Constitutional Law - Validity of Statute - Infringement of Right to Travel - Penalty for Bringing Needy Person into State under Social Services Law § 149

Robert J. Hantman for Roadrunner Charters Inc., defendant.

Andrew Myers for Buckeye Coach LLC and others, defendants.

Steven Banks for plaintiff.

Beth Haroules for New York Civil Liberties Union and another, amicus curiae.

{**88 Misc 3d at 223}After oral argument, which took place on September 23, 2024, where Steven Banks, Esq. and Jacob Kumerick, Esq. appeared for plaintiff the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services (plaintiff); Nyall Cook, Esq. appeared for defendant Roadrunner Charters Inc.; Mark Levine, Esq., Elliot Kudisch, Esq., [*2]and Douglas Stevinson, Esq. appeared for all the other defendants (collectively defendants); and Beth Haroules, Esq. appeared as amicus curiae for the New York Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint is granted. Plaintiff's cross-motion to lift the automatic stay of discovery is moot.

Plaintiff commenced this case to prevent migrants from moving to New York City from Texas. Plaintiff relies on New York Social Services Law § 149, an antiquated and unconstitutional law, to achieve this goal. The statute has its origins in "anti-pauper" statutes passed after the War of 1812. The statute's title is "Penalty for bringing a needy person into the state." It is a penal statute and makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to bring knowingly an indigent person to New York "for the purpose of making him a public charge" (see Social Services Law § 149 [1]). Plaintiff also seeks indemnification from defendants for the costs of sheltering migrants.

Plaintiff previously sought to enjoin defendants from busing migrants in motion sequence 001. The court rejected the request for injunctive relief finding section 149 unconstitutional (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 128). This court specifically held that the issue of mass migration within the country "is an issue reserved by the Constitution for Congress, lest the United States fall to a regime of balkanization with each state setting forth a patchwork of inconsistent criteria for crossing state lines." Indeed, it is for this reason the U.S. Supreme Court ruled many decades ago an essentially identical California statute unconstitutional (Edwards v California, 314 US 160, 172 [1941]).

The court is cognizant of the financial burdens borne by the City of New York in providing shelter and services to the many migrants who have sought refuge and opportunity in this diverse and welcoming city. The City's budget, services, housing availability, and affordability have undoubtedly been taxed in part by ensuring its obligations under the recognized right to{**88 Misc 3d at 224} shelter are not breached (see e.g. Callahan v Carey, 12 NY3d 496 [2009]). However, it is not the role of this court to create policy, be it immigration, budgetary, or social services. Rather, it is this court's role to ensure the law is upheld, including this nation's highest law, the United States Constitution.

The defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in its entirety on the grounds that New York Social Services Law § 149 is unconstitutional. They offer a plethora of doctrines under which section 149 may be deemed unconstitutional, not least of which is the impermissible infringement on interstate commerce. Plaintiff opposes and argues that under a facial challenge to the statute, defendants must show there is no set of circumstances under which the statute may be considered constitutional. Plaintiff argues that section 149 is narrowly tailored because it only addresses "bad actors" who transport indigent folks into New York for the purpose of making them public charges. She further argues that the burden on interstate commerce is only incidental. In reply, defendants argue that the burden on interstate commerce is not merely "incidental" because it severely hampers the transportation of individuals across state lines. They further argue that the statute infringes on a fundamental right and does not pass strict scrutiny as it is not narrowly tailored. Defendants argue that, in such circumstances, the law is per se invalid.

As previously stated by this court, section 149 violates the Interstate Commerce Clause pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v California (314 US 160, [*3]172 [1941]). Simply put, the states are not permitted to regulate the interstate transportation of individuals based on economic status (see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States, 379 US 241, 279 [1964, Douglass, J., concurring] [the right of persons to move freely from state to state occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel, and coal across state lines]). This is an issue reserved by the Constitution for Congress.

However, section 149's violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause is not the only reason the statute is unconstitutional. The statute also violates a fundamental right—the right to travel—and is subject to strict scrutiny (Attorney General of N. Y. v Soto-Lopez, 476 US 898 [1986]; see also Deide v Day, 676 F Supp 3d 196 [SD NY 2023]). Under a strict scrutiny analysis of{**88 Misc 3d at 225} a statute that impinges upon a fundamental right, the government must adopt the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling state interest (Americans for Prosperity Foundation v Bonta, 594 US 595 [2021]). "States . . . do not have any right to select their citizens" (Saenz v Roe, 526 US 489, 511 [1999]). The fundamental right to travel across state lines encompasses travel for the purpose of "temporary sojourn" or to become a permanent resident (Edwards at 183 [Jackson, J., concurring]). State law implicates the constitutional right to travel (a) when it actually deters such travel; (b) when impeding travel is its primary objective; or (c) when it uses any classification which it serves to penalize exercise of that right (Soto-Lopez at 904).

Here, section 149 implicates the constitutional right to travel on all three grounds. First, the record reflects that it has deterred interstate travel since defendants have stopped transporting migrants from Texas to New York due to the threat of legal liability. Second, deterring interstate travel is plainly a primary objective of section 149 since it expressly aims to prohibit individuals from transporting indigent folks into New York. Finally, section 149 expressly and impermissibly utilizes economic class to penalize the right of certain individuals from traveling into New York. Therefore, a strict scrutiny analysis of section 149 is appropriate (see also Memorial Hospital v Maricopa County, 415 US 250 [1974]; Anonymous v City of Rochester, 13 NY3d 35, 45 [2009] ["For an adult, there is no doubt that this right is fundamental and an ordinance interfering with the exercise of such a right would be subject to strict scrutiny"]).

Although the Commissioner's application of section 149 may conceivably serve compelling interests, the statute is not narrowly tailored to address those interests. Pursuant to the statute, individuals who transport indigent individuals with the knowledge they will seek social services in New York potentially face criminal charges. The same statute threatens civil liability and requires those who knowingly transport indigent individuals to either indemnify New York or arrange for the transported indigent individuals to be removed from New York. The statute in essence requires companies and individuals to conduct "due diligence" into a passenger's economic status prior to bringing them into the State of New York to avoid criminal and civil liability. This is a sweepingly overbroad statute, the likes of which has already been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. {**88 Misc 3d at 226}Supreme Court in Edwards v California (314 US 160, 172 [1941]). Enforcement of a statute like section 149 foists legal uncertainty on anyone who transports someone to New York. This uncertainty undoubtedly chills individuals' fundamental right to interstate travel. Therefore, section 149 is not narrowly tailored and fails to pass the strict scrutiny test.

The proper forum to reach a solution to the issues presented in this lawsuit is the United States Congress. Instead of seeking resolution in Congress, the Commissioner asks this court to enforce an antiquated, unconstitutional statute to infringe on an individual's right to enter New [*4]York based on economic status.^[FN*] Therefore, the Commissioner's complaint is dismissed. Because the case is dismissed, plaintiff's cross-motion seeking to lift the automatic stay of discovery is moot.