Claimant American Transit Insurance Company, as Subrogee of Shamina Ahmed and Mohammad Taiab, commenced this action seeking confirmation of an arbitration award against the State of New York and to enter judgment thereon in the amount of $38,616.82. Defendant answered and asserted several affirmative defenses. Claimant now moves for summary judgment. Defendant opposes the motion and cross-moves to dismiss the claim as untimely. Claimant opposes defendant's cross-motion.

On July 2, 2025, the Court sent a letter to the parties requesting further briefing on the question of whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this claim under Court of Claims Act § 9 (4) or any other subsection thereof. Both parties submitted papers in response to the Court's request. Claimant argues that, because it seeks a money judgment against defendant, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over the claim. Defendant contends that confirmation of an arbitration award is an equitable determination and, as such, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction insofar as its reach extends only to New York State and certain public authorities as defendants (see NY Const, art VI, § 9; Court of Claims Act § 9). The Court of Claims has subject matter jurisdiction over claims "[t]o render judgment in favor of the claimant or the [S]tate for such sum as should be paid by or to the [S]tate" (Court of Claims Act § 9 [4]). In contrast, the Court has "no jurisdiction to grant strictly equitable relief" (Psaty v Duryea, 306 NY 413, 416-417 [1954]; accord Ozanam Hall of Queens Nursing Home v State of New York, 241 AD2d 670, 671 [3d Dept 1997]). Nevertheless, the Court of Claims Act "necessarily implies the right to afford equitable relief where the same may be incidental to a claim for a money judgment" (Psaty, 306 NY at 417 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]) and Supreme Court may grant monetary relief in an action against the State where it "is incidental to an entitlement to equitable relief" (White v State of New York, 161 Misc 2d 938, 941 [Ct Cl 1994], citing Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 237 [1988]). Therefore, to determine if the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, the "threshold question . . . is whether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim" (Buonanotte v New York State Off. of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 60 AD3d 1142, 1143 [3d Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 12 NY3d 712 [2009]; see City of New York v State of New York, 46 AD3d 1168, 1169 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 705 [2008]). The parties may not waive lack of subject matter jurisdiction and it "may be raised at any stage of the action" (Matter of Charter v Allen, 206 AD3d 994, 995 [2d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted]). Furthermore, the Court may, sua sponte, " 'at any time, when its attention is called to the facts, refuse to proceed further and dismiss the action' " (Matter of Fry v Village of Tarrytown, 89 NY2d 714, 718 [1997], quoting Robinson v Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 112 NY 315, 324 [1889]).

Here, the facts present a close question as to whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. On the one hand, claimant ultimately seeks entry of a money judgment against the State, and the equitable relief sought (confirmation of the arbitration award) could be viewed as incidental thereto. On the other hand, claimant must receive confirmation of the arbitration award before it can obtain a monetary judgment, and therefore the monetary award may be incidental to the equitable one. Whether a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award grants primarily equitable or monetary relief appears to be a question of first impression.

Although close, the Court agrees with defendant's position that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction for three reasons. First, under CPLR article 75—which governs proceedings to confirm arbitration awards—the confirmation of the award must come before judgment is entered. CPLR 7510 provides that "[t]he court shall confirm an award upon application of a party made within one year after its delivery to them." Then, "[a] judgment shall be entered upon confirmation of an award" (CPLR 7514). Since monetary relief cannot be granted until after the equitable relief has been granted, the primary relief sought must be the equitable confirmation of the arbitration award. Second, the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over similar proceedings involving arbitration including proceedings to challenge or vacate an arbitration award (see Stewart v State of New York, UID No. 2012-030-564, *3 [Ct Cl, Scuccimarra, J., Sept. 17, 2012]) and to compel arbitration (see Henderson v State of New York, 40 Misc 3d 638, 641 [Ct Cl 2012], rearg denied 40 Misc 3d 1202(A) [2013]). No authority has been presented to or uncovered by this Court that would suggest confirmation of an arbitration [*2]award should be treated differently. Third, and finally, Supreme Court has entertained proceedings to confirm arbitration awards against the State, albeit in different circumstances than the one presented here (see generally Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn., Inc. [State of New York], 13 AD3d 961 [3d Dept 2004]; Matter of Hall [State of New York (Dept. of Envtl. Conservation)], 235 AD2d 757 [3d Dept 1997]; Matter of Dickinson [State of New York], 188 AD2d 919 [3d Dept 1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 708 [1993]). Taken together, the weight of authority suggests that a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award grants equitable relief and the monetary relief is incidental thereto. Therefore, the Court, sua sponte, dismisses the action because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Claimant's motion and defendant's cross-motion are denied as moot. This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.