| Matter of JW |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 25048 [86 Misc 3d 764] |
| February 25, 2025 |
| Roper, J. |
| Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected through Wednesday, August 20, 2025 |
| In the Matter of JW, Petitioner, for Leave to Change Name and Change Sex Designation. |
Names - Change of Name - Petition to Change Name and Sex Designation - Sua Sponte Sealing of Court Records
Records
- Sealing of Records
- Petition to Change Name and Sex Designation
- Sua Sponte Sealing
JW, petitioner pro se.
This honorable court decides and orders sua sponte, upon application of petitioner JW identified as non-binary seeking declaratory judgment for name change and sex designation to{**86 Misc 3d at 765} X, pursuant to Civil Rights Law §§ 64-a and 67-b to seal court records is hereby under separate sealed order granted.
Herein, petitioner seeks a change of name and sex designation change to X to coincide with their non-binary identification, in one of the very limited matters in which this court sits as a court of equity pursuant to the 2021 Gender Recognition Act (L 2021, ch 158), amending Civil Rights Law article 6 and enacting Civil Rights Law article 6-A. In sitting as a court of equity in such ex parte petition for declaratory judgment " 'the court may grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or not demanded, imposing such terms as may be just' " (Piccirilli v Benjamin, 226 AD3d 1233, 1238 [3d Dept 2024], citing State of New York v Barone, 74 NY2d 332 [1989], quoting CPLR 3017 [a]). There are broader considerations of the underpinning legislative intent and history beyond the text of the black letter law in decision-making of such declaratory judgments in equity. Herein, the issue before this court is whether within its powers in equity the court may sua sponte seal court records of a change of name and sex designation pursuant to NY Civil Rights Law §§ 64-a and 67-b where petitioner does not seek the prayer of relief to seal. This is distinguished from the recently decided matter in which the issue presented was as to the unintended legislative internal inconsistency of the "totality of the circumstances" test pursuant to NY Civil Rights Law § 64-a as applied to a Transgender person who requests sealing (Matter of KA, 85 Misc 3d 1210[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50128[U], *1 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2025]). This court is sensitive to not intend to patronize, to not relegate to victimhood nor to detract from the outward Pride of who they are as Transgender people. However, as a court of equity, this court has "the power to dispose of all matters at issue and to grant complete relief in accordance with the equities of the case" (Piccirilli at 1237).
To grant full relief here, even where not demanded, requires comprehensive consideration of grave matters of societal public safety protections to petitioner, not merely confined to this court's geographical jurisdiction. Rather, this petition is indelible in perpetuity for all to see not merely in Brooklyn, New York City, but extending nationally as well as [*2]globally. Petitioner's safety in Brooklyn does not necessarily extend to wherever the Transgender person's life may take them in the future. This is indeed a significant life altering change for a member of a community that faces unfortunate consequential{**86 Misc 3d at 766} public ridicule, discrimination and hate crimes.[FN1] Similarly to de jure decree that a Black slave is 3/5 of a human being does not make it factually so, likewise, the de jure decree or edict of the nonexistence of Transgender people does not make it factually so. However, such a de jure decree indeed further bolsters the need for public safety protections of that denied demographic. Regardless of the discriminatory de jure edict proclaiming the nonexistence of Transgender people, a hate crime against a Transgender person, like any other crime, is against The People. NY Civil Rights Law § 67 statutorily establishes the sex designation X, which is not universally accepted and actually scorned and reviled in some sectors of society here and abroad. It may be argued that sealing is contrary to a proud Transgender, non-binary, or gender nonconforming person's intent. Historically, the Interracial demographic has statutorily been defined to apply exclusively to Black and White mixed blood pursuant to overruled miscegenation laws, which now have freedom of choice of racial classification without criminal recrimination (see Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 2 [1967]). Prior to the landmark case, the de jure one-drop rule[FN2] statutorily mandated the Interracial to be classified as the Black demographic even though defied by immutable characteristics. Once overturned, a non-Black appearing Interracial with no Black characteristics may choose to openly and proudly publicly choose to self-identify as such. Similarly, the Transgender, non-binary or gender nonconforming person may also choose to live openly and proudly and publicly choose to self-identify as such. Therefore, perhaps in choosing the X gender marker in and of itself is intended to be open and proud. Accordingly, this intent to not choose to seal is an extension and reaffirmation of their proud identification. However, this court in equity is tasked with the holistic implications of its decision upon petitioner, even where, as here, sealing of the court records is not being demanded.
For the foregoing reasons, this court, sitting in equity, notwithstanding that the relief of sealing was not prayed for relief, in the best interest, and what is just, and right, and good for petitioner JW's change of name and change of sex{**86 Misc 3d at 767} designation, pursuant to Civil Rights Law §§ 64-a and 67-b, the court records attendant thereto are hereby ordered sealed, sua sponte.