A woman and her service dog arrive at the Bronx Zoo on a beautiful Saturday. When she arrives at the entrance, she sees two signs. One says, "ABSOLUTELY NO ANIMALS ALLOWED." The other says, "NO DOGS ALLOWED, EXCEPT SERVICE DOGS." She knows three other things: (1) the signs were authorized by the head zookeeper, so there is no question as [*8]to their authority; (2) they were created and installed simultaneously, so there is no question that one is outdated; and (3) there is and will be no one to help her interpret them—she's on her own. Is she allowed to enter with her dog? The majority says she can't because each sign is independent. If that makes sense to you, there's no point in reading further. And, actually, if that doesn't make sense to you, there's also no point in reading further. But if you're unsure, or if you just like reading or dogs or signs, read on.

Is making a terroristic threat a crime for which the Legislature decided bail could be imposed? That question is the same as it is for my zoo example. In 2019, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed the Bail Reform Act (see L 2019, ch 59, § 1, part JJJ, § 2). They did so in response to the unduly long periods of time persons accused of crimes were being held in pretrial detention at Rikers Island, which was then and is now subject to federal court supervision because of overcrowding and inadequate facilities and personnel ^[FN1]. A catalyst for the Bail Reform Act was the case of a 16-year-old named Kalief Browder, who was accused of stealing a backpack, held in pretrial detention at Rikers Island for three years, never convicted of any crime, and committed suicide shortly after his release.^[FN2]

The Bail Reform Act largely eliminated cash bail and specified a finite set of more serious offenses for which bail may still be set (see People ex rel. Rankin v Brann, 41 NY3d 436, 441 [2024], citing L 2019, ch 59, § 1, part JJJ, § 2, CPL 510.10 [4]). For all other offenses, subject to a few limited exceptions, the defendant must be released pending trial, potentially on non-monetary [*9]conditions (CPL 510.10 [3]; see id.).

As the majority sets out, the Bail Reform Act initially contained nine subparagraphs, (4) (a) - (4) (i), that identified bail eligible crimes; over the course of successive amendments, the Act contained twenty-one subparagraphs (majority op at 10-11). The two subparagraphs in question here, (4) (a) and (4) (g), were part of the original Bail Reform Act. They said two somewhat different things:^[FN3]

"A principal stands charged with a qualifying offense for the purposes of this subdivision when he or she stands charged with:"

The "crime defined in section 490.20" of the Penal Law is the crime at issue here: making a terroristic threat. Subparagraph (4) (g) refers to it directly. Subparagraph (4) (a) does not. Instead, it refers to section 70.02 of the Penal Law, which lists section 490.20 among the more than 80 crimes identified therein as violent felonies. The majority reasons that because subparagraph (4) (a) (with two exclusions) covers every "felony enumerated in section 70.02 of the Penal Law," the specific exclusion of making a terroristic threat contained in subparagraph (4) (g) is meaningless. It is clear that the more specific (4) (g) overcomes the more general (4) (a). Whether we think of this as informed by our canons of construction, by the practicalities of the legislative drafting process or by common sense, the Legislature has specifically determined that making a terroristic threat is not bail eligible.

We, like most other courts, have a longstanding rule of statutory construction that if general and particular provisions in the same statute are incompatible, the particular provision controls (see e.g. Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Sullivan, 32 NY3d 652, 658 [2019] ["(U)nder principles of statutory construction, whenever there is a general and a specific provision in the same statute, the general applies only where the particular enactment is inapplicable"], citing Matter of Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v Srinivasan, 27 NY3d 1, 9 [2016], citing McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 238; see Cons Laws § 238, at 404-406 ["The particular provision . . . is considered . . . an exception to the general where the two are incompatible, and so far as the particular intention is applicable, the general intention yields"]). The majority acknowledges that rule, but discounts it on the theory that both provisions are specific. I cannot agree.

Subparagraph (4) (a) is a very general catch-all. It does not name any crimes (except the two it excludes)—it identifies its coverage by referring to a different, preexisting statute (Penal Law 70.02) that serves a purpose unrelated to bail. The question is not whether Penal Law 70.02 is specific, but whether subparagraph (4) (a) is. Subparagraph (4) (a) is like the zoo sign referring to "animals"—general. It would not help if, for example, the sign instead said "animals as defined in the Merriam Webster Dictionary, Revised Edition," or "domestic animal as defined in section 188 (7) of the Agriculture and Markets Law." The sign would still be general when compared to the companion sign specifically excluding service dogs. Penal Law 70.02 covers a multitude of offenses (over 80 unique offenses, spanning many categories of crimes). In contrast, in drafting (4) (g), the Legislature was focused on terrorism-related crimes only—that is what the section concerns. The exclusion in (4) (g) is even narrower; it covers a single offense.

The majority insists that our settled rule of construction "does not apply here," because both provisions "include a reference to the specific crime of making a terroristic threat" (majority op at 11). But the proper question is not whether the crime is specific, but whether the provision is. A specific provision targets a narrower subject with more detail; a general provision applies more broadly, and with less detail (see e.g. Cons Laws § 238 ["General statutes . . . in the absence of contrary intention, do not overreach particular prohibitions founded on special reasons of policy or convenience, and an explicit statement in a later statute may even control general language of an earlier enactment"]; Muck v Hitchcock, 212 NY 283, 286 [1917] [holding that the broad references to "corporations" in the Religious Corporations Law applied only to domestic, not foreign corporations]). Subparagraph (4) (g) contains a specific reference to the crime of making a terroristic threat; subparagraph (4) (a) does not.

The majority's argument is incompatible with both common sense and our settled doctrine. The majority contends that because (4) (a) references Penal Law 70.02, "which enumerates violent felonies," (4) (a) is just as specific as (4) (g), which "directly references the offense" (majority op at 11). As explained previously, "the crime defined in section 490.20" is contained in the text of (4) (g); it is not in the text of (4) (a). In (4) (a), the Legislature deliberately chose to reference a broad class of offenses (violent felonies) rather than enumerate the individual offenses or categories of offenses within that class. Instead, the Legislature used the subsequent subparagraphs to delineate the categories and identify the qualifying offenses within each. "A felony enumerated in section 70.02 of the Penal Law" is broad; "the crime defined in section 490.20" is narrow.

The majority attempts to distinguish Matter of Perlbinder Holdings, LLC (27 NY3d 1 [2016]; see majority op at 11, n 7), by claiming that the provisions here, unlike the provisions in that case, are both specific. In that case, we held that a provision in the New York City Charter broadly authorizing appeals from decisions of the Department of Buildings (DOB) did not apply to the specific circumstance of applications for zoning variances, the procedures for which were enumerated in a more specific provision. But applications for variances are a form of appeals from DOB decisions on zoning applications; they constitute a subset within the broader category of all DOB decision appeals. Thus, we held that the provision concerning that subset controlled over the general provision authorizing appeals. That holding applies here: (4) (a) involves a broad circumstance (whether a violent felony qualifies for bail), whereas the exclusion in (4) (g) concerns a "highly specific" circumstance (whether "the crime defined in section 490.20" qualifies for bail). When faced with the specific circumstance, the provision governing that specific circumstance controls.

Another way to understand why subparagraph (4) (a) is general is to note that it sweeps in changes to Penal Law 70.02 that occur after subparagraph (4) (a) was enacted, and will continue to do so as the content of Penal Law 70.02 changes in the future. For example, after the effective date of subparagraph (4) (a), the Legislature amended Penal Law 70.02 to add "criminal manufacture, sale, or transport of an undetectable firearm, rifle or shotgun as defined in section 265.50;" and "aggravated strangulation as defined in section 121.13-a." (see L 2024, ch 23, § 5). This further demonstrates that subparagraph (4) (a) is general, catching whatever happens to be in Penal Law 70.02 at the time a bail decision is made, whereas subparagraph (4) (g) is specific—always exempting making a terroristic threat (only). A sign that says "please return all gym equipment to its proper place" is general: it applies to whatever equipment exists as equipment is added or removed. A sign that says "place all dumbbells back in the appropriately numbered slots by weight" is, by contrast, specific.

Rather than follow our settled principles of statutory construction, the majority creates a new canon of selective disjunctiveness for our consideration: where two provisions conflict, pretend one of the provisions does not exist. That is, when the woman reads the two zoo signs, she must conclude that the broader "ABSOLUTELY NO ANIMALS ALLOWED" excludes her service dog, because it indisputably covers all animals, including dogs, regardless of what the other sign says. What is the worth of such a canon? Suppose, instead, that the zoo had the following single sign:

THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WILL BE PROSECUTED:

PERSONS ENTERING THE ZOO WITH ANIMALS; OR

PERSONS ENTERING THE ZOO WITH FIREARMS; OR

PERSONS ENTERING THE ZOO WITH ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES; OR

PERSONS ENTERING THE ZOO WITH DOGS, EXCEPT FOR SERVICE DOGS.

The "disjunctive" nature of the sign—using "or" and semicolons, does not reveal anything about the legislature's intent. Because the sign, like the statute at issue, has some inconsistency, our job is to do our best to discern the author's intent. Most people reading the above sign would believe the zoo intended to allow people with service dogs to enter—not that the first clause would override the exception for service dogs because of the use of "or" and semicolons.

The majority contends that a "disjunctive list" reading of CPL 510.10 (4) implies that each [*10]subparagraph should be read independently and that the subparagraphs are "'not intended to modify'" one another (majority op at 7, citing Reiter v Sonotone Corp., 442 US 330, 339 [1979]). The majority concludes that there is therefore "no indication" that the Legislature intended to compromise (4) (a)'s function "by importing an exclusion from a different [sub]paragraph dealing with a different category of crimes" (id. at 8).

However, the majority offers no explanation for why (4) (a) can be read to overcome (4) (g), but not vice versa. If both are equally effective, independent provisions, (4) (a) is no more powerful than 4 (g). Reading (4) (g) independently would clearly carve out "the crime as defined in section 490.20" from the list of felony terrorism offenses that qualify for bail. In other words, the majority's approach cannot explain why interpreting each provision as "disjunctive" would lead to the conclusion that "the crime defined in section 490.20" is bail eligible. Instead, considering each provision separately more clearly leads to the conclusion that the Legislature considered the category of terrorism offenses on its own terms and determined that 490.20 would not be bail eligible. Perhaps the majority believes that only provisions that include should be given a "distinct, concrete function," not those that exclude. However, the majority's theory does not support that conclusion and the majority provides no basis in the legislative history or statutory structure to explain why its theory of disjunctiveness operates only in one direction, so that (4) (a) overrides the clear exclusion in (4) (g), but not vice versa.^[FN4]

The majority's interpretation runs afoul of yet another canon of construction, because it renders the exclusion in (4) (g) entirely superfluous (see Kimmel v State, 29 NY3d 386, 393 [2017] ["a statute should be construed to avoid rendering any of its provisions superfluous"]). A simple test for whether something is superfluous is whether removing it would produce the same effect (cf. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, superfluous [defining "superfluous" as "not needed" or "exceeding what is sufficient or necessary"] [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/superfluous] [accessed May 27, 2025]). Removing the exclusion in (4) (g) would make no difference under the majority's interpretation: someone accused of making a terroristic threat could be held on bail whether (4) (g) exists or not. It is unreasonable to assume the Legislature enacted text with no meaning (see e.g. People v Galindo, 38 NY3d 199, 205 [2022] ["'effect and meaning must, if possible, be given to the entire statute and every part and word thereof'"], citing Cons Laws § 98 [a]). Conversely, giving effect to (4) (g) does not render (4) (a) [*11]superfluous: (4) (a) still is necessary to cover many offenses not covered elsewhere in the bail law.^[FN5]

The majority explains that its interpretation does not render the exclusion superfluous, because, for the crime of making a terroristic threat, a court looking at the Bail Reform Act legislation would conclude it could impose bail by the circuitous route of (4) (a) to Penal Law 70.02 to 490.20, but not by the more direct route of (4) (g) to Penal Law 490.20. But whether an offense qualifies for bail is binary: an offense either qualifies or it does not. Whether by cross-reference to Penal Law 490.20 through subparagraph (4) (a)'s reference to Penal Law 70.02, or directly by subparagraph 4 (g)'s reference to Penal Law 490.20, the underlying crime is set out in Penal Law 490.20, and it is either bailable or not. Nothing the majority says explains why a bail court's authority or decisionmaking when faced with someone accused of violating Penal Law 490.20 would be any different if the exclusion in subparagraph (4) (g) did not exist. The majority's interpretation wipes out the exclusion and leaves it with no practical effect. If the "ABSOLUTELY NO ANIMALS ALLOWED" sign bars a service dog from the zoo, the allowance for service dogs in the other sign is totally superfluous—the zoo might as well remove the sign.

Let's put the canons away. As the majority acknowledges, our task when interpreting statutes is to do our best to determine what the Legislature wanted. The majority's decision requires one to view the Legislature as having done the following. First, when enacting the Bail Reform Act, the Legislature specified in subparagraph (4) (a) that of the more than 80 felonies then listed in CPL 70.02—which were listed not for purposes of bail, but to classify felonies by severity for sentencing purposes—would be bail eligible. Then, the Legislature took the trouble to provide in subparagraph (4) (g) that making a terrorist threat would not be bail eligible. Third, when it did so, it believed that specific exclusion in subparagraph (4) (g) would have no effect. The majority's view that this best expresses the Legislature's intent reflects a very dim view of legislative competence.

Section 70.02 of the Penal Law long predates the 2019 bail reform legislation. Titled "Sentence of imprisonment for a violent felony offense," in subsection 1 it classifies more than 80 violent felonies in categories ranging from B (more severe) to E (less severe). In subsection 2, it sets out the authorized sentences for each category, and in subsection 3 it sets out the terms of sentences for each category. One of those enumerated felonies, listed as class D, is "making a terroristic threat as defined in section 490.20." Section 70.02 was not enacted with bail eligibility in mind or for any purpose relating to bail; its purpose was to set out the legally allowable sentences for violent felonies.

Turning back to the Bail Reform Act, the majority acknowledges, as it must, that subparagraph (4) (g) "expressly excludes the crime of making a terroristic threat" (majority op at 2). However, the majority says we must disregard the Legislature's specific exclusion of that crime because each subparagraph should be read independently, with each serving a "distinct, 'concrete function'" (majority op at 9, quoting Pulsifer v United States, 601 US 124, 140-41 [2024]). According to the majority, a "disjunctive" reading—giving each subparagraph standalone significance—means that the exclusion in subparagraph (4) (g) is effectively overridden by subparagraph (4) (a), which provides that a violent felony—of which making a terroristic threat is one—constitutes a qualifying offense.

It helps to approach the legislative intent question with a dose of common sense. When the Legislature wrote, in (4) (a), that all of the 80+ felonies listed in Penal Law 70.02 would be bail eligible,^[FN6] it saved itself the trouble of enumerating each of those in the bail reform legislation. Doing so also allowed for the future automatic determination of new violent felonies as bail eligible without the need to amend the bail law. That is, the Legislature started from two propositions: the vast majority of violent felonies would be bail eligible; and violent felonies should presumptively default to bail eligibility when changes to Penal Law 70.02 were later adopted. Then, the Legislature took up the task of fine tuning that general assessment, which is what it did: as part of the Act itself in the next six subparagraphs of section 4 ([b] - [g]), and over time in the next fourteen ([h] - [t]). As part of the drafting of the initial Bail Reform Act, when the Legislature got to the point of considering terrorism-related felonies, which appear in Penal Law sections 490.00-490.70, it itemized how it wished terrorism-related crimes to be treated for purposes of bail. Even though the catch-all in subparagraph (a), by incorporating the felonies listed in Penal Law 70.02, already captured numerous terrorism-related violent felonies,^[FN7] the Legislature then considered terrorism-related felonies specifically in subparagraph (4) (g), where it did two things. First, because subparagraph (4) (a), through incorporation of all the violent felonies in Penal Law 70.02, captured only those terrorism-related felonies that were violent, subparagraph (4) (g) provided that every [*12]"felony crime of terrorism as defined in article four hundred ninety of the penal law" would be bail eligible, thus capturing terrorism-related crimes not listed in Penal Law 70.02 as violent felonies. Then, in the same sentence, the Legislature expressly stated that "the crime defined in section 490.20"—making a terroristic threat—would not be bail eligible.

So, in determining legislative intent, we are left with two options. One is the majority's view, which is that the Legislature decided, in subparagraph (a), that everything listed in Penal Law 70.02—including making terroristic threats—was bail eligible, and then went to the trouble of creating a subparagraph specific to terrorism that expressly excluded terroristic threats as bail eligible, expecting that language to have no effect whatsoever. My view, instead, is that for matters of drafting convenience and both present and future expediency, the Legislature concluded that sweeping in everything in Penal Law 70.02—violent felonies—would be a good starting point, and then carefully created subdivisions to tailor its judgment about what else to include and what else to exclude. My view represents good legislative drafting: a general provision in subparagraph (a) that takes in all violent felonies as then and in the future defined as such in Penal Law 70.02, with specific exclusions and additions itemized in many successive subparagraphs ^[FN8]. The majority's view assumes the Legislature drafted poorly, adding a specific exclusion it knew to be meaningless, or carelessly did not recognize as meaningless.

The majority's remaining arguments do not allow us to disregard subparagraph (4) (g)'s exclusion. First, the majority points to the "significant overlap among various [sub]paragraphs in CPL 510.10 (4)" (majority op at 8), contending that that overlap supports its argument that the Legislature "did not consider how each of the [sub]paragraphs relate" and did not intend "for an exclusion included in one [sub]paragraph to be engrafted onto another" (majority op at 9). The majority's argument undermines its own conclusion. If the Legislature did not consider how the subparagraphs related to each other, then by that logic, it also would not have been aware of or attentive to any conflict between to subparagraphs (4) (g) and (4) (a). Why would a legislature that "did not consider how each of the [sub]paragraphs relate" intend for the broad inclusion in one subparagraph to override any exclusions or limitations it delineated in any of the other twenty subparagraphs?

Although I agree with the majority that there is redundancy in the statutory scheme, I disagree with the majority that the redundancy suggests that the exclusion has no force. Returning to my zoo example, the admonition in the second sign that no dogs are allowed is redundant of the "ABSOLUTELY NO ANIMALS ALLOWED" sign, but the fact that it is tethered to the exception for service dogs reflects that when the zookeeper stopped thinking about animals generally and instead focused on dogs, the zoo created a sign with some redundancy but with a clear exception tied to the redundant statement. Nothing about the overlap suggests that the exception was meant to be disregarded.

Instead, the overlap here reflects precisely what I view as the commonsense legislative drafting process. The Legislature identified a large class of offenses that presumptively would be included (violent felonies), then proceeded through various categories of crimes one by one to delineate which crimes within the category would be bailable. Any redundancy was not an issue because the Legislature likely assumed that, when faced with a question of whether an offense qualified, a court would zero in on the subparagraph dealing with that particular category of offense. Likely, the Legislature was aware that making a terroristic threat was also a violent felony, but did not view (4) (a) and (4) (g) as conflicting at all: the Legislature presumed that any reader of the statute, in determining whether making a terroristic threat qualified for bail, would refer to the subparagraph concerning terrorism offenses and understand that the language designating as bail eligible numerous terrorism crimes, "other than" making a terroristic threat, meant that making a terroristic threat was ineligible for bail, just as the zoo did not mean to bar a service dog.

Second, the majority points to the inclusion of exceptions and qualifications in many subparagraphs, which it argues reflects the Legislature's "careful and discrete consideration of each subparagraph's scope and any appropriate exceptions" (majority op at 9). Again, that observation supports my view, not the majority's. If the Legislature's decision to craft exceptions in each subparagraph was careful and deliberate, we should give more weight to the careful consideration of crimes of terrorism than to the wholesale inclusion of all violent felonies.

Third, the fact that (4) (a) expressly excepts two violent felony offenses (forms of burglary and robbery) from qualifying for bail does not shed light on the meaning of (4) (g)'s exclusion (see majority op at 9-10). As the Attorney General explained in her brief, those two particular exclusions in subparagraph (a) were put front and center because those were the two crimes of which Kalief [*13]Browder was accused and which resulted in his prolonged pretrial detention at Rikers Island ^[FN9]. Notably, those crimes are not exempted in another subparagraph, and no subparagraph addresses those categories of crimes. On the majority's reading, the Legislature would have had to exclude Penal Law § 490.20 from both (4) (a) and (4) (g) to give its exclusion effect—an approach that would create true (and pointless) redundancy ^[FN10]. If the zoo's "ABSOLUTELY NO ANIMALS ALLOWED" sign had instead said, "ABSOLUTELY NO ANIMALS ALLOWED EXCEPT FOR POLICE HORSES," and the second sign remained as it was, my analysis would be no different: the decision to place police horses in a more prominent position may have been done to alert zoogoers that such horses might be present, and in any event would not detract from the second sign allowing persons with service dogs to enter.

Finally, the majority contends that the legislative history "offers no basis for a contrary view" (majority op at 10), which observation, if true, would apply equally to my interpretation. Because the Bail Reform Act was part of the budget bill, there is no formal legislative history concerning it, and it is therefore fair to say that the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act does not cut either way. Although not legislative history of the Bail Reform Act or subparagraphs (4) (a) or (4) (g) per se, the Legislature has amended paragraph (4) multiple times after enacting it—including an amendment to subparagraph (4) (g) to include additional money laundering offenses (L 2020, ch 56, § 1, part UU, § 2; see majority op at 6). The fact that the Legislature has amended subparagraph (4) (g) but has not touched the exclusion of Penal Law 490.20, supports the idea that subsequent Legislatures knew of the provision, examined the subdivision, and decided not [*14]to strike the exclusion. Had the zookeeper amended the second sign to read, "NO DOGS OR CATS ALLOWED, EXCEPT FOR SERVICE ANIMALS," we would tend to think that when the zoo amended the sign to include cats, the continuation of the service animal exception meant something, even if it is not legislative history of the highest order.

As the majority notes, the crime of making of terroristic threat was enacted after September 11, 2001, and, along with other terrorism-related crimes, intended "to ensure that terrorists . . . are prosecuted and punished in state courts with appropriate severity" (L 2001, ch 300, § 4). Excluding crimes like Mr. Cavagnolo's from being eligible for bail may be a repugnant result to some—perhaps it is to the majority. However, it is up to the other branches of government, not the courts, to determine what crimes are bail eligible. Giving effect to the exclusion does not produce an absurd result or one contrary to public policy ^[FN11]. Courts are not entitled to substitute their own policy preferences when the statutory text is clear (see People v Roberts, 31 NY3d 406, 418 [2018], citing People v Robinson, 95 NY2d 179, 182 [2000] ["If the words chosen have a 'definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, then there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add or take away from that meaning'"]).

The Legislature that passed the Bail Reform Act decided that the crime of making of terroristic threat would not be a bail-eligible offense. Because the majority's interpretation admittedly renders the plain language in subparagraph (4) (g)'s exclusion nugatory, I dissent.

Judgment reversed, without costs, habeas corpus proceeding converted to a declaratory judgment action and judgment granted in accordance with the opinion herein. Opinion by Judge Halligan. Judges Garcia, Singas and Cannataro concur. Chief Judge Wilson dissents in an opinion, in which Judge Troutman concurs. Judge Rivera dissents, joins Sections I, II (A), III and V of the dissenting opinion, and further agrees that the majority's construction renders language in CPL 510.10 (4) (g) superfluous.

Decided June 17, 2025