| Cortez v Kapoor |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 05497 [242 AD3d 824] |
| October 8, 2025 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| Janet Cortez, Appellant, v Seema Kapoor, Respondent. |
William Pager, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant.
Nancy L. Isserlis (The Zweig Law Firm, P.C., Cedarhurst, NY [Jonah S. Zweig], of counsel), for respondent.
Insurance
- No-Fault Automobile Insurance
- Serious Injury
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated March 8, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The defendant moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the accident. In an order dated March 8, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the motion. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine, her left shoulder, and her left knee under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208 [2011]).
We need not reach the parties' remaining contentions in light of our determination.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the accident. Dillon, J.P., Christopher, Wan and Hom, JJ., concur.