| Ocampo v Victory Mitsubishi |
| 2024 NY Slip Op 50907(U) [83 Misc 3d 1242(A)] |
| Decided on June 14, 2024 |
| Supreme Court, New York County |
| Lebovits, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Alfonso
Ocampo, Petitioner,
against Victory Mitsubishi and Santander Consumer USA, Respondents. |
This proceeding arises from a dispute over a transaction among petitioner, Alfonso Ocampo; a car dealership, respondent Victory Mitsubishi; and a bank, respondent Santander Consumer USA. Petitioner moves for an order (i) requiring respondents to return the license plates bearing number XXX5440 to the New York Department of Motor Vehicles, (ii) requiring respondents to send a letter explaining how long the car has been in their possession to the DMV so that petitioner's license is unsuspended immediately, allowing him to return to work, (iii) declaring any and all debt owed to Santander Consumer USA null and void, and (iv) awarding petitioner compensatory and punitive damages in an unspecified amount. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Petitioner alleges that he sought a short-term lease from Victory Mitsubishi to improve his credit to finance a car. Petitioner further alleges that on June 27, 2023, when he arrived at the dealership, a salesperson pressured him into buying a car. (See NYSCEF No. 1 [verified petition] at ¶ 7.) Petitioner claims he was adamant about leasing it instead, and he alleges that he "entered into a leasing contract." (NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) But the sales contract petitioner signed is an agreement to buy the car; petitioner's signature appears on lines labeled "buyer's signature" and "buyer signs." (See NYSCEF No. 2 at 6, 12.) Victory Mitsubishi argues that petitioner reviewed the contract and that there "is not mention of a 'lease' in any of the documents." (NYSCEF No. 14 [affirmation in opposition to order to show cause] at ¶¶ 9,10.) Petitioner claims he was unable to review the contract fully because it was presented on an iPad. (See NYSCEF No. 16 [reply to [*2]respondents' affirmation] at ¶ 1.) Petitioner also alleges that the contract was described to him as a "lease agreement" and that he was not given a copy of the contract after signing. (See NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 13.)
Nine days later, on July 6, 2023, a third, unidentified party stole the catalytic converter from the car. Petitioner alleges that he contacted Victory Mitsubishi about the theft and was advised by Victory Mitsubishi to have the car towed to its facility. (See NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 10.) Petitioner states that on July 22, he tried to return the car to Victory Mitsubishi under the "lease agreement" he believed he had entered into and was then allegedly informed by Victory Mitsubishi for the first time that he had made a financed purchase. Victory Mitsubishi argues that the car was towed to its facility to help petitioner file an insurance claim to replace the converter. (See NYSCEF No. 14 at ¶ 16.) As of April 8, 2024, the date of petitioner's petition, the car remained at Victory Mitsubishi. (See NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 14.)
Petitioner admits that he stopped paying for his car insurance at some point after the car was towed to Victory Mitsubishi; he did so because he was no longer driving the car. (See NYSCEF No. 1 [verified petition] at ¶ 17.) Petitioner received notices from the Department of Motor Vehicles dated November 4 and 5, 2023, stating that his license would be suspended indefinitely if he did not renew his insurance or surrender his registration and license plates. (See generally NYSCEF No. 3.) Petitioner asserts that he and his attorney made multiple attempts to contact Victory Mitsubishi to get the license plates (bearing number XXX5440). The final attempt from petitioner's attorney is included as Exhibit C. (NYSCEF No. 4.) Petitioner alleges that Victory Mitsubishi refused to return the plates. (See NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 16.) Petitioner's license is now suspended, and he claims to be unable to work because of the suspension. Petitioner further claims that Victory Mitsubishi is "retaining the license plates . . . to keep [petitioner] locked into an unaffordable high-interest loan" that petitioner cannot afford; petitioner alleges this has "ruined" his credit. (NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶¶ 20, 21.)
Victory Mitsubishi contends that it "did not agree to accept the return or voluntary surrender of the [v]ehicle" but admits that as of May 6, 2024, the date of respondents' affirmation, the car remained at Victory Mitsubishi's facilities because petitioner "never pick[ed] up the [v]ehicle from Victory." (NYSCEF No. 14 [affirmation in opposition to order to show cause] at ¶¶ 17, 19.)
Respondents claim that petitioner is in debt to co-respondent, Santander Consumer USA, which financed his purchase from Victory Mitsubishi, for having defaulted under the terms of the sales agreement. Petitioner contends that he is not indebted to either respondent. (NYSCEF No. 16 [reply to respondents' affirmation] at ¶ 8.) Petitioner alleges that Santander sought payments for the car from petitioner because "Victory Mitsubishi misled [Santander] into believing that [petitioner] ha[d] possession of the vehicle." (NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 22.) Petitioner also alleges that on March 27, 2024, Santander told petitioner that Victory Mitsubishi never informed Santander that Victory Mitsubishi possessed the car. (See NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 22.) Petitioner's reply to respondents' affirmation in opposition claims that as of May 15, 2024, "Santander Bank has . . . acknowledged that they have possession of the car." (NYSCEF No. 16 at ¶ 5.)
It is unclear where the car currently is. It is also unclear whether, as petitioner alleges (see NYSCEF No. 16 at ¶ 5), Santander has repossessed the car under the sale contract and retains possession. If the car has been repossessed, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 425 would require respondents to deliver (personally or by first-class mail) petitioner's license plates to the nearest motor-vehicle office. And if the car has not been repossessed and remains petitioner's property, it is unclear why Victory Mitsubishi did not return the plates to petitioner.
On the issue of petitioner's debt to Santander, and by extension any damages to be awarded, neither party has provided evidence or notice of petitioner's alleged default or the amount of debt that petitioner has supposedly incurred. Additionally, petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that his unintentional purchasing, rather than leasing, of the car arose from Victory Mitsubishi's intentionally deceiving petitioner. This court cannot declare any debt null and void.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the motion is granted in part to the extent that respondents may not retain possession of the license plates bearing number XXX5440 any longer; and it is further
ORDERED that respondents submit (by e-filing and email to [email protected]) within 30 days of entry of this order an affidavit as to (i) the car's current location and (ii) whether the car has been repossessed under the sales contract. Following the submission of that affidavit, this court will issue a further decision about whether respondents must return the license plates to petitioner or the New York Department of Motor Vehicles; and it is further
ORDERED that the branch of the motion requesting damages and that petitioner's debt to Santander be declared null and void is denied without prejudice due to the lack of sufficient evidence of deception to void the sales contract; and it is further
ORDERED that petitioner serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on respondents.
DATE 6/14/2024