| People v Pertsas (Michael) |
| 2024 NY Slip Op 51828(U) [84 Misc 3d 136(A)] |
| Decided on December 20, 2024 |
| Appellate Term, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appellate Advocates (Robert C. Langdon of counsel), for appellant. Richmond County District Attorney (Thomas B. Litsky of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Biju J. Koshy, J.), rendered July 5, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and imposed sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
After waiving prosecution by information, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (Penal Law § 220.03) in satisfaction of an accusatory instrument that also charged him with a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The Criminal Court (Biju J. Koshy, J.) sentenced defendant to a conditional discharge.
The accusatory instrument, executed and sworn to by a police detective, alleged the following:
"Deponent states that . . . defendant did knowingly and unlawfully possess a controlled substance, namely, COCAINE, in that the deponent observed the defendant to have one (1) glass pipe containing residue that the deponent recognized as COCAINE sticking out of a jacket pocket behind the driver's seat of the above-mentioned vehicle and one (1) glass pipe containing residue that the deponent recognized as COCAINE sticking out of the rear passenger's seat of the above-mentioned vehicle.
Deponent further states that he observed the defendant to have three (3) metal push rods containing residue that the deponent recognized as COCAINE in the cup holder of the above-mentioned vehicle.
Deponent further states that the above-described substances are what they are alleged to be, namely, COCAINE, based upon deponent's professional training and experience as a police officer, previous arrests for criminal possession of said substances, familiarity with the packaging of controlled substances, and physical characteristics of said substances [*2]that are similar to substances previously seized by deponent."
On appeal, defendant challenges the facial sufficiency of the count to which he pleaded guilty, contending that the accusatory instrument contained a conclusory assertion that the controlled substance he allegedly possessed was cocaine.
"A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution" (People v Case, 42 NY2d 98, 99 [1977]; see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]; People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). Thus, the facial insufficiency of an accusatory instrument constitutes a jurisdictional defect which is not forfeited by a defendant's guilty plea (see People v Thiam, 34 NY3d 1040 [2019]; Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 573 [2004]). Here, since defendant expressly waived the right to be prosecuted by information, the relevant count of the accusatory instrument must be evaluated under the standards that govern a misdemeanor complaint (see Dumay, 23 NY3d at 524; see also CPL 100.15, 100.40 [4]), which is sufficient on its face when it alleges facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charge (see CPL 100.40 [4] [a]; 100.15 [3]) and provides reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime charged (see CPL 100.40 [4] [b]; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986]). While the law does not require that the accusatory instrument contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charges, the offense and factual bases therefor must be sufficiently alleged (see Konieczny, 2 NY3d at 575). "So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]; see Konieczny, 2 NY3d at 575). Moreover, where, as here, a defendant pleads guilty to one or more of the counts actually charged in a multi-count accusatory instrument, and, on appeal, raises a jurisdictional challenge, he or she need not challenge the facial sufficiency of all of the counts contained in the accusatory instrument at the time the defendant entered the guilty plea; rather, he or she need only challenge the facial sufficiency of the actual count to which he or she pleaded guilty (see People v Mason, 62 Misc 3d 75 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]; see also Dumay, 23 NY3d 518).
Pursuant to Penal Law § 220.03, "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree when he or she knowingly and unlawfully possesses a controlled substance." Standing alone, a conclusory statement that a substance seized from a defendant was a particular type of controlled substance does not meet the reasonable cause requirement (see People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 [2009]; Dumas, 68 NY2d at 731 [the charge must be "supported by evidentiary facts showing the basis for th(at) conclusion"]). An accusatory instrument charging a violation of Penal Law § 220.03 is sufficient when it "adequately identifies the particular drug, alleges that the accused possessed that illegal substance, states the officer's familiarity with and training regarding the identification of the drug, provides some information as to why the officer concluded that the substance was a particular type of illegal drug, and supplies sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy" (Kalin, 12 NY3d at 231-232; see People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1067 [2015]; People v Jennings, 22 NY3d 1001, 1002 [2013]).
Here, the factual allegations contained in the accusatory instrument were sufficient to [*3]establish the basis for the police officer's conclusion that the substance recovered was cocaine, in that the officer explained, with reference to his training and experience in identifying cocaine, how he had formed that belief, as well as describing the drug paraphernalia, i.e., glass pipes and metal rods, that the cocaine residue was found in (see Smalls, 26 NY3d at 1067; Jennings, 22 NY3d at 1002; Kalin, 12 NY3d at 230-232; People v Crawford, 66 Misc 3d 133[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 52118[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). Contrary to defendant's contention, neither a laboratory nor a field test report was required to accompany the accusatory instrument for it to be facially sufficient (see Kalin, 12 NY3d at 231; People v Pearson, 78 AD3d 445 [2010]; People v Batts, 53 Misc 3d 153[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51729[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). In view of the foregoing, the accusatory instrument was facially sufficient.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ENTER: