The parties in this matter were married on December 19, 2007, in the City of Mount Vernon, County of Westchester, State of New York, in a civil ceremony. Together, they have three unemancipated children, being: (1) E.Y., date of birth XX/XX/XXXX; (2) O.Y., date of birth XX/XX/XXXX; and (3) NY, date of birth XX/XX/XXXX (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Children"). No further children of the marriage are expected.

Plaintiff commenced this matrimonial action on October 20, 2022, represented by legal counsel, with the filing of a Summons, Verified Complaint, and ancillary documents (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1) (hereinafter referred to as the "Complaint"). Notably, the Complaint states, in part, that:

FIFTH: The grounds for divorce that are alleged are as follows: Abandonment (DRL 170(2) That commencing on or about July 2017, and continuing for a period of more than one (1) year immediately prior to commencement of this action, the Defendant left the marital residence of the parties located at XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York 10550, taking the parties' minor children with her and did not return. Such absence was without cause or justification and was without Plaintiff's consent.

SIXTH: There is no judgment for a divorce and no other matrimonial action between the parties pending in this court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant as follows:

A. Judgement dissolving the marriage between the parties;

B. Judgment granting Plaintiff & Defendant all of their respective separate property;

C. Judgment awarding joint custody of the minor children of the parties with physical custody to Defendant and liberal visitation to Plaintiff;

D. Judgment awarding Defendant reasonable child support in accordance with the child support guidelines;

E. Judgment granting Defendant the right to resume the use of pre-marital name to wit: "XXXXXX" or any former name.

Within the Complaint, Plaintiff notes that he waives distribution of marital property and is not seeking maintenance as payee as described in the Notice of Guideline Maintenance (the "Notice"), other than what was already agreed to in a written stipulation.

On February 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Service indicating that the Complaint had been served on Defendant on February 11, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2).

On May 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed an uncontested divorce package (NYSCEF Doc. No. 3); Note of Issue (NYSCEF Doc. No. 4); proposed Judgment of Divorce (NYSCEF Doc. No. 5); proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law (NYSCEF Doc. No. 6); and Certificate of Dissolution (NYSCEF Doc. No. 7). None of these documents included a Stipulation or Agreement of Settlement between the parties or other indication that Defendant consented to proceed in an uncontested manner.

On May 15, 2023, a Notice of Appearance was filed by Defendant's counsel (NYSCEF Doc. No. 9), with an Affidavit of Service of same (NYSCEF Doc. No. 10).

On July 20, 2023, a Court Notice was issued scheduling a Preliminary Conference to be held on August 30, 2023, at 9:30 a.m. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 13).

On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Statement of Net Worth (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 14 & 15) (hereinafter "Plaintiff's SNW") which was signed before Plaintiff's counsel who notarized the document. Plaintiff's SNW lists assets totaling $31,000.00 including one account held by Plaintiff with a balance of $1,000.00, and a business interest held in Y.B.B. XXXXXXXXXX, (hereinafter "YBB") of which Plaintiff is the sole owner, valued at $30,000.00. Plaintiff then lists liabilities totaling $76,200.00 including a Small Business Administration Loan to YBB, having a balance due of $74,000.00, and Home Depot debt of $2,200.00 due from YBB. This Court notes that Plaintiff's Amended SNW (NYSCEF Doc. No. 52) differs in that the one account held by Plaintiff has a balance of $500.00, as opposed to the aforementioned $1,000.00; the aforementioned Small Business Administration Loan has a balance of $73,000.00, as opposed to the aforementioned $74,000.00; the Home Depot debt is $1,400.00, as opposed to the aforementioned $2,200.00; and there is an additional liability to Discover, with $4,500.00 in current debt. Plaintiff asserts his monthly income in his most recently filed income tax return is $2,737.00 with monthly expenses totaling $2,070.00.

On August 29, 2023, Defendant filed a Statement of Net Worth, dated August 28, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 18) (hereinafter "Defendant's SNW") which was signed before Defendant's counsel who notarized the document. Defendant's SNW lists assets totaling an unknown amount, including a Capital One Bank Account with a date of commencement value of $244.00; a vehicle with an alleged date of commencement value of $500.00; and a 401k with an unknown date of commencement value. Defendant then lists liabilities totaling $12,500.00 arising out of credit card debts. Defendant asserts her monthly income in her most recently filed tax return is $7,731.00 with monthly expenses of $5,579.50.

On August 30, 2023, a Preliminary Conference was held wherein all parties and counsel [*2]appeared after which a Preliminary Conference Order was entered directing that all discovery be completed with a Note of Issue to be filed by December 9, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 19).

On September 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (NYSCEF Doc. No. 20) (hereinafter "Amended Complaint"), with an Affidavit of Service of same (NYSCEF Doc. No. 21) reciting the same allegations, again waiving spousal maintenance, but altering the relief requested seeking the following:

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant as follows:

" A. Judgment dissolving the marriage between the parties;

B. Judgment resolving all issues of equitable distribution of marital property;

C. Granting Plaintiff and Defendant all of their respective separate property; and

D. Judgment granting Defendant the right to resume the use of pre-marital name to wit: "XXXXXX" or any former name."

On September 14, 2023, a Verified Answer with Counterclaim was served by Defendant (NYSCEF Doc. No. 68) (hereinafter "Answer") wherein Defendant denies the allegation that she abandoned Plaintiff asserting a counterclaim:

"4. Commencing with the 16th day of June, 2017, and continuing up until the present time, the plaintiff has without any good or justifiable cause, or without any provocation, refused to have sexual intercourse with the defendant, and plaintiff has thereby disavowed his marriage to the defendant and abandoned her.

5. Despite defendant's repeated requests to plaintiff that he discontinue his refusal to fulfill his marital obligations and to have sexual intercourse with the defendant, the defendant has persisted and continued to refuse to fulfill his marital duties and to have sexual intercourse with the defendant, and such refusal has been willful and intentional on the part of the plaintiff, without any just cause or provocation."

On September 15, 2023, a Verified Reply to Counterclaim was filed by Plaintiff (NYSCEF Doc. No. 25) wherein Plaintiff provides the following:

"1. Admits that allegations contained in paragraph "4" and "5" of the Defendant's counterclaim, in as much as the parties have not resided together since June, 2017.

Wherefore Plaintiff:

1) Withdraws the grounds alleged in his complaint and consents to the Defendant obtaining a judgment on the grounds alleged in her counterclaim.

2) Requests equitable distribution of marital property.

3) Requests that Defendant be granted the right to resume her maiden name "XXXXXX" or any prior surname."

On October 19, 2023, a Compliance Conference was held wherein all parties and counsel appeared and the Court extended the date of completion of discovery and filing the Note of Issue to January 31, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 30).

On November 30, 2023, a Consent to Change Attorney was filed by incoming counsel for Plaintiff (NYSCEF Doc. No. 33).

On December 12, 2023, a Compliance Conference was held wherein all parties and counsel appeared after which, for a second time, an Order was entered which extended the date of completion of discovery and filing the Note of Issue to February 29, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. [*3]39).

On February 29, 2024, a Note of Issue was filed (NYSCEF Doc. No. 40).

On March 1, 2024, a Pre-Trial Conference Order was entered wherein it was directed: (1) Pre-Trial Conference to be held on May 13, 2024, at 9:00 a.m.; and (2) Trial to be held on May 23, 2024, from 9:00 a.m. — 5:00 p.m. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 41).

On May 10, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel filed a Witness List listing Plaintiff and Plaintiff's brother D.Y. as possible witnesses (NYSCEF Doc. No. 46); Exhibit List providing potential exhibits A-G (NYSCEF Doc. No. 47); Statement of Material Facts (NYSCEF Doc. No. 48); Statement of Proposed Disposition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 49); and Statement of Net Worth (NYSCEF Doc. No. 50) (hereinafter "Plaintiff's SNW #2") which largely comported with Plaintiff's SNW.

On May 12, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel filed a Memorandum (NYSCEF Doc. No. 51) and third Statement of Net Worth (NYSCEF Doc. No. 52) (hereinafter "Plaintiff's SNW #3") which largely comported with Plaintiff's SNW.

On May 12, 2024, Defendant's counsel filed Defendant's second Statement of Net Worth (NYSCEF Doc. No. 53) (hereinafter "Defendant's SNW #2") which provided further information beyond what was set forth in Defendant's SNW including: Defendant's assets totaling $56,875.57 and debts totaling $12,910.00.

On May 12, 2024, Defendant filed an Exhibit List delineating proposed exhibits A-M to be presented at trial (NYSCEF Doc. No. 55).

On May 13, 2024, a Pre-Trial Conference was held wherein all parties and counsel appeared, and wherein the following Court Exhibits were marked:

(1) Court Exhibit #1 — Defendant's Witness List providing only Defendant as a potential witness to testify at trial (NYSCEF Doc. No. 56);

(2) Court Exhibit #2 — Plaintiff's Witness List providing only Plaintiff and Plaintiff's brother D.Y. as potential witnesses to testify at trial (NYSCEF Doc. No. 57);

(3) Court Exhibit #3 — Plaintiff's Exhibit list providing potential exhibits A-G including a stipulation signed by both counsel indicating that it is agreed by the parties and counsel that all of Plaintiff's exhibits shall be marked for identification and moved into evidence on consent on the first day of trial (NYSCEF Doc. No. 58);

(4) Court Exhibit #4 — Defendant's Exhibit List providing potential exhibits A-M including a stipulation signed by both counsel indicating that it is agreed by the parties and counsel that all of Defendant's exhibits shall be marked for identification and moved into evidence on consent on the first day of trial excluding proposed exhibits B and J (NYSCEF Doc. No. 59);

(5) Court Exhibit #5 — Statement of Facts Not In Dispute (NYSCEF Doc. No. 60); and

(6) Court Exhibit #6 — Statement of Proposed Disposition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 61).

On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Statement of Proposed Disposition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 62), and Defendant filed a Statement of Proposed Disposition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 63).

On May 23, 2024, a Trial was held and completed after which an Order was entered directing that: (1) Counsel shall order transcript and pay for same equally which shall be submitted to the Court to be "So Ordered" by June 24, 2024, and (2) Counsel may submit post-trial submissions limited to 20 pages by June 24, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 64).

On June 20, 2024, Defendant's counsel requested an extension for counsel to file post-trial submissions to June 28, 2024, (NYSCEF Doc. No. 70) which was granted pursuant to Court [*4]Order (NYSCEF Doc. No. 71).

Post-Trial submissions were filed by Plaintiff's counsel on June 24, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 72), and by Defendant's counsel on June 28, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 73).

Plaintiff's Post-Trial submission requests that the Court:

1. Grant neither party spousal maintenance asserting that both are self-supportive;

2. Grant Plaintiff an award of legal fees in the amount of $25,000.00;

3. Grant Plaintiff an award of fifty percent of the value of Defendant's real estate;

4. Grant Plaintiff an award of fifty percent of the value of Defendant's bank account;

5. Deny Defendant's claims to funds Plaintiff may have received from real estate investments due to claims that Defendant did not contribute to these business investments; Defendant already benefitted from the business investments while the parties lived together; and Defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence at trial to support that Plaintiff received funds from any real estate transactions.

Defendant's Post-Trial submission requests that the Court:

1. Grant Defendant an award of spousal maintenance in an amount to be set by the Court;

2. Grant Defendant an award of legal fees and disbursements in the amount of $17,487.50; and

3. Grant Defendant equitable distribution of marital property including real properties following the Court having determined such properties to be marital property.

The Court held a trial on May 23, 2024, which was completed that day. Both parties appeared with counsel.

Exhibits:

During the trial, the following exhibits were admitted into evidence:

Plaintiff's Exhibits -

1. Exhibit 1 — Pleadings

2. Exhibit 2 — Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth

3. Exhibit 3 — Defendant's Statement of Net Worth

4. Exhibit 4 — Plaintiff's 2022 Tax Return

5. Exhibit 5 — Defendant's 2021 Tax Return

6. Exhibit 6 — Defendant's Capital One Bank Statement for October 2022

7. Exhibit 7 — Defendant's Deposition Transcript dated January 22, 2024

Defendant's Exhibits -

8. Exhibit A — Draft Recorded Deed in Westchester County, from Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to G.A.Y., for premises located at 239 South 10th Avenue, Mount Vernon, NY 10550

9. Exhibit B — Notarized Affidavit dated February 7, 2012 concerning membership interest in YBB and [Redacted] ATENRA

10. Exhibit C — Recorded Deed in Westchester County, from Wells Fargo Bank and Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust to ATENRA for premises located at 258 XXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, NY 10550

11. Exhibit D — FCI Lender Services Payment Statement dated 6/12/2020 addressed to [Redacted] URSA, G.A.Y.

12. Exhibit E — Fay Servicing Mortgage Statement dated 6/10/2020 addressed to URSA, G.A.Y.

13. Exhibit F — ANDREADIS CAPITAL LLC Invoice dated 5/1/2023 addressed to URSA, 1 G.A.Y., Member

14. Exhibit G — People's United Bank Statement for 10/31/2016 to 11/30/20l6 addressed to Y.B.B., G.A.Y.

15. Exhibit H — Bank of America check No. 118 dated 3/14/2014 in amount of $1,866.66 by G.A.Y. to Joseph Schiliro for payment of Mortgage

16. Exhibit I — US Small Business Administration, Summary of Loan #9673728109 (Primary Borrower: Y.B.B.)

17. Exhibit J — [NOT ADMITTED]

18. Exhibit K — Transcript of deposition of plaintiff, Dated January 22, 2024

19. Exhibit L — Title search-property titled in ATENRA, YBB, URSA and G.A.Y. in Rockland County

20. Exhibit M — Title search-property titled in ATENRA, YBB, URSA and G.A.Y. in Westchester County

Witnesses:

Plaintiff and Defendant were the sole witnesses to testify at the trial.

a. Summary of Testimony of Plaintiff

Family Background, Employment History and Financial Support -

Plaintiff testified that the parties knew each other in the country of Jamaica and were married on December 19, 2007. He testified that Defendant was facing deportation at that time, and he helped her by marrying her. He testified that the parties are the parents of the three Children. After the parties' marriage, Plaintiff testified that they resided together at his mother's home located at XXXXXXXXXXX, Bronx, New York, where the parties remained until they separated in 2009, ten months after the birth of their first child. He testified that the parties could not get along and that Defendant wanted to use him for immigration purposes referencing the parties' first child as an "anchor baby." He testified that Defendant moved back to Brooklyn to her mother's home during which time he paid all of Defendant's expenses, including but not limited to payment of expenses for Defendant to obtain a home health aide certificate. With respect to Defendant's education, Plaintiff further testified that she attended college at BMCC and Medgar Evers, where he assisted her with her studies.

He testified that the parties got back together in 2012, moving into 258 XXXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York. He testified that during this time he paid all of the bills and that Defendant may have been doing home health aide work. He testified that in 2017 Defendant again moved out of the marital residence and from that time until the date of commencement of the instant action, Plaintiff continued to provide Defendant with financial support.

With respect to Plaintiff's employment history, he testified that he obtained his mortgage broker's license in 2006 and worked as a mortgage broker at the time of the parties' marriage. He reported that he surrendered his broker's license in 2008, when he began his current employment as a property manager assisting clients in locating, renovating, and managing properties. He testified that he has assisted many family members with obtaining properties, including his two brothers, D.Y. and R.Y.. When asked how many properties he is currently managing he responded, "I'm managing 258. I'm managing 20 XXXXXX. Probably about three or four now." [*5](Tr. at 42:1-11)^[FN1] . He testified that he is usually paid by his clients in cash or check.

He testified that Defendant never participated in his business activities. When presented with Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, he identified this document as his statement of net worth which he testified reflects his current income and expenses, confirming that he signed the document. When presented with Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 he identified the document as his 2022 Income Tax Return testifying that the gross receipts of his business totaled $96,977.00. He testified that he sought to negotiate a settlement with Defendant and offered to assist her in the purchase of real estate, " ...because eventually my children will inherit it, so it's not an unreasonable thing to do, but she said no." (Tr. at 31:5-7). He testified that he is seeking his attorney's fees and half of Defendant's assets.

Business Entities —

He testified that he formed several limited liability companies including: (1) YBB (hereinafter "YBB"); (2) URSA (hereinafter "Ursa"); (3) Y.F. (hereinafter "Y.F."); and (4) ATENRA (hereinafter "Atenra") (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "LLCs").

He claims he never had an interest in the real properties owned by these entities. He testified, "It was an understanding between my clients and I that I was not going to receive any funds from the properties, that I was just helping the transaction." (Tr. at 47:16-21). When asked if his association with the LLCs was done as a favor he responded, "Yes, because I'm going to be the one who ultimately manages the property, and I will get paid to manage the property." (Tr at 48:3-5). When asked if he executed transfer documents as a member of any of the LLCs, he responded, "I don't recall, maybe one. I'm not sure. But most of the time there were other members who executed the transfer of documents." (Tr. at 48:8-10).

He testified that he has never received monies from the LLCs, but when asked if he was ever employed by the LLCs, he testified that he has been an agent from time to time. When asked what he has done for the LLCs, he testified that he has assisted them in obtaining the properties, including executing documents and maintaining the properties. He however testified that he attempts to train his clients and has assisted his clients in the sale of properties. "I was compensated as a property manager throughout the time my clients owned the property, but I received no monies from the sale of the properties." (Tr. at 50:12-14).

With respect to D.Y., he testified that he assisted him with the following properties: (1) 674 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York, where his brother currently resides and (2) 258 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York, where Plaintiff currently resides. When asked if those were the only properties he assisted his brother with he testified, "I don't recall. Maybe earlier Dewayne purchased a property, but I don't remember the address. As I said, that's—the first property was—the property he owns and I assisted in was 2010. So that's like 14 years ago. So, my memory is not that well." (Tr. at 23:11-15).

[YBB]

He testified that he is the sole owner of YBB, an acronym for [Redacted], which is the [*6]entity from which he operates his property management business.

[Ursa]

He testified that Ursa purchased 20 XXXXXXX; 50 XXXXXXXXXXX; possibly 113 XXXXXXXX, 154 XXXXXXXXXXX and 236 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX.

When asked if he had been a member of Ursa, he responded, "Maybe at some point back in the day, but I'm not currently a member, and I haven't been a member for some time." (Tr. at 35:25;36: 1-2). When asked when he was last affiliated with Ursa he responded, "I don't recall" (Tr. at 42:19), but later testified, "Okay. 2022, I was still a member of Ursa. And yes, I was still a member of Ursa in 2022, yes." (Tr. at 49:9-10). When asked who owns Ursa, he responded, "I don't think I can tell you who my client is. That's confidential information," and then indicated, "It's multiple members, so it's not just one person. So do you want me to give you a list of the members from my memory of Ursa?" (Tr. at 43:3-4,6-8) When asked again how many other members of Ursa existed, he responded, "I don't recall. It changes from time to time because they were family members," and continued, "It's multiple family members. My uncle, my brothers, my mom when she was alive. I mean it's a long list." (Tr. at 48;15-16,19-21).

[Atenra]

With respect to Atenra, he testified that the entity purchased 258 XXXXXXXXXX. He testified that he assisted in the formation of Atenra which was established to assist his friend L.F.. When asked if he had been a member of Atenra, he responded, "Maybe at some point back in the day, but I'm not currently a member, and I haven't been a member for some time." (Tr. at 35:25;36:1-2) When presented with Defendant's Exhibit B, he testified that he signed the document entitled Affidavit Concerning Membership Interest in Atenra. When asked if there came a time when he was no longer a member of Atenra, he responded, "If I have documents? This is from 2014. So, I only did this as it says so my client can obtain this property at 258. And then after my client obtained the property, I was no longer a member. This is from 2014." (Tr. at 38:6-9). He then amended his statement to indicate he has not been a member of Atenra LLC since 2012.

[Y.F.]

He testified that he assisted with the formation of this entity but that it was never utilized.

b. Summary of Testimony of Defendant

She testified that the parties were married on December 19, 2007, in the State of New York and that she was not facing deportation at that time. She testified that the parties are the parents of the Children. At the time of the parties' marriage, she testified that she was residing with her parents in Brooklyn, New York. She testified that following the marriage she relocated to 1907 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, Bronx, New York, where she resided with Plaintiff until 2009 when she returned to her parent's home for approximately two to three years. She testified that Plaintiff was abusive and controlling. She testified that she initially sought to spend two to three weeks at her parent's home, but that period was enlarged as Plaintiff was not ready for her to return as he was seeing someone else.

She testified that in 2012 she moved back with Plaintiff to 258 XXXXXXXXXX, reporting that, "It was the house of horrors. It was—he was very controlling, very manipulative, very abusive, emotionally, and physically and mentally. I was devalued all the time. I was always put down. And it was echoed through when he called our son an anchor baby, and that is [*7]not fair." (Tr. at 61:20-25). She testified that she had police reports and sought assistance from My Sister's Place but did not have the police reports in Court as she was not instructed to bring them. When asked at trial why she was only mentioning alleged abuse against her by Plaintiff for the first time, she responded that this was the first time she was asked.

She testified that Plaintiff sought to have another woman in the parties' relationship, "I was always in fear—always fear, fear, fear, fear all the time to the point that he believes in polygamy, and he wanted to have another woman in the relationship, and I disagreed. And that's when it really started to happen because he started to call her a prospect." (Tr. at 62:1-7). She reported that she again left the marital residence on August 13, 2017, and that her doing so was directly related to Plaintiff's request that another woman enter the relationship, stating, "Yes, because I was given an ultimatum. Either I agree to have this lady come every Sunday for Sunday dinners, and I will have to be the one to cook it, or I stay and just agree to his controlling ways. And I decided to go with the one that—to leave, so I left." (Tr. at 63:22-25; 63:1-2).

She testified that she relocated with the Children to Newark, New Jersey. She testified that in the seven years since the parties have been separated that Plaintiff's contribution to the support of the Children have been minuscule, purchasing school uniforms on one occasion, i-Pads, a hover board, and a drone. She further testified that Plaintiff sent $300.00 debit cards and that he directed the Children to utilize them without her involvement, causing her to not utilize them at all. She testified that she has never sought child support in a court proceeding as she was scared to do so. She testified that she requested child support directly from Plaintiff who would respond that she would need to bring the Children to New York where he would directly purchase the items for the Children, which he has never done.

When asked who paid the parties' expenses when they resided together, she testified that, "He always made sure to maintain power and control. He didn't want me to work or do anything. So, he wanted to have that power, to always be the one to — so I could depend on him financially for everything. So, then it came with financial abuse, because I had to always go to him and ask him for money." (Tr. at 63:13-18). She testified that the parties initially did not have a joint account as Plaintiff would place everything in his mother's name because the mother of his first child had emptied out his then account. However, Defendant noted that she eventually added Plaintiff to her bank account. She testified that the parties never filed joint income tax returns, but that she never refused to join her finances with Plaintiff.

She testified that she does not own real estate, but testified that during the parties' marriage, Plaintiff purchased real estate including: (1) 258 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX; (2) 674 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX; (3) 154 XXXXXXXXXXX; and (4) 239 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX. She testified that Plaintiff still has interest in these properties. She testified that Plaintiff utilized hard money lenders to purchase property, including Joseph Shapiro who loaned Plaintiff funds to purchase 258 XXXXXXXXXX, after which Plaintiff completed a refinance to pay back the hard money lenders. She further testified that Plaintiff places family members names on the title to the properties, but remains the true owner, "And this was exemplified also in 258 XXXXXXXXXX where he uses family members to put the house in their names: that's A.A., and R.Y., and A.O.. And then he was still the owner of the property. So, he was the one still maintaining the mortgage and doing everything after he paid back Joe his money that he loaned him. And he was also paying — before he paid back the money, he was also paying the mortgage on the house as well." (Tr. at 68:10-19).

When asked if Plaintiff has any real estate titled in his name or the name of YBB she [*8]testified, "No. He doesn't keep anything under his name. He is very crafty. He has a family member or the LLC." (Tr. at 82:2-3). When asked if it was an assumption that Plaintiff owned properties held in various LLCs, she testified, "I wouldn't say that it's an assumption. It's more fact, so yes." (Tr. at 82:16-17). She testified that Plaintiff is the sole member of limited liability companies and when asked how she knew this to be true she indicated that a private investigator had confirmed that she had proof, but that proof was not brought to Court.

She testified that she believes the Plaintiff's real estate holdings, which includes seven properties, are valued at 3.6 million dollars. She testified that she is entitled to a share of these properties as she encouraged Plaintiff to obtain his mortgage broker license and assisted him with the properties, including cleaning 674, 258 and 239. During cross examination she was questioned as to how she arrived at the 3.6-million-dollar valuation:

Q. Okay. Going back to this $3.6 million value, how did you arrive at that number?

A. By the appraisal. The properties were appraised by adding them up.

Q. Who did the appraisal?

A. An appraisal company. A lawyer was in charge of the appraisal.

Q. There was no—withdrawn. Do you have a written copy of this appraisal?

A. I think it was presented as evidence.

MS. TROTT: Your Honor, to the best of my knowledge, I have not seen an appraisal submitted as an exhibit, am I correct?

MS. MCGREGOR: There was no appraisal.

A. My lawyer informed me that an appraisal was done. (Tr. at 82:18-25; 83:1-9).

With respect to 258, she testified that Plaintiff purchased this property in 2012 and she accompanied him to the closing. She lived at this property and when tenants moved out, she assisted Plaintiff in cleaning the property. She testified that this property is now held by a corporation by the name of "S.B.^[FN2] ," which is held by Plaintiff's fiancé. When asked if it is owned by Plaintiff, Defendant testified, "Well, they are associated, so I figure it's interrelated or intertwined. So yes, I would say it's owned by both of them." (Tr. at 80:4-6).

She testified that while she resided with Plaintiff he was employed as a mortgage broker and earned income through a day care, K.H., operated out of a property he owned at 10 XXXXX Street or Avenue, where he also generated rental income. She testified that although Plaintiff later sold the 10 XXXXX property, it earned between $150,000.00 and $200,000.00 per year, as evidenced by his lifestyle of driving expensive cars, having a vegan diet, and his employment. However, when asked if she had seen any documentation to show those figures as Plaintiff's income, she responded, "I could not see any income because I was not allowed. He is very controlling, as I keep stating, and I was not allowed to see any documents." (Tr. at 85:1-3).

When asked if she received her education while residing with Plaintiff she responded, "No. No. While I was living with him, I couldn't get to do anything that I wanted to do because he wasn't a firm believer to get an education, for me to uplift myself. So it was always during the separation that I could always go back to school." (Tr. at 71:16-20). She testified that during the parties' first separation she completed a home health course and then enrolled at Medgar Evers [*9]School in 2011 but could not complete her studies as she became pregnant with the parties' child, N.Y, after which the parties again cohabitated. Following the parties' final separation, she testified that she obtained training to be a registered nurse. She testified that she was always working, and during the time the parties resided together she was employed as a care giver and security guard. She testified that she is currently employed as a registered nurse with an annual salary of $90,000.00. When asked about her expenses, she testified that she pays $2,300.00 in rent in an apartment where she resides with the Children and her parents who are unemployed. When presented with Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Defendant testified that this is her bank statement for several accounts showing a balance of $78,387.82. She testified that she accumulated this money through her tax money to prepare for the Children to attend college.

a. Witness Credibility

The Second Department Appellate Division has held that the determination of witness credibility is to be determined by the trier of fact:

"The credibility of the witnesses, the reconciliation of conflicting statements, a determination of which should be accepted and which rejected, the truthfulness and accuracy of the testimony, whether contradictory or not, were issues for the trier of the facts. The memory, motive, mental capacity, accuracy of observation and statement, truthfulness, and other tests of the reliability of witnesses can be passed upon with greater safety by a trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses than by appellate judges who simply read the printed record" (Barnet v. Cannizzaro, 3 AD2d 745 [2d Dept 1957] [internal citations omitted).

It has been recognized that in the context of matrimonial proceedings, "Since the court had the opportunity to view the demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing, it was in the best position to gauge their credibility, and its resolution of credibility issues is entitled to great deference on appeal" (Lieberman v. Lieberman, 21 AD3d 1004 [2d Dept 2005] [internal citations omitted]).

Based upon the demeanor and substance of the testimony of Plaintiff, both at trial as well as in his Deposition, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not a credible witness and while not entirely discrediting Plaintiff's testimony, has provided it with little weight. The Court made this determination based upon an assessment of the Plaintiff's character, temperament, and sincerity. Notably, Plaintiff's testimony at trial included responses to questions which appeared to lack veracity. While Plaintiff testified that he is employed as a property manager, he was unable to testify to the exact number and location of the properties he managed. He was further unable to testify as to what specific real estate transfer documents he had executed for his clients.

Upon review of Defendant's Exhibit K (Plaintiff's Deposition Transcript), which was admitted into evidence on consent, Plaintiff's testimony during the deposition was evasive and in certain instances conflicted with his trial testimony. When asked to disclose his property management clients, Plaintiff failed to do so without legitimate basis (P5, L 8-25; P6, L 1-21).^[FN3] [*10]When asked if he had any interest in real estate during the marriage, he responded that he did not recall (P 7, L 11-12). As Plaintiff has been employed in the real estate industry for over a decade and testified that his expertise permits him to assist others with their real estate needs, it is incomprehensible that Plaintiff would not recall if he owned real estate during the parties' marriage. When asked if he was a member of Ursa, he responded that he did not recall (P 18, L 20-22), despite having testified during trial that he was a member until the year 2022. When asked where he has his personal bank account, he responded that he does not have a personal account (P20, L17-19), despite Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth indicating that he does maintain his own bank account. When asked if he had married a person other than Defendant, he initially indicated that he had not, but then directed Defendant's attorney to check the records at the county clerk's office to obtain the answer (P 29, L 18-21).

Based upon the demeanor and substance of the testimony of Defendant, the Court finds that Defendant is a credible witness. The Court made this determination based upon an assessment of the Defendant's character, temperament, and sincerity.

b. Grounds for Dissolution of the Parties Marriage

Pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law ("DRL") § 170(2), "An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any of the following grounds:***(2) The abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant for a period of one or more years."

The Second Department Appellate Division has set forth the manner within which a party may prevail on a cause of action for divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment:

"It is well settled that to establish a cause of action for a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment, the spouse who claims to have been constructively abandoned must prove that the abandoning spouse unjustifiably refused to fulfill the basic obligations arising from the marriage contract and that the abandonment continued for at least one year (George M. v. Mary Ann M., 171 AD2d 651; Caprise v. Caprise, 143 AD2d 968). The refusal must be unjustified, willful, and continued despite repeated requests for continued conjugal relations (Casale v. Casale, 111 AD2d 737; George v. George, 34 AD2d 888). Proof that one spouse, in response to a single request, refused to engage in sexual relations, in the absence of proof that the other spouse thereafter repeatedly and unsuccessfully requested a resumption of sexual relations, is insufficient to sustain a cause of action for a divorce on the ground of constructive abandonment (Caprise v. Caprise, supra; Nicholson v. Nicholson, 87 AD2d 645). (Lyons v. Lyons, 187 AD2d 415 [2d Dept 1992]).

If a spouse responds to a claim by the other of constructive abandonment with unequivocal admissions of constructive abandonment by that spouse a trial court may properly grant summary judgment as to grounds (Nemet v. Nemet, 99 AD2d 828 [2d Dept 1984]).

Here, Defendant's Verified Answer included a counterclaim for dissolution of the parties' marriage based upon the alleged constructive abandonment of Defendant by Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a Reply containing an admission of Plaintiff's abandonment of Defendant, withdrawing his own cause of action for dissolution of the parties' marriage, and consenting to a judgment of divorce being entered in favor of Defendant on the grounds of abandonment.

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at the Trial, a judgment shall be entered granting Defendant a divorce against Plaintiff, dissolving forever the bonds of matrimony existing between Plaintiff and Defendant upon the grounds of abandonment pursuant to DRL § 170(2).

c. Custody, Access & Support

The parties have stipulated through their submissions that as the Children reside outside the State of New York within the State of New Jersey that the parties will commence proceedings within that jurisdiction to address all issues pertaining to the custody, access, and support of the Children. Accordingly, no determinations as to those issues will be made herein.

d. Spousal Maintenance

New York State Domestic Relations Law sets forth the manner in which spousal maintenance shall be calculated and the duration determined by the Court (Emmanuel D. v. Ximena D., 154 N.Y.S.3d 216, [Kings Sup. Ct. 2021]).

"The court may impute income to a party based on, among other things, her employment history, future earning capacity, and educational background (Strohli v. Strohli, 174 AD3d 938 [2d Dept 2019] [internal citations omitted]).

A party in a matrimonial action may waive spousal maintenance and support (Messina v. Messina, 143 AD2d 735 [2d Dept 1988]).

Here, Defendant's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) lists Plaintiff's annual income as $74,830.00, and total yearly expenses as $89,879.28. Defendant's 2021 Income Tax Return (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5) lists Defendant's total income as $20,240.00, adjusted gross income of $20,396.00 and taxable income as $1,596.00. However, at trial, Defendant testified that her current income is $90,000.00, which comports with her current yearly expenses.

Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) lists Plaintiff's annual adjusted gross income as $36,000.00, and total yearly expenses as $24,840.00. Plaintiff's 2022 Tax Return (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) lists Plaintiff's total income as $25,737.00, adjusted gross income as $23,919.00, and taxable income as $8,775.00. Tellingly, Schedule C of this return notes Plaintiff's total income of $25,737.00 originating from profit from business, being YBB which reports gross receipts of $96,977.00, with $71,240.00 of expenses ($61,000.00 for supplies, $1,280.00 for deductible meals, and $3,960.00 for utilities). The Court therefore finds Plaintiff's 2022 Tax Return to lack credibility, as the Plaintiff's stated income does not comport with his stated monthly expenses in Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth and the excessive proportion of expenses listed in Schedule C in comparison to the gross receipts of Plaintiff's business raises red flags.

During trial Defendant testified that it was her belief that during the parties' marriage [*11]Plaintiff earned between $150,000 and $200,000 annually, attempting to support her claim through her testimony regarding Plaintiff's then lifestyle. However, Defendant confirmed that she did not have any documentation to support her claims and in the portion of Defendant's post-trial submission pertaining to maintenance, her counsel provides no support for her claim but rather merely asserts, "Giving regard to the circumstances of this case and of the respective parties, it is respectfully requested that the Court awards maintenance to the Defendant." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 73, p. 7).

Accordingly, based upon the Plaintiff's employment history, future earning capacity, and educational background, the Court hereby imputes an annual income to Plaintiff in the amount of $90,000.00. The Court finds this appropriate due to Plaintiff's many years of experience in the real estate industry, including his previously held license as a mortgage broker, which he testified that he voluntarily relinquished, coupled with his significant experience as a property manager. The Court recognizes that while Plaintiff has decided to operate as a self-employed business owner, Plaintiff's income would rise significantly if he sought employment elsewhere within the real estate industry. The Court further finds that Plaintiff's income tax returns reflect an inordinately excessive amount of asserted business expenses compared to net income based upon the gross business receipts, which appear to have been calculated as an attempt to diminish Plaintiff's true income.

Plaintiff has waived spousal maintenance from Defendant, while Defendant has sought an award of spousal maintenance from Plaintiff. Even with the Court having imputed Plaintiff's income to $90,000.00, as Defendant's income is of the same amount, the application of the Spousal Maintenance calculation set forth within the DRL would result in neither party receiving spousal maintenance and accordingly, it is determined that neither party shall receive from the other past, present, or future spousal maintenance.

e. Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets, Declaration of Separate Property, Dissipation of Marital Assets and Allocation of Debts

The Appellate Division, Second Department has noted the manner in which a trial court is to make a determination as to equitable distribution in the context of a matrimonial action:

"The Equitable Distribution Law mandates that, whenever a marriage is terminated, absent an agreement of the parties, the court must determine the rights of the parties in their separate and marital property and provide for the disposition of the property in the final judgment (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][a]). In determining the equitable distribution of marital property, the court is required to consider 14 specific factors and may take into account any other factor the court finds just and proper (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d]). The court is obligated to render a decision in which it sets forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision, a requirement that cannot be waived (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][g]). In the absence of express findings of fact and of a detailed discussion of the enumerated factors, meaningful appellate review is precluded and a remittal for further fact finding may be required (Gape v. Gape, 110 AD2d 621; Kluge v. Kluge, 159 AD2d 968). Facts must be sufficiently developed at trial to enable a reasoned determination of the issues of equitable distribution and, if not, a new trial may be ordered (Madu v. Madu, 135 AD3d 836, 837; McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 74 AD3d 911, 915)."

DRL § 236[B][5] notes, in part, that:

"b. Separate property shall remain such.

c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties.

d. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider:

(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action;

(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;

(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;

(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution;

(5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage;

(6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;

(7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party. The court shall not consider as marital property subject to distribution the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement. However, in arriving at an equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning capacity of the other spouse;

(8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;

(9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;

(10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party;

(11) the tax consequences to each party;

(12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;

(13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration;

(14) whether either party has committed an act or acts of domestic violence, as described in subdivision one of section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law, against the other party and the nature, extent, duration and impact of such act or acts;

(15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. "Companion animal", as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law; and

(16) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.

e. In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property.

f. In addition to the disposition of property as set forth above, the court may make such order regarding the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects as provided in section two hundred thirty-four of this chapter, without regard to the form of ownership of such property.

g. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel."

"Although in a marriage of long duration where both parties have made significant contributions to the marriage, a division of marital assets should be made as equal as possible, there is no requirement distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis" (Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d 348, 349 [2d Dept 2002]; Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094, 1098 [2d Dept 2017]). "Courts have discretion to value 'active assets' such as a professional practice on the commencement date [of the action], while 'passive assets' such as securities, which could change in value suddenly based on market fluctuations, may be valued at the date of trial but such formulation should be treated as helpful guideposts and not immutable rules" (Lieberman-Massoni v. Massoni, 215 AD3d 656 [2d Dept 2023]; Daniel v. Friedman, 22 AD3d 707, 708 [2d Dept 2005]; Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 94 NY2d 696, 707 [2000]). In Lieberman-Massoni v. Massoni, the Appellate Division determined, "considering [wife's] substantial indirect contributions to husband's business, including caring for children and maintaining parties' residence in New York while husband worked a majority of time in Los Angeles, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff 35% of the value of the defendant's B-Units" (Lieberman-Massoni v. Massoni, 215 AD3d 656, 660 [2d Dept 2023]).

Where a spouse is seeking an interest in business interests of the other, the non-titled spouse must identify the business interests and proof of value of those business interests (Post v. Post, 68 AD3d 471 [2d Dept 2009]). Absent evidence to establish net worth of a business a trial court may substitute the businesses annual earnings for the net worth figure (Griffin v. Griffin, 115 AD2d 587 [2d Dept 1985]).

The unequal distribution of marital assets has been determined appropriate due to a finding of a spouse engaging in conduct constituting economic fault such as dissipation of marital assets (Stewart v. Stewart, 133 AD3d 493 [2d Dept 2015]) or the contributions to marriage being one-sided by one spouse (Evans v. Evans, 57 AD3d 718 [2d Dept 2008]). However, in the absence of such factors the unequal distribution of marital assets was determined to be inappropriate notwithstanding the parties not having entered into a traditional economic partnership during their marriage and having lived apart for the majority of their marriage upon a finding that the parties acquiesced to the living situation and the one spouse had a significant role in raising the parties' child:

"Here, there is no evidence of economic fault on the part of either party, and while the [*12]parties' relationship was unusual, it cannot be said that the defendant did not contribute to the marriage. Although each party maintained his or her assets and income separately, with the plaintiff accumulating a significantly greater amount of assets over the course of their 33—year marriage, together the parties managed to accumulate a sizable marital estate, with the defendant having amassed a significant portion of the parties' assets. The Supreme Court aptly noted the unique nature of the economic relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and found that they 'did not enter an economic partnership during the course of the marriage in a traditional sense' and that '[t]heir marriage was independently cooperative.' However, the economic decisions made by the parties during their marriage should not be second-guessed by the court (Mahoney—Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 NY3d 415, 421 [2009]). While the parties lived separately for substantial periods of time during their marriage, the plaintiff apparently acquiesced to this arrangement. Moreover, the defendant had a significant role in raising the parties' daughter, who resided with both parties until she was three years old, and who then resided solely with the defendant in India for the next 12 years except for one school year that she spent with the plaintiff" (Achuthan v. Achuthan, 179 AD3d 751 [2d Dept 2020]).

To the extent that a party alleges his or her spouse has engaged in wasteful dissipation of marital assets, the alleging party bears the burden of proving such waste by a preponderance of the evidence (Rosen v. Rosen, 192 AD3d 710 [2d Dept 2021]). The Third Department noted:

"Supreme Court properly weighed the duration of the marriage, defendant's advanced age and earning capability in making its determination; however, it did fail to consider the alleged wasteful dissipation of marital assets by plaintiff. Where the wasteful dissipation of assets can be traced to a party's poor judgment, unwillingness or inability to manage, that portion of the amount dissipated must be charged against said party's equitable share (Lenczycki v. Lenczycki, 152 AD2d 621, 624), even when such dissipation results in foreclosure (Berrios v. Berrios, 159 AD2d 401, 402—403). Furthermore, even when dissipated funds have no relationship to the value of real property, the wasteful dissipation of assets must be considered in making an award of equitable distribution (Baker v. Baker, 188 AD2d 710, 710—711)." (Strang v. Strang, 222 AD2d 975 [3d Dept 1995]).

In one matter wherein a spouse alleged the other engaged in wasteful dissipation of marital assets including real properties, the Court determined the claim to lack credibility as proof was furnished to the Court that the incomes that came from the investments were used to pay marital expenses (Singh v. Singh, 36 Misc 3d 1218, 2012 NY Slip Op 51390 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2012]).

Furthermore, when there are inconsistencies or outright misrepresentations among financial records, sworn affidavits, and testimony, and a party is recalcitrant in providing financial document disclosure, the Court may find that the party lacks credibility and draw a negative inference related to the discrepancies in financial representations (Racquel L.J. v. Derwin J.J., 64 Misc 3d 1221, 2019 NY Slip Op 51219 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2019]).

In a divorce action, the party seeking to overcome the statutory presumption that all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is marital property has the burden of proving that the property in dispute is separate property (Nerayoff v. Rokhsar, 168 AD3d 1071 [*13][2d Dept 2019]). Property acquired by a spouse by gift from a party other than the spouse is separate property (Vogel v. Vogel, 156 AD2d 671 [2d Dept 1989]).

It is further appropriate for the Court to allocate responsibility for the payment of debts between the parties involved in a matrimonial action (Goddard v. Goddard, 256 AD2d 545 [2d Dept 1998]; see also, Dellafiora v. Dellafiora, 54 AD3d 715 [2d Dept 2008]).

In making a determination as to the equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets, the Court has reviewed the following factors:

(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action;

Income at the time of marriage:

Based upon the testimony and evidence presented to this Court at the time of trial, it is unclear what the income and property of each party was at the time of the marriage. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was unable to work due to her immigration status when they were married and that he worked as a mortgage broker, having obtained his mortgage broker license in 2006, but no evidence was presented for the Court to determine what Plaintiff's income was at that time. Defendant did not provide any evidence as to her employment and income at the time of the parties' marriage but did testify that she had worked as a caretaker and security guard during the parties' marriage and did not contest Plaintiff's claim that he worked as a mortgage broker at that time.

Property at the time of marriage:

Based upon the testimony and evidence presented to this Court at the time of trial, it is unclear what property either party had at the time of the parties' marriage.

Income at the time of commencement of the action:

At the time of commencement of this action, Plaintiff asserts that he is employed as a property manager through YBB, of which he is the sole owner. Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit #2) indicates that his adjusted gross income is $36,000.00 While Plaintiff's 2023 income tax return was not provided, Plaintiff's 2022 income tax return (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) reflects a total income of $25,737 with taxable income of $8,775.00. Plaintiff further testified that the 2022 gross receipts for YBB was $96,977.00, which is corroborated by his 2022 income tax return schedule C reflecting gross receipts for that entity of $96,977.00 with an asserted $71,240.00 in total expenses including: (1) supplies of $61,000.00; (2) deductible meals of $1,280.00; and (3) utilities of $3,960.00. The Court has imputed Plaintiff's income to $90,000.00 annually as set forth above. At the time of commencement of this action, Defendant testified that she was employed as a registered nurse with a current income of $90,000.00. Defendant's Statement of Net Worth indicates her annual income is $74,830.00. Defendant's 2023 income tax return reflects a total income of $74,830.00 and a taxable income of $54,030.00.

(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;

The parties were married on December 19, 2007. Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth reports the health of both parties as good, while Defendant's Statement of Net Worth does not address the health of the parties, and the Court was not provided with any testimony or evidence to suggest that the parties are not in good health.

(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;

The parties both testified that they have been separated for a lengthy period of time with both maintaining a separate residence of their own, and that the parties will address all custody and access issues pertaining to the parties' Children in the State of New Jersey where the parties' Children reside, negating the need for the Court to address the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects.

(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution;

Not applicable as no testimony or evidence was presented to the Court pertaining to the loss of inheritance and pension rights by either spouse upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution.

(5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage;

The Court has been presented with no evidence that either party is covered under any health, dental, vision, pharmaceutical or other health insurance benefits. Plaintiff's Complaint (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1) indicates in the Fourth paragraph "none" for Plaintiff's health plan and "unknown" for Defendant's health plan. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (NYSCEF Doc. No. 20) indicates in the Fourth paragraph no information for Plaintiff's health plan and again lists "unknown" for Defendant's health plan. Defendant's Verified Answer with Counterclaim (NYSCEF Doc. No. 68) admits the allegations contained in the Fourth paragraph pertaining to health insurance. Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) and Defendant's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) each provide no expense pertaining to health insurance. Plaintiff's Statement of Proposed Disposition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 62) and Defendant's Statement of Proposed Disposition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 63) are both silent as to the issue of the existence of either party or loss of health insurance benefits by either party.

(6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;

As set forth herein, the Court has determined that neither party shall receive an award of spousal maintenance from the other as Defendant's undisputed annual income of $90,000.00 and Plaintiff's imputed annual income of $90,000.00, would not result in an award of spousal maintenance to either party under the New York State Domestic Relations Law.

(7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party. The court shall not consider as marital property subject to distribution the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement. However, in arriving at an equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning capacity of the other spouse;

The Court has taken into consideration that at the time of the parties' marriage and during the course of the parties' marriage Plaintiff has been engaged in the formation of several business entities utilized for the purchase, management, and sale of real property. The Court has determined that while Defendant was not directly involved in Plaintiff's [*14]business activities, Defendant made substantial indirect contributions to Plaintiff's business endeavors, including through her role as the sole caregiver and source of financial support for the parties' Children, thereby enabling Plaintiff to allocate more time and financial resources to Plaintiff's business interests. Plaintiff's failure to contribute to the financial support of the parties' children has both enhanced his own earning capacity and decreased the earning capacity of Defendant. Therefore, the Court has determined that Defendant is entitled to 30% of the marital portion of Plaintiff's business interests, as existing at the time of trial, or which have been determined to have been dissipated by Plaintiff prior to trial.

(8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;

The Court has considered the lack of liquid assets of both parties in this matter, and that the limited liquid assets consist of minimal funds located in the parties' financial accounts, while Plaintiff's interest in YBB, is not liquid. The Court has determined that the lack of liquidity of marital property is largely due to the wasteful dissipation of marital property by Plaintiff.

(9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;

Based upon the testimony and evidence presented to the Court, the Court finds that that parties are equally situated with respect to the probable financial circumstances of each party. Plaintiff is the owner of YBB and has a background as a New York State Licensed Mortgage Broker and property manager, which could potentially allow Plaintiff's income to increase significantly in the future. Plaintiff's gross receipts from YBB were $96,877.00, as set forth in his 2022 income tax return Schedule C, including what appears to be questionable deductions of a significant portion of that amount, leading this Court to believe that the majority of these gross receipts should be imputed to Plaintiff, seeing as though the Court has imputed income to Plaintiff at $90,000.00. As Defendant testified that she now earns approximately $90,000.00 as a nurse, the parties are now earning almost the same amount, with Defendant having the ability to continue to enhance her financial circumstances as well.

(10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party;

The Plaintiff has testified that he is the sole owner of YBB, however neither of the parties has provided any information as to the value of this entity beyond the testimony of Plaintiff, Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth, and Plaintiff's income tax returns. With respect to YBB, which Plaintiff testified is currently being used by him as an active property management company from which he derives his sole source of income, the Court has recognized the desirability to keep said entity intact and shall do so by determining the value of the entity, awarding Defendant a lump sum in equitable distribution with respect to YBB, and awarding Plaintiff sole ownership interest with the requirement that he be solely responsible for any debts or liabilities of YBB.

With respect to Y.F., Ursa, and Atenra, the Court has not been presented with any documents or any evidence pertaining to said entities to determine the value of Plaintiff's interests in such entities, aside from land transfer documents obtained by Defendant. The Court notes that as Plaintiff formed these entities, and was a member of these entities, he [*15]was the party best situated to produce documentation to the Court pertaining to said entities. The limitation of documents with respect to said entities is exacerbated by Plaintiff's lack of credible and complete testimony with respect to his interest in said entities; his capital contributions, if any; his date of transfer of interest, if any; and with what consideration, if any.

Accordingly, the Court hereby draws a negative inference pertaining to the ownership and value of aforementioned entities, as set forth herein.

(11) the tax consequences to each party;

Not applicable as the Court received no testimony or evidence at trial to determine that either party will be impacted by tax consequences arising out of an equitable distribution award to be entered by this Court.

(12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;

As noted herein, the Court has taken into consideration the significant wasteful dissipation of marital assets by Plaintiff, primarily consisting of real properties and business interests held in title by Plaintiff or through business entities held in title by Plaintiff transferred without consideration.

(13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration;

As noted herein, the Court has taken into consideration the significant wasteful dissipation of marital assets by Plaintiff primarily consisting of real properties and business interests held in title by Plaintiff or through business entities held in title by Plaintiff transferred without consideration.

(14) whether either party has committed an act or acts of domestic violence, as described in subdivision one of section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law, against the other party and the nature, extent, duration and impact of such act or acts;

The Court finds that Defendant provided credible testimony that Plaintiff engaged in domestic violence against Defendant throughout the course of the parties' marriage which proximately resulted in Defendant's diminished ability to seek an education and obtain employment providing Defendant with optimal income and benefits, and further caused Defendant to be the primary caregiver and financial support for the parties three minor children.

(15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. "Companion animal", as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law; and

Not applicable as the Court was not provided any evidence or testimony at trial pertaining to the existence of any companion animal of either party.

(16) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.

While the Court recognizes that during the parties' marriage the parties lived in separate residences for several periods of time, including the last several years prior to the commencement of this action, this case presents a fact pattern similar to that as in Achuthan. The testimony of the parties confirmed that their relationship consisted of multiple periods wherein the parties resided at separate locations with the parties [*16]remaining in communication, continuing their marital relationship, and later engaging in continued co-habitation. During this time, Defendant contributed to the marriage by being the primary (if not sole) caregiver and source of financial support for the parties' three minor Children, and while the parties did not enter an economic partnership in the traditional sense, the economic decisions of the parties should not be second guessed by this Court. Moreover, the Court takes into consideration that the final separation of the parties resulted from Plaintiff's ultimatum placed upon Defendant that she enter into a lifestyle wherein another individual would be included as a sexual partner in the parties' marriage. Although the Court recognizes the right of all individuals, including married couples, to engage in lawful sexual activity that they deem appropriate, such as open relationships or polyamorous relationships, it is not appropriate to require that an intimate partner engage in sexual acts that they do not agree to and such conduct could be determined to constitute domestic violence.^[FN4] Here, Defendant testified credibly that she was provided an ultimatum to either agree to such sexual acts and lifestyle as demanded by Plaintiff or to leave the marital domicile, and she elected to leave. The Court finds that Plaintiff's ultimatum constituted an act of domestic violence against Defendant, as Defendant was forced to either agree to engage in sexual activity that she found objectionable, or to leave the marital domicile. This resulted in Defendant and the Children having to leave their then home and forfeit the financial support of Plaintiff, who had thus far served as the primary if not sole supporter, pursuant to Plaintiff's own testimony.

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at trial, the Court makes the following determinations:

1. Defendant's Capital One Accounts — Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 was admitted into evidence, which was a statement for Defendant's Capital One Accounts; for the Statement Period October 1- October 31, 2022; pertaining to the following accounts: (1) 360 Checking account number ending "7880" having a balance of $1,066.74; (2) 360 Savings account number ending "8104" having a balance of $73,167.00; (3) Kids Savings account number ending "9239" having a balance of $1,384.35; (4) Kids Savings account number ending "9592" having a balance of $1,384.36; (5) Kids Savings account number ending "0244" having a balance of $1,385.37; with all accounts having a balance of $78,387.82 (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant Account Funds"). As no compelling evidence was presented to the Court that the Defendant Account Funds are separate property, the Court determines same to be marital property, with a balance of $78,387.82 as of the date of commencement of this action, and that same should be distributed with Plaintiff being awarded $39,193.91 as and for equitable distribution from Defendant Account Funds with Defendant retaining sole ownership, title and interest in any remaining Defendant Account Funds. To effectuate this award, by August 31, 2024, Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $39,193.91, and to the extent Plaintiff has not received this sum in full and has provided Defendant with all sums awarded from Plaintiff to Defendant herein, Plaintiff shall submit with notice of settlement a proposed money judgment for the then unpaid amount.

2. Defendant's 401(k) Account — Defendant's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) indicates that Defendant has a 401(k) account with a date of acquisition of 2023 having a current value of $6,000.00 (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant's 401(k)"). The Court was not presented with any written evidence at trial pertaining to Defendant's 401(k), such as account statements. Neither party's post-trial submissions make any specific requests for relief pertaining to Defendant's 401(k). However, as the Court has determined Defendant to be a credible witness and her sworn statement within her Statement of Net Worth to be sufficient to determine that Defendant's 401(k) is separate non-marital property, it hereby awards Defendant sole ownership of Defendant's 401(k) with all funds contained therein.

3. Defendant's Vehicle — Defendant's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) lists Defendant's vehicle as being acquired in 2018 as a gift from family having an original price of $2,000.00 and a current fair market value of $500.00, (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant's Vehicle"). The Court was not presented with any written evidence at trial pertaining to Defendant's vehicle, such as a title or valuation report. Neither party's post-trial submissions make any specific requests for relief pertaining to Defendant's Vehicle. However, as the Court has determined Defendant to be a credible witness and her sworn statement within her Statement of Net Worth to be sufficient to determine that Defendant's Vehicle is separate non-marital property, it hereby awards Defendant sole ownership of Defendant's Vehicle with all funds contained therein.

4. Plaintiff Bank Account — Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2), referenced supra as Plaintiff's SNW #2, lists one bank account held by Plaintiff, being a checking account at TD Bank, listing no other identifying information except for a balance of $500.00, (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff Account Funds"). As no compelling evidence was presented to the Court that the Plaintiff Account Funds are separate property, the Court determines same to be marital property, with a balance of $500.00 as of the date of commencement of this action, and that same should be distributed with Defendant being awarded $250.00 as and for her equitable distribution of same to be paid by Plaintiff to Defendant by August 31, 2024. To the extent this amount is not paid by Plaintiff to Defendant by that date, Defendant shall have leave of the Court to submit to the Court, with Notice of Settlement, a proposed Money Judgment equal to the balance then due.

5. YBB — Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) indicates Plaintiff is the sole owner of YBB [Redacted] ("YBB") listing the current net worth of YBB as $30,000.00 with a capital contribution of $1,000.00 but leaving a majority of the other required information blank, including type of business, date of acquisition, original price or value, source of funds to acquire, or method of valuation. In the liabilities portion of the document, Plaintiff includes two asserted liabilities of YBB including: (1) Small Business Administration Loan, with an original debt amount of $75,000.00, current debt amount of $73,000.00, leaving the date of incurring the debt blank; and (2) Home Depot Loan, with an original debt of $2,500.00, current debt of $1,400.00, leaving the date of incurring the debt blank, (hereinafter collectively referred to as "YBB Debt"). Applying the required analysis set forth in Post, there is no dispute as to the identity of the business assets to which Plaintiff is alleged to own, as Plaintiff has disclosed that he is the sole owner of YBB. As no compelling evidence was presented to the Court that YBB is [*17]separate property, the Court determines same to be marital property. The Court must next move to the second step of the analysis to determine if Defendant has submitted proof of the value of YBB. While the Court acknowledges Plaintiff's asserted value of YBB to be $30,000.00, as Plaintiff provided no methodology for such valuation, the Court finds same to be without basis and declines to adopt that valuation for equitable distribution purposes. At trial neither party provided the Court with any proposed valuation of YBB. Plaintiff's 2022 Income Tax Return (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) includes a Schedule C which lists the gross income of YBB in that tax year as $96,977.00 ^[FN5]. Accordingly, the Court adopts as the value of YBB $96,977.00 and awards to Defendant as her distribution award pertaining to YBB thirty percent of the value of YBB being the sum of $29,093.10, as and for her equitable distribution of same to be paid by Plaintiff to Defendant by August 31, 2024. To the extent this amount is not paid by Plaintiff to Defendant by that date, Defendant shall have leave of the Court to submit to the Court, with Notice of Settlement, a proposed Money Judgment equal to the balance then due. The Court further determines that Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership of YBB and Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all debts and liabilities associated with YBB, including but not limited to the YBB Debts.

With respect to the transfer of property previously owned by YBB, Defendant's Exhibit M (pages 69-78) includes the following documents pertaining to the real property known as 674 XXXXXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York (hereinafter referred to as "674 XXXXXXXXXXXXX");

a. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated September 28, 2010; grantor Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee and grantee YBB; recorded November 12, 2010; Control Number 502173243; consideration $140,000.00; reflecting no mortgage (hereinafter referred to as "674 Deed #1"); and

b. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated September 9, 2011, grantor YBB and grantee D.Y.; recorded November 16, 2011; Control Number 512513583; consideration $480,000.00 (hereinafter referred to as "674 Deed #2").

As 674 Deed #1 reflects that 674 XXXXXXXXXXXXX was purchased by YBB in 2010 with no mortgage for $140,000.00 and 674 Deed #2 reflects that 674 XXXXXXXXXXXXX was sold by YBB in 2011 for $480,000.00, Plaintiff's then 100% interest would be $480,000.00, less the original purchase price of $140,000.00, which equals $340,000.00.

Accordingly, the Court adopts $340,000.00 as the value of YBB property. However, the Court declines to award Defendant any portion of said value, as Defendant has already been awarded with 30% of the aforementioned value of YBB, as referenced supra. The Court further determines that Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership of YBB and Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all debts and liabilities associated with YBB.

6. Y.F. — Plaintiff's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) does not reference Y.F. (hereinafter referred to as "Y.F."). At trial Plaintiff testified to forming Y.F. but did not provide further information with respect to the type of entity, in what jurisdiction the [*18]entity was formed, what financial investment was made by Plaintiff in the entity, or Plaintiff's ownership interest in the entity, and merely stated that the entity was formed but never utilized. Moreover, the Court was not presented with any documentation pertaining to Y.F.. While neither party's post-trial submission refers to any specific relief pertaining to this business interest, Defendant's post-trial submission requests that the Court grant an award of equitable distribution of the marital property. Applying the required analysis set forth in Post, to the extent Defendant seeks any equitable distribution pertaining to Y.F., Defendant failed to identify the business asset as it is unclear what portion of this business interest is held by Plaintiff, and failed to provide the Court with any evidence as to the value of this business interest, and/or failed to provide evidence of any alleged wasteful dissipation of such business interest. Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership any interest Plaintiff now holds in Y.F. and Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all debts and liabilities associated with Y.F..

7. Ursa — When examining Ursa, for purposes of claims of separate property, equitable distribution and dissipation, the Court finds Plaintiff's testimony without credibility that he was listed as a part owner of Ursa as a favor without compensation despite his efforts on behalf of Ursa to purchase, renovate, manage, and sell real properties. The Court determines that Plaintiff was an owner of Ursa and due to Plaintiff's failure to provide credible testimony at trial when asked about the nature of his ownership interest in this entity, along with other purported owners of interest within the entity, or to provide documentation pertaining to Ursa during the discovery process, the Court determines Plaintiff to have had an ownership interest of 100% of Ursa until December of 2022. The Court further determines that Plaintiff's interest in Ursa to have been a marital asset. Based upon the testimony and evidence received at trial, it is determined that that Plaintiff has engaged in wasteful dissipation of marital assets due to Plaintiff's transfer of the parties' interest in Ursa without reasonable consideration in the amount of $2,413,724.00, of which Defendant is entitled to a judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of 30% being $724,117.20, as further set forth herein below ^[FN6], which Defendant is awarded. To effectuate this award, by August 31, 2024, Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $724,117.20, and to the extent Defendant has not received this sum in full and has provided Plaintiff with all sums awarded from Defendant to Plaintiff herein, Defendant shall submit with notice of settlement a proposed money judgment for the then unpaid amount.

a. 239 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York — Defendant's Exhibit M (Pages 4-24) includes the following documents pertaining to the real property known as 239 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York (hereinafter referred to as "239 XXXXXXXXXX"):

1. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated June 17, 2016; grantors Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and grantee Plaintiff; recorded June 13, 2016; Control Number 561683272; consideration $69,276.00; and reflecting no mortgage (hereinafter referred to as "239 Deed #1");

2. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated August 18, 2017; grantor Plaintiff and grantee Ursa; recorded December 5, 2017; Control Number 572713487; reflecting no consideration or mortgage (hereinafter "239 Deed #2"); and

3. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated September 7, 2018; grantor Ursa and grantee D.E.; recorded September 26, 2018; Control Number 582503361; reflecting consideration of $535,000.00 (hereinafter referred to as "239 Deed #3").

As 239 Deed #1 reflects that 239 XXXXXXXXXX was purchased by Plaintiff in 2016 with no mortgage for $69,276.00 and 239 Deed #2 reflects that 239 XXXXXXXXXX was sold by Plaintiff to Ursa in 2017 for no consideration, and 239 Deed #3 reflects that Ursa sold the property in 2018 for $535,000.00. Plaintiff would be entitled to 100% of the sale price of $535,000.00, less the $69,276.00, which is $465,724.00, of which Defendant would be entitled to a 30% interest of $139,717.20.

b. 236 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York — Exhibit M, pages 25-34 include the following documents pertaining to the real property known as 236 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York (hereinafter referred to as "236 XXXXXXXXXX"):

1. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated October 26, 2018; grantor G.W. and grantee Ursa; recorded November 7, 2018; Control Number 582983423; reflecting consideration of $235,000.00 and no mortgage (hereinafter referred to as "236 [*20]Deed #1"); and

2. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated August 15, 2022; grantor Ursa, grantee L.L.B., L.L. and E.L.; recorded September 22, 2022; Control Number 622273177; reflecting consideration of $825,000.00 (hereinafter referred to as "236 Deed #2).

As 236 Deed #1 reflects that 236 XXXXXXXXXX was purchased by Ursa in 2018 with no mortgage for $235,000.00 and 236 Deed #2 reflects that 236 XXXXXXXXXX was sold by Ursa in 2022 for $825,000.00 (hereinafter referred to as "236 Gross Proceeds") Plaintiff's then 100% interest would be $825,000.00, of which Defendant would be entitled to a 30% interest of $247,500.00.

c. 113 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York — Exhibit M, pages 35-42 include the following documents pertaining to the real property known as 113 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York (hereinafter referred to as "113 XXXXXXXXXX"):

1. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated February 19, 2020; grantor K.H. and grantee Ursa; recorded July 10, 2020; Control Number 600503426; reflecting consideration of $180,000.00 and no mortgage (hereinafter referred to as "113 Deed #1"); and

2. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated September 8, 2023; grantor Ursa and grantee 113 F.D.G. LLC ^[FN7]; recorded October 16, 2023; Control Number 632493006; reflecting no consideration and no mortgage (hereinafter referred to as "113 Deed #2").

As 113 Deed #1 reflects that 113 XXXXXXXXXX was purchased by Ursa in 2020 with no mortgage for $180,000.00 and 113 Deed #2 reflects that 113 XXXXXXXXXX was transferred by Ursa in 2023 for no consideration, and the Court was presented with no valuation for 113 XXXXXXXXXX as of the date of commencement, transfer from Ursa or trial,^[FN8]the Court determines that Ursa's interest in this property should be determined to [*21]be the amount Ursa purchased the property for being $180,000.00 of which Plaintiff's 100% interest is $180,000.00 of which Defendant would be entitled to a 30% interest of $54,000.00.

d. 154 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York — Exhibit M (pages 43-48) includes the following documents pertaining to the real property known as 154 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York (hereinafter referred to as "154 XXXXXXXXXX"):

1. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated September 15, 2021; grantor L.F. and grantee Ursa; recorded November 29, 2021; Control Number 612583362; reflecting consideration of $278,000.00 and no mortgage (hereinafter referred to as "154 Deed"). As 154 Deed reflects a purchase price of $278,000.00 with no mortgage by Ursa in 2021 and the Court has been presented with no valuation of 154 XXXXXXXXXX as of the date of commencement, transfer from Ursa or trial, the Court determines that Ursa's interest in this property should be determined to be the amount Ursa purchased the property for being $278,000.00 of which Plaintiff's 100% interest is $278,000.00 of which Defendant would be entitled to a 30% interest of $83,400.00.

e. 20 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York — Exhibit M (pages 49-53) includes the following documents pertaining to the real property known as 20 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York (hereinafter referred to as "20 XXXXXXXXXX"):

1. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page, dated August 21, 2017; grantor C.E.S. and grantee Ursa; recorded October 17, 2017; Control Number 572233228; reflecting consideration of $195,000.00 and no mortgage (hereinafter "20 Deed"). As 20 Deed reflects a purchase price of $195,000.00 with no mortgage by Ursa in 2017 and the Court has been presented with no valuation of 20 XXXXXXXXXX as of the date of commencement, transfer from Ursa or trial, the Court determines that Ursa's interest in this property should be determined to be the amount Ursa purchased the property for being $195,000.00 of which Plaintiff's 100% interest is $195,000.00 of which Defendant would be entitled to a 30% interest of $58,500.00.

f. 50 XXXXXXXXXX, Pomona, New York — Exhibit M includes the following documents pertaining to the real property known as 50 XXXXXXXXXX, Pomona, New York (hereinafter referred to as "50 XXXXXXXXXX"):

1. Deed with Rockland County Clerk Recording Page, dated January 29, 2020; grantors R.J.B. and K.B. by Bernard Weinreb, Esq., Referee, and Ursa as grantee; recorded February 18, 2020; Instrument Number 2020-00005839; reflecting consideration of $401,000.00 and no mortgage (hereinafter "50 Deed #1"); and

2. Deed with Rockland County Clerk Recording Page, dated June 29, 2021; grantor Ursa and grantee K.H.; recorded July 15, 2021; Instrument Number 2021-00029337; reflecting consideration of $470,000.00 and no mortgage (hereinafter "50 Deed #2").

As 50 Deed #1 reflects a purchase price of $401,000.00 with no mortgage by Ursa in 2020 and 50 Deed #2 reflects that 50 XXXXXXXXXX was sold by Ursa in 2021 for $470,000.00, Plaintiff's then 100% interest would be $470,000.00 of which Defendant would be entitled to a 30% interest of $141,000.00.

8. Atenra — When examining Atenra, for purposes of claims of separate property, equitable distribution and dissipation, the Court finds Plaintiff testimony without credibility that he was listed as a part owner of Atenra as a favor without compensation [*22]despite his efforts on behalf of Atenra to purchase, renovate, manage, and sell real properties. The Court determines that Plaintiff was an owner of Atenra and due to Plaintiff's failure to provide credible testimony at trial when asked about the nature of his ownership interest in this entity, along with other purported owners of interest within the entity, or to provide documentation pertaining to Atenra during the discovery process, the Court determines Plaintiff to have had an ownership interest of 100% of Atenra until at least December 2015. The Court further determines that Plaintiff's interest in Atenra to have been a marital asset. Based upon the testimony and evidence received at trial, this Court determines that Plaintiff has engaged in wasteful dissipation of marital assets due to Plaintiff's transfer of the parties' interest in Atenra without any consideration in the amount of $385,000.00 of which Defendant is entitled to a judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of 30% being $115,500.00, calculated as set forth below. To effectuate this award, by August 31, 2024, Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $115,500.00, and to the extent Defendant has not received this sum in full and has provided Plaintiff with all sums awarded from Defendant to Plaintiff herein, Defendant shall submit with notice of settlement a proposed money judgment for the then unpaid amount.

a. 258 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York — Defendant's Exhibit M (pages 54-68) includes the following documents pertaining to the real property known as 258 XXXXXXXXXX, Mount Vernon, New York (hereinafter referred to as "258 XXXXXXXXXX"):

a. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page; dated February 9, 2012; grantors Wells Fargo Bank N.A. and Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, and grantee Atenra; recorded March 8, 2012; Control Number 520456412; consideration $140,000.00; and reflecting no mortgage (hereinafter referred to as "258 Deed #1") (also admitted into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit C);

b. Deed with Westchester County Clerk Recording Page; dated September 25, 2015; grantor Atenra, and grantees R.Y., A.A., and A.H.; recorded October 22, 2015; Control Number 552673002; consideration $385,000.00; reflecting no mortgage (hereinafter referred to as "258 Deed #2"); and

As 258 Deed #1 reflects that 258 XXXXXXXXXX was purchased by Atenra in 2012 with no mortgage for $140,000.00 and 258 Deed #2 reflects that 258 XXXXXXXXXX was sold by the Atenra in 2015 for $385,000.00 (hereinafter referred to as "258 Gross Proceeds") and Plaintiff's then 100% interest would be $385,000.00 (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff's Share of 258 Gross Proceeds"), of which Defendant would be entitled to a 30% interest of $115,500.00.

9. Additional Declaration of Separate Property — Other than as set forth herein, each party shall retain sole ownership, title and interest to all property, tangible, real or otherwise in each parties' possession, custody, and control, including, but not limited to: (1) financial accounts; (2) tangible personal property; (3) real property; (4) retirement accounts; and (5) all other property.

10. Debts — The parties' debts shall be allocated in the following manner:

a. Defendant Credit Card Debt — Defendant's Statement of Net Worth (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) provides two credit card debts including: (1) Creditor Discover, date of incurring debt January of 2022, for the purpose of personal and household expenses, current debt of $9,210.00, listing nothing for the original debt or amount of debt at the [*23]date of commencement; and (2) Creditor Capital One, date of incurring debt 2018, for the purpose of personal and household expenses, current debt of $3,700.00, listing nothing for the original debt or amount of debt at the date of commencement (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendant Credit Card Debt"). Neither party's post-trial submissions make any specific requests for relief pertaining to Defendant's Credit Card Debt. At trial the Court was presented with no documents in evidence pertaining to the Defendant Credit Card Debt, nor any testimony sufficient to confirm the existence, origin, or date of commencement balances of Defendant's Credit Card Debt. Accordingly, it is hereby determined that Defendant shall be solely responsible for Defendant's Credit Card Debt.

b. Other Debt - Other than as set forth herein, both parties shall be solely responsible for any debts held in their respective names, individually, jointly with others or through any business entities of which they may have an ownership interest.

In the context of a matrimonial action, trial courts have the authority to grant parties the request to resume the use of prior pre-marriage names.

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at the Inquest, both parties may resume the use of any pre-marriage sur-names.

The Appellate Division Second Department has noted how a trial court should determine if an award of attorneys' fees is warranted in a matrimonial action:

"In a matrimonial action, an award of attorney's fees is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the issue is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case (Prochilo v. Prochilo, 165 AD3d 1304; Patete v. Rodriguez, 109 AD3d 595, 599). The purpose of Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) is to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the nonmonied spouse by ensuring that the latter will be able to litigate the action on equal footing with the former (Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d 1252, 1253; Finnan v. Finnan, 95 AD3d 821; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 64—65).

* * *

In determining whether to award attorney's fees, the court should review the financial circumstances of both parties, together with all of the other circumstances of the case, including, inter alia, the relative merit of the parties' positions, and whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation (Prochilo v. Prochilo, 165 AD3d 1304; Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d 1252; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d at 64—65)." (Brockner v Brockner, 174 AD3d 567, 568 [2d Dept 2019]).

When seeking an award of attorneys' fees, parties are required to submit itemized billing statements as proof of the attorneys' fees incurred, both to demonstrate substantial compliance with 22 NYCRR 1400.2 and 1400.3 and to establish the "extent and value of [the] services" rendered (Yakobowicz v. Yakobowicz, 217 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2023] [internal citations omitted]).

Plaintiff's Application for an Award of Attorneys' Fees -

Plaintiff's post-trial submission (NYSCEF Doc. No. 72) requests an award of attorneys' fees, "Furthermore the defendant insisted on going to trial on this case and caused the Plaintiff to incur major legal fees for no apparent reason and this the plaintiff is deserving of an award of legal fees in the sum of $25,000.00. The Plaintiff has agreed to pay $350.00 an hour and has incurred legal fees in the amount of $25,000.00 for this trial."

Plaintiff was initially represented by Ingrid S. Albert, Esq., who filed Plaintiff's first Statement of Net Worth (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 14 and 15) which excluded the portion of the form pertaining to payment of attorneys' fees and filed a Retainer Agreement (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16) providing a retainer of $2,000.00 to be billed at an hourly rate of $250.00 for non-court appearance time, $300.00 for court appearance time and $85.00 for paralegals. The Court has not been presented with any invoices pertaining to the legal services provided by Ms. Albert for Plaintiff with respect to this action, nor did the Court receive any testimony from Plaintiff, Ms. Albert, or any other witnesses regarding such services.

Plaintiff's second and current counsel appeared on November 30, 2023, by the filing of a Consent to Change Attorney filing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 33). On May 10, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel filed Plaintiff's second Statement of Net Worth which provides in Section VIII that Plaintiff has provided counsel with the sum of $3,500.00 and has agreed to pay counsel fees at a rate of $350.00 per hour, but no Retainer Agreement is annexed. On May 12, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel filed Plaintiff's third and final Statement of Net Worth (NYSCEF Doc. No. 52) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2), listing the same counsel fee information in Section VIII, and again fails to annex any Retainer Agreement. To date Plaintiff's counsel has failed to file any Retainer Agreement or any invoices pertaining to the legal services provided by Plaintiff's counsel to Plaintiff with respect to this action, nor did the Court receive any testimony from Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel, or any other witnesses regarding such services.

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's application for an award of legal fees is denied.

Defendant's Application for an Award of Attorneys' Fees -

Defendant's post-trial submission (NYSCEF Doc. No. 73) requests an award of attorneys' fees, "The Defendant has paid $9,000.00 in counsel fees and it is respectfully requested that the Court, having regard to the circumstances of this case and of the respective parties, make an award of counsel fees and disbursements, pursuant to DRL § 237. Attached, is the statement of services rendered in relation to the legal services rendered on the Defendant's behalf. The Defendant's Statement of Net Worth, filed on May 12, 2024, is also annexed hereto."

On August 29, 2023, Defendant's first Statement of Net Worth was filed (NYSCEF Doc. No. 18) and lists in Section VII legal fees of $4,000.00 paid to lawyers and experts in connection with this action and annexed a Retainer Agreement requiring a retainer of $4,500.00, to be billed at an hourly rate of $350.00. On May 12, 2024, Defendant's second Statement of Net Worth was filed (NYSCEF Doc. No. 53), including the same information for attorneys' and expert fees, and annexing the same Retainer Agreement.

The Court acknowledges receipt of a three-page Statement of Services annexed to Defendant's post-trial submission, listing total legal fees of $16,450.00 and total disbursements of $1,037.50, the Court is disregarding this Statement. While the Court permitted post-trial submissions to permit counsel to make written summations to the Court, rather than doing so orally, it would be improper and unjust to permit either party to submit additional exhibits to the [*24]Court for consideration when making its ultimate determinations herein without such exhibits having been admitted into evidence.^[FN9] Here, the Court was not provided with this document, nor any other any other invoices pertaining to the legal services provided by Defendant's counsel to Defendant with respect to this action, nor did the Court receive any testimony from Defendant, Defendant's counsel or any other witnesses regarding such services.

Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's application for an award of legal fees is denied.

Any relief specifically not granted or otherwise addressed herein is denied. The Court will further note that Plaintiff's testimony and application during the Inquest was that she be permitted to waive spousal support and that she should not be required to provide spousal support to Defendant.

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant is granted a Judgment of Divorce against Plaintiff, dissolving forever the bonds of matrimony existing between Plaintiff and Defendant upon the grounds of the Abandonment pursuant to DRL § 170(2); and it is further

ORDERED that as the parties have stipulated that as the Children reside outside the State of New York within the State of New Jersey where the parties will commence proceedings to address all issues pertaining to the custody, access and support of the Children, no determinations as to those issues will be made herein; and it is further

ORDERED that neither party shall be required to provide past, present, or future spousal maintenance and support to the other; and it is further

ORDERED that with respect to Defendant Account Funds Plaintiff is awarded from Defendant as a distributive award the sum of $39,193.91 as and for equitable distribution from Defendant Account Funds with Defendant retaining sole ownership, title, and interest in any remaining Defendant Account Funds. To effectuate this award, by August 31, 2024, Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $39,193.91, and to the extent Plaintiff has not received this sum in full and has provided Defendant with all sums awarded from Plaintiff to Defendant herein, Plaintiff shall submit with notice of settlement a proposed money judgment for the then unpaid amount; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's 401(k) is determined to be the separate non-marital property of Defendant to which Defendant is awarded sole title and interest, and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Vehicle is determined to be the separate non-marital [*25]property of Defendant to which Defendant is awarded sole title and interest, and it is further

ORDERED that with respect to Plaintiff Account Funds Defendant is awarded from Plaintiff as a distributive award the sum of $250.00 as and for equitable distribution from Plaintiff Account Funds with Plaintiff retaining sole ownership, title, and interest in any remaining Defendant Account Funds. To effectuate this award, by August 31, 2024, Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $250.00, and to the extent Defendant has not received this sum in full and has provided Plaintiff with all sums awarded from Defendant to Plaintiff herein, Defendant shall submit with notice of settlement a proposed money judgment for the then unpaid amount; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant is awarded from Plaintiff as a distributive award pertaining to 30% of the value of YBB being the sum of $29,093.10, to be paid by Plaintiff to Defendant by August 31, 2024. To the extent this amount is not paid by Plaintiff to Defendant by that date, Defendant shall have leave of the Court to submit to the Court, with Notice of Settlement, a proposed money judgment equal to the balance then due. The Court further determines that Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership of YBB and Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all debts and liabilities associated with YBB, including but not limited to the YBB Debts; and it is further

ORDERED that the Court determines that Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership any interest Plaintiff now holds in Y.T. and Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all debts and liabilities associated with Y.T.; and it is further

ORDERED that it is determined that that Plaintiff has engaged in wasteful dissipation of marital assets due to Plaintiff's transfer of the parties' interest in Ursa without reasonable consideration in the amount of $2,413,724.00, of which Defendant is entitled to 30% being $724,117.20, which Defendant is awarded. To effectuate this award, by August 31, 2024, Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $724,117.20, and to the extent Defendant has not received this sum in full and has provided Plaintiff with all sums awarded from Defendant to Plaintiff herein, Defendant shall submit with notice of settlement a proposed money judgment for the then unpaid amount; and it is further

ORDERED that this Court determines that Plaintiff has engaged in wasteful dissipation of marital assets due to Plaintiff's transfer of the parties' interest in Atenra without any consideration in the amount of $385,000.00 of which Defendant is entitled to a judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of 30% being $115,500.00. To effectuate this award, by August 31, 2024, Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $115,500.00, and to the extent Defendant has not received this sum in full and has provided Plaintiff with all sums awarded from Defendant to Plaintiff herein, Defendant shall submit with notice of settlement a proposed money judgment for the then unpaid amount; and it is further

ORDERED that unless otherwise specified herein, each party shall retain sole ownership, title and interest to all property, tangible, real or otherwise in each party's possession, custody, and control, including, but not limited to: (1) financial accounts; (2) tangible personal property; (3) real property; (4) retirement accounts, and (5) all other property; and it is further

ORDERED that unless otherwise specified herein, both parties shall be solely responsible for any debts held in their respective names; and it is further

ORDERED that both parties may resume the use of any pre-marriage sur-names; and it is further

ORDERED that both parties shall be solely responsible for their own any attorneys' fees, expert fees, or other litigation costs incurred in this action; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry on Defendant within 20 days of the date of this Decision and Order, and shall file an Affidavit of Service within 20 days of the date of this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief sought has not been granted, it is expressly denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.