Vincent DiBenedetto, appellant pro se. Andres Gil, for respondent (no brief filed).

Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Patterson, Putnam County (Michael V. Caruso, J.), rendered March 4, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of using a portable electronic device while operating a motor vehicle, and imposed sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Following a nonjury trial, at which both a state trooper and defendant testified, defendant was found guilty of using a portable electronic device while operating a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1225-d [1]), and the court imposed sentence.

Defendant's claims raised on appeal pertaining to the prosecutor's actions prior to trial are predicated on facts outside the record and, thus, cannot be resolved without reference to matters dehors the record. Consequently, these claims are not reviewable on direct appeal (see People v Banyai, 82 Misc 3d 129[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50401[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2024]; People v Renner, 81 Misc 3d 144[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50193[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2024]; People v Hoover, 81 Misc 3d 133[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51379[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2023]). Rather, the Justice Court, where a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 may be made to enable defendant to further develop the record, is the appropriate forum for a review of these claims (see People v Hutchinson, 61 Misc 3d 153[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51805[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018]).

Defendant's contention that the state trooper gave false testimony because he did not testify that he had searched defendant's cell phone is without merit, as the trooper was not required to offer such testimony since what transpired after the alleged Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1225-d (1) violation was not part of the People's prima facie case. Moreover, as the trooper did not testify on direct examination that he searched defendant's cell phone, it was a provident [*2]exercise of discretion for the court to have sustained the People's objection on cross-examination when defendant asked the trooper if he had searched the phone, since this subject was beyond the scope of direct examination (see People v Gilchrist, 98 AD3d 1232 [2012]; People v Francisco, 44 AD3d 870 [2007]). Although a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront all adverse witnesses through cross-examination (see Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673 [1986]; Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 315 [1974]; People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40 [1988]), that right is not unlimited (see People v Stanard, 42 NY2d 74, 83 [1977]), and the trial court has broad discretion to limit the manner and extent of cross-examination (see People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 244 [1969]; People v Almeida, 159 AD2d 508 [1990]). In any event, defendant was given an opportunity to testify about the trooper's search of his cell phone and the record further demonstrates that, appearing pro se, defendant was afforded wide latitude by the Justice Court throughout the trial.

Finally, by testifying that his daughter was present in the vehicle and was using her own cell phone when he was pulled over by the trooper, defendant opened the door to being cross-examined about his daughter, including her age. Even if the prosecutor's remark, insinuating that defendant's daughter was too young to have her own cell phone, could be perceived as error, the error was harmless, as the proof of defendant's guilt was overwhelming (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1225-d [1], [4]) and there is no significant probability that the court would have acquitted defendant had it not been for any prejudice that may have resulted from that remark (see People v Arafet, 13 NY3d 460, 467 [2009]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; People v Waksal, 75 Misc 3d 129[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50380[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2022]; People v Marks, 63 Misc 3d 156[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50820[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

DRISCOLL, J.P., WALSH and GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.