "where the claimant is or was a tenant or lessee of real property owned by the defendant and the claim relates to such tenancy or lease" (emphasis added), chapter 485, § 7 amends CCA 1801 differently, conferring jurisdiction "where claimant is a tenant or lessee of real property owned by the defendant and the claim relates to such tenancy or lease" (emphasis added). Simply put, the drafters omitted the "or was" language in amending CCA 1801 that they included in amending CCA 1803 as well as sections 1801 and 1803 in their respective UDCA, UCCA, and UJCA counterparts.

It is virtually inconceivable that the Legislature intended to provide personal jurisdiction to a claimant that is or was a tenant under all four sections 1803, and subject matter jurisdiction to a claimant that is or was a tenant under three of the{**85 Misc 3d at 1106} four sections 1801 (the UDCA, UCCA, and UJCA), but intentionally did not want to extend subject matter jurisdiction to a claimant that was a tenant under 1801 of the CCA. An intended omission of that magnitude and significance would assuredly have been reflected in some type of legislative history, and there is none. Rather, in every way, shape, and form, it is manifestly apparent that [*5]the Legislature intended to confer jurisdiction over the claim at issue here upon the court, to correct what the Legislature noted was an "unfair burden on the tenant in terms of the return of their security deposit." (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2021, ch 485 at 6.) Especially where the Legislature did amend CCA 1803 to provide for service of small claims by former tenants in the manner alleged here, the Legislature's amendment of CCA 1801 omitting two (admittedly important) words is clearly little more than a "legislative scrivener's error," which may be interpreted away "to avoid the absurd result of dismantling the [Legislature's] carefully crafted statutory scheme." (CVAS 2, LLC v City of Fredericksburg, 289 Va 100, 118 n 6, 766 SE2d 912, 920 n 6 [2015]; see also Michael S. Fried, A Theory of Scrivener's Error, 52 Rutgers L Rev 589, 593-594, 598 [2000] [quoting prior authority defining "scrivener's error as a situation where, on the very face of the statute it is clear to the reader that a mistake of expression (rather than of legislative wisdom) has been made," and noting that "(b)y an overwhelming majority . . . courts tend to favor the pragmatic resolution of cases in keeping with common sense and the obvious intent of the legislature to a narrowly literal application of statutes in cases of scrivener's error"] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted].) The court's own statutorily-required small claims handbook looks past the error in favoring jurisdiction.^[FN2] (A Guide to Small Claims & Commercial Small Claims in New York City, Nassau County, Suffolk County.) Rather, as the Second Department has noted (and the Court of Appeals affirmed), the court should look away from "literal construction" {**85 Misc 3d at 1107}here that "fails to meaningfully incorporate as guiding criteria the policy objectives sought to be achieved" by the Legislature in widening the courthouse door to former tenants. (Vespucci at 55.)

The court will do so here as well, especially as there is no evidence of actual prejudice to a defendant taking full avail of New York County—a frequently appearing attorney who is well-known and well-regarded in the same courthouse in which the court sits in addition to being a landlord in this county—in appearing in New York County as a litigant. (See e.g. Brian Krist, Enjoying the Meal, and Walking Out on the Check: The Implications of Limiting Jurisdiction to Subpoena Following Daimler, Richmond County Bar Assn J at 25 [spring 2019] [discussing lack of prejudice as a factor in considering jurisdiction].) The Legislature has spoken and, following the Appellate Divisions in Isaly, Vespucci, and Turner and informed by the United States Supreme Court in King and Dublino, the court will read the unmistakable intent of the Legislature into the text and finds that claimant has established subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

Accordingly, it is ordered that defendant's motion to dismiss this action is denied.