Constitutional Law - Right to Bear Arms - Prohibited Possession of Billy Clubs and Metal Knuckles

Crimes - Right to Speedy Trial - Declaration of Readiness - CPL 30.30 (5-a) Certification - Subsequent Dismissal of Facially Insufficient Count

The Legal Aid Society (Colin Cowperthwaite and Kissa Broadie of counsel) for defendant.

Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney (Sam Arno of counsel), for the People.

In his omnibus motion,^[FN1] defendant Saladin Taylor moves to dismiss the fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon counts of the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient and duplicitous, and otherwise in violation of the Second Amendment. He also argues that a vendor-license violation charged under Administrative Code of the City of New York § 20-453 is facially insufficient, and that the entire instrument must be dismissed on CPL 30.30 speedy trial grounds due to the insufficiency of all the charges. In the alternative, he asks for suppression, pretrial hearings, and other relief. [*2]

The People generally oppose, except that they acknowledge that count 2, which charges the vendor-license violation, is facially insufficient. They ask that it be dismissed. At the direction of the court, the People also filed a surreply.

As set forth below, count 2 is dismissed, but the remaining counts survive, and Huntley/Dunaway/Mapp hearings are ordered.

Because the parties are the primary audience, this decision assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

Duplicity/Facial Sufficiency/Second Amendment

In the bill of particulars accompanying their surreply, the People have clarified that the five charges of fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon (Penal Law § 265.01 [1]) correspond to the two "expandable batons" and three sets of "metal knuckles." (People's surreply at 3.) So while Taylor's concerns about duplicity were well-founded, the bill of particulars—which he specifically requested in his omnibus motion—provides him with the certainty and specificity lacking in the{**87 Misc 3d at 852} original accusatory instrument, rendering that issue academic. (See People v Elliott, 41 Misc 3d 1228[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51869[U], *4 [Crim Ct, NY County 2013, Statsinger, J.] [observing that a bill of particulars can cure a duplicity defect]; cf. People v Davis, 72 NY2d 32, 38-39 [1988] [concluding that bill of particulars submitted in response to a defense request cured an indictment's duplicity problem].)

Taylor's weapon-count challenges to facial sufficiency are otherwise limited to the daggers, pepper spray, knives, and tasers, not the batons and alleged metal knuckles. (See defense's mot at 8-11; defense's reply at 2-7.) Regardless, the factual allegations of the accusatory instrument appear sufficient as to the batons and knuckles. (See People v Ocasio, 28 NY3d 178, 181-184 [2016] [addressing billy clubs]; People v Aragon, 28 NY3d 125, 129-130 [2016] [metal knuckles].)

At the same time, however, the People concede that the Administrative Code § 20-453 count is insufficient. Their response brief includes an application to dismiss that count. That application is granted and count 2 of the accusatory instrument is dismissed.

Finally, Taylor raises a constitutional challenge to the restrictions on possessing billy clubs and metal knuckles found in section 265.01 (1), contending that those prohibitions do not pass muster under the Second Amendment and recent United States Supreme Court decisions clarifying the Amendment's reach.^[FN2] (See e.g. United States v Rahimi, 602 US 680 [2024]; New York State [*3]Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen, 597 US 1 [2022].) Taylor's constitutional challenge does not succeed, for substantially the same reasons set out by the Court of Appeals of Michigan in People v Dummer (— NW3d —, 2025 WL 849512, *4-13 [Mich App, Mar. 18, 2025, No. 369752] [denying facial Second Amendment challenge to metal knuckles because, in part, "brass knuckles are dangerous and unusual weapons that have not, from 1791 through the post-Civil War era, played a role in the defense of self or others"]), and California's Ninth {**87 Misc 3d at 853}Circuit opening brief in Fouts v Bonta (9th Cir Case No. 24-1039 [May 8, 2024] [addressing billy clubs]).^[FN3]

In sum, count 2 is dismissed on the People's application. The remaining counts survive.

Speedy Trial Dismissal Premised on CPL 30.30 (5-a)

Taylor also argues that the invalidity of the section 20-453 count means that the People could not have validly declared ready for trial on February 18 and 22, thereby requiring dismissal of the accusatory instrument under CPL 30.30. Although the People certified on both occasions that all counts of the accusatory instrument were sufficient, as is required by CPL 30.30 (5-a), the People now concede that the Administrative Code charge was not facially sufficient; and, in Taylor's view, this means that the People were never ready, and the speedy trial section 30.30 clock continued running.

As of right now, the decisional appellate law on this topic appears to hold that (1) a failure to file the section 30.30 (5-a) certification prevents the People from declaring ready (see People v Hernandez, 84 Misc 3d 10, 12-13 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2024]), but (2) a section 30.30 (5-a) certification that is undermined by the subsequent dismissal of a count does not (see People v Williams, 83 Misc 3d 21, 23 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]). Williams is currently before the Court of Appeals, which will presumably settle (2) for good at some point next term. But Williams has not yet been fully briefed or calendared for argument, and neither party asks for this case to be held for the Court's decision in Williams. At least as of the time of [*4]writing, Williams stands as the primary appellate authority on inaccurate section 30.30 (5-a) statements, and it undermines Taylor's position.

Taylor contends that Williams does not control because it conflicts with the Appellate Term, First Department's decision in People v Powell (74 Misc 3d 50 [App Term, 1st Dept 2022]). But Powell dealt with the doctrine of partial readiness in the{**87 Misc 3d at 854} context of conversion, not facial insufficiency. (See Powell, 74 Misc 3d at 51 [addressing "a forcible touching count which was not converted until December 3, 2015"].) Also, much of the discussion in Powell arose in the context of whether section 30.30 (5-a) should apply retroactively. In other words, the Appellate Term was not actually addressing the substance of the statute, but was instead determining whether the new section 30.30 (5-a) should apply to cases pending at the time of its enactment.^[FN4]

Williams, by contrast, addressed a section 30.30 (5-a) declaration that was undermined by the subsequent dismissal of a count on insufficiency grounds, holding that the filing of a 5-a declaration is all that is required for the People to declare ready; "the [L]egislature did not provide for sanctions or any consequence in the event the . . . certification was inaccurate." (Williams, 83 Misc 3d at 23.) Thus, even assuming that the relevant discussion in Powell is not dicta, Powell does not appear to directly conflict with Williams.

Taylor asserts that Williams is no barrier to the partial-readiness-abrogation issue discussed above, and instead resolved only whether an inaccurate section 30.30 (5-a) statement should lead to dismissal as a "direct" sanction. But he does not persuasively explain why the indirect sanction he proposes—an inaccurate section 30.30 (5-a) statement implicates partial readiness, which the Legislature abolished via the statutory changes to section 30.30, so an inaccurate section 30.30 (5-a) statement is really a declaration of partial readiness, which the People can no longer do, thus the speedy trial clock never stops and the case is dismissed—is a logical outcome if the direct sanction that Williams rejected is not in play. While unintended consequences are a risk of any statutory overhaul, the Legislature probably would not have intended dismissal to be premised on partial-readiness-abrogation grounds if dismissal could not be premised directly on an inaccurate 5-a statement itself. Williams was clear on that point: the Legislature did not provide for "sanctions or any consequence" for an inaccurate certification, language that {**87 Misc 3d at 855}appears to put out of reach both direct and indirect paths to dismissal. (Id.; cf. Cruz v TD Bank, N.A., 22 NY3d 61, 72 [2013] [observing that legislative bodies do not "hide elephants in mouseholes"].)

Taylor responds that rejecting his position would, in effect, "render Williams irrevocably in conflict with the Legislature's clear abrogation of the partial readiness doctrine and, therefore, compel a determination that Williams was wrongly decided," because otherwise a section 30.30 (5-a) [*5]statement would be essentially toothless. (Defense's mot at 18.) Of course, Williams may be wrongly decided, and many of the arguments now raised in the Court of Appeals echo Taylor's concerns.^[FN5] And Taylor's other arguments regarding partial readiness may be well-suited for an institutional amicus brief before the Court of Appeals. But as of right now, his attempt to distinguish Williams is unpersuasive, and overturning Williams is the responsibility of the Court of Appeals. So regardless of whether Williams is technically binding, this court chooses to follow it here.

Accordingly, Taylor's speedy trial section 30.30 challenge is denied. He is free to move for renewal or reargument if Williams goes his way in the Court of Appeals.

Hearings

Mapp/Dunaway/Huntley hearings are ordered. Any voluntariness, preclusion, or Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia issues are referred to the trial court. All other requests are denied, and additional pretrial motions are not authorized absent a showing of good cause.

For the reasons set forth above, count 2 is dismissed, but all other counts survive, and Mapp/Dunaway/Huntley hearings are ordered.